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ABSTRACT 
 My dissertation was motivated by a desire to not only gain clarity in Nietzsche’s 
manifold use of the notion of sickness, but also to better understand the ideal of health that runs 
through his writings. Given this goal, I begin by identifying the primary kinds of sickness that 
animate Nietzsche’s critical project. Having identified three types of sickness in his writings, I 
then turn to offering an account of how Nietzsche attempts to address these forms of sickness. 
Finally, having completed the task of understanding health—which forms the three central 
chapters of the dissertation—I conclude by moving to what Nietzsche calls “the great health,” 
which can be understood as moving beyond mere health. 
In chapter one I identify three kinds of sickness—the sickness of bad conscience, the 
sickness of life negation, and the sickness of enervation—which I argue are the central to 
understanding Nietzsche’s critique of morality. According to this diagnosis, people suffer from 
several problems, including pervasive feelings of guilt and self-hatred, a tendency to devalue the 
world and life, and a false sense of human good that results in enervation. Nietzsche’s work can 
be read as an attempt to diagnose, understand, and address these problems. 
 Chapter two begins my analysis of how Nietzsche works to treat the three forms of 
sickness identified in chapter one. I proceed by reconstructing an account of how to treat the first 
form of sickness, that of bad conscience, as well as the pervasive feelings of guilt and self-
punishment that follow. Surveying several tentative ideas Nietzsche offers on how this problem 
might be addressed, I conclude by arguing that the path to a “good conscience” is paved via a 
kind of philosophical therapy, which aims to reorient how we look at guilt and failure, thereby 
initiating a psychic transformation. 
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 Chapter three turns to an examination of how to address the problem of suffering and 
meaninglessness, offering an account of how a person might learn to love life, despite what is 
strange, questionable, and terrible. I argue that with §334 of The Gay Science, Nietzsche offers a 
model of how a person might learn to love life. First, a person must work to understand life; 
then, through good will, patience, and openness to life, she becomes used to it; and finally, 
enchanted by life, she comes to love life for what it is. 
 Chapter four turns to Nietzsche’s attempt to address the problem of enervation. The 
problem lies with a weakened will, which is attributed to the goal of eliminating suffering, as 
well as other values Nietzsche associates with modernity. The solution Nietzsche offers can be 
understood as an attempt to strengthen the will. Through his discussion of the will to power, 
which, following Reginster, can be understood as a will to overcome resistances, Nietzsche can 
be understood as advocating the need for appropriate forms of resistance and challenge in a 
person’s life.  
 I conclude by examining what Nietzsche calls “the great health”, which he describes as 
“the ideal of a human, superhuman well-being” (GS 382). Health can be understood as the 
process whereby a person continuously works to eliminate the negative factors that undermine 
health. Nietzsche also recognizes a further process beyond mere health, which he calls “the great 
health.” This great health can be understood as the ongoing development of the positive elements 
of health. Among the notions that Nietzsche intimates are part of great health, I focus on four 
such elements: overflowing abundance, cheerfulness and laughter, living experimentally, and 
forgetting. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE PROBLEM OF SICKNESS 
1.1 Introduction 
"What is it that I in particular find utterly unbearable?" Nietzsche asks. "That something 
deformed comes near me; that I should have to smell the entrails of a deformed soul!" (GM I.12). 
Nietzsche’s rhetoric may surprise us here. But as he continues, he expresses his basic worry: "the 
reduction and equalization of the European human conceals our greatest danger" (ibid). 
Nietzsche makes it clear that there is something deeply troubling about both modern humanity as 
it is presently constituted, and the direction in which he sees it headed. Human beings are beset 
by several serious problems, including pervasive feelings of guilt and self-hatred, a tendency to 
devalue the world and life, and a false sense of human good that results in enervation. 
Nietzsche’s work can be read as an attempt to uncover, understand, and remedy the situation. 
Even a cursory reading of Nietzsche’s writings reveals great concern and alarm about 
humanity’s health. He alternately describes human beings as unhealthy, sick, degenerate, 
declining, deformed, decadent, out of sorts, and failed.
1
 Nietzsche reiterated the point that the 
majority of human beings are sick time and time again.
2
 Sickness, Nietzsche claims, has become 
part of humanity’s nature, leading him to proclaim that “man is the sick animal” (GM III.13). 
This will undoubtedly surprise us, as Nietzsche surely intends. Nietzsche expresses genuine 
                                                     
1
 Nietzsche recognized all too clearly the problem of sickness. In fact, as he frequently alerts us, he himself had been 
sick. The nature of Nietzsche’s sicknesses is a subject unto itself. His many physical ailments are well-documented, 
as are the various spiritual sicknesses he suffered, e.g., the dominating influence of Schopenhauer, Wagner, and 
pessimism. Each of these sicknesses was, as Nietzsche recognized, to his benefit, for having overcome his 
sicknesses, he is able to offer an account of sickness as one who has experienced it, fought the deepest despair, and 
prevailed. Accordingly, in possession of the perspectives of both the sick and the healthy, Nietzsche claims to be in 
a unique position to diagnose this problem (EH I.1). However, one might challenge Nietzsche’s supposedly 
privileged position on understanding sickness, as his experiences, e.g., the spiritual sickness of being dominated by 
Schopenhauer and Wagner, were not the same kinds of sickness that the majority of people have experienced. 
2
 See GM III.1.  Nietzsche notes that “[t]he European distinguishes himself with morality because he has become a 
sick, sickly, maimed animal” (GS 352). Similarly, Nietzsche speaks of “the entire herd of the deformed, out of 
sorts, short-changed, failed, those of every kind who suffer from themselves” (GM III.13). Or, as 
Nietzsche says elsewhere: “comparatively speaking, humans are the biggest failures, the sickliest 
animals who have strayed the most dangerously far from their instincts” (A 14). 
[2] 
 
alarm, and through his writings wishes to emotionally affect and alarm us, and therein to get us 
to genuinely reflect on our condition.  
The preface to the Genealogy articulates the basic nature of Nietzsche’s project, as well 
as the primary concern underlying his investigations. This project necessitates the investigation 
of the multifarious conditions in which what we might call Platonic-Christian morality has 
developed.
3
 Nietzsche claims that this is knowledge we have hitherto lacked, because the origin 
and value of our values has never been questioned. Nietzsche considers imperative the need to 
question both morality and our values.
4
  
Nietzsche then expresses a worry that the values we have traditionally held to be good 
might be “a danger, a temptation, a poison, a narcotic through which perhaps the present were 
living at the expense of the future” (GM P.6). Nietzsche expresses the concern that Platonic-
Christian morality—taken as unquestionably good—might be hindering us, if not positively 
harming us.
5
 Nietzsche’s expectation is that a proper understanding of Platonic-Christian 
morality—including its aims, its methods, and its effects—is necessary to overcome the sickness 
that it represents. Prior to any effective treatment, we must understand the nature of the sickness. 
Nietzsche investigates in what ways human beings are sick, the extent of the sickness, and what 
is causing the sickness. Only once these questions have been answered—thereby providing a 
                                                     
3
 Nietzsche recognizes that there have been many moralities, but his target is clearly directed at what we 
might call Platonic-Christian morality, a notion that will become clearer over the course of this chapter. A 
contrasting delineation of the scope of Nietzsche’s critique can be found in Leiter, who holds that 
Nietzsche’s target is “morality in the pejorative sense”, which encompasses a broader scope than 
Christian, Kantian, or utilitarian morality. See Leiter, 2002, chapter 3. Leiter admits that Nietzsche most 
frequently attacks these targets, but that there are particular descriptive and normative components that 
Nietzsche directs his critique against. Leiter argues that Nietzsche’s critique is primarily directed against 
any morality that holds individuals have free will, that the self is transparent, and individuals are all 
sufficiently similar to warrant one moral code. Each of these theses can be ultimately attributed to the 
Platonic-Christian conception of human beings. Accordingly, when I speak of morality I will have in mind 
Platonic-Christian morality, which includes the values of modernity. 
4
 See GS 345, where Nietzsche notes that “no one until now has examined the value of that most famous 
of all medicines called morality; and for that, one must begin by questioning it for once.” 
5
 Nietzsche asks whether “morality would be to blame if a highest power and splendor of the human type 
… were never attained?” (GM P.6).  
[3] 
 
better understanding sickness—can the other part of the project begin: working to treat and 
overcome sickness.  
Nietzsche’s investigations uncover not just one type of sickness, but rather three different 
types of sickness that have affected humanity. Specifically, I argue that Nietzsche diagnoses the 
following types of sickness: (1) the sickness of bad conscience, which leads to the devaluation of 
the human, pervasive feelings of guilt, and the need for and legitimization of self-punishment; 
(2) the sickness of life-negation, which is precipitated by the problem of suffering, and leads to 
the devaluation of life and the world in favor of a world beyond; and finally, (3) the sickness of 
enervation, which is characterized by a weakened will, leaving a person who aims at small, 
easily attainable goals like pleasure, ease, and comfort, and not willing to become something 
greater. 
With the question of sickness before us, I proceed in this chapter as follows: I begin with 
some preliminary remarks surveying some of the ways Nietzsche talks about sickness more 
generally. In section 1.3 I turn to the first of the three main forms of sickness Nietzsche 
diagnoses, the sickness of bad conscience, where I offer an account of the nature of this form of 
sickness. Section 1.4 continues in the same vein, offering an account of the sickness of life 
negation. The final form of sickness, the sickness of enervation, is the subject of section 1.5. I 
conclude by offering some summary remarks on the development of the three main types of 
sickness, address the positive aspect of sickness, and then briefly give an overview of the topics I 
will examine in chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
  
[4] 
 
1.2 Preliminaries 
Nietzsche, undoubtedly aiming to get our attention, refers to “the majority of mortals” as 
“the physiologically failed and out of sorts” (GM III.1). This is a provocative charge, one which 
will be met with incredulity. Elsewhere Nietzsche notes not just the ubiquity of sickness, but its 
normality (GM III.14). Given these claims, there are many questions that need to be answered 
about the how to understand the various forms of sickness, how they might related, and what 
causes them. With respect to the three forms of sickness I have identified in Nietzsche’s works, 
those questions will be answered below in sections 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5. At the same time, there are 
some more general themes and issues that warrant a brief survey, helping to situate some of 
Nietzsche’s concerns with respect to sickness. 
First and foremost, understanding sickness in Nietzsche’s writings is invariably 
complicated by the fact that Nietzsche uses the term “sickness” to refer to many different kinds 
of sickness. As I will argue, there are three primary forms of sickness about which he is 
particularly concerned: the sickness of bad conscience, the sickness of life-negation, and the 
sickness of enervation. However, Nietzsche often uses the term “sickness” metaphorically too; 
and sometimes he uses “sickness” to refer to physiological sickness.  
Physiological sickness is not Nietzsche’s primary concern, though given his experience 
with various forms of illness—from debilitating migraines to intense stomach problems—his life 
is an interesting example. There is no doubt that Nietzsche knew physiological sickness all too 
well. When he talks about the illnesses he experienced, as he does at length in the 1886 prefaces 
to Human All Too Human and The Gay Science, he rarely addresses his ailments with any detail.
6
 
                                                     
6
 That is reserved for his letters, as the index of Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche shows. To take one evocative 
example from a September 1881 letter to Overbeck, Nietzsche writes, “I am desperate. Pain is vanquishing my life 
and my will. What months, what a summer I have had! My physical agonies were as many and various as the 
changes I have seen in the sky. In every cloud there is some form of electric charge which grips me suddenly and 
[5] 
 
Rather, he talks about his subsequent periods of recovery, his gratefulness for recovery, how 
sickness acted as a stimulus, and the bright future that he saw ahead. Nietzsche seems to have 
seen a connection between his physical ailments and his intellectual or spiritual ailments. I 
believe it is no coincidence that during the time of some of his more severe physical ailments 
that he began to turn away from the dominating influence of Schopenhauer and Wagner, both of 
whom constituted for Nietzsche a kind of spiritual sickness.
7
 
While providing a useful example in various ways, Nietzsche’s experiences of his 
physical and psychological illnesses are not representative of all people. Nonetheless, his 
meditations in the prefaces to Human All Too Human and The Gay Science raise a question 
worth pondering: what is it people think about when ill? Recovery, the return of health, the 
means of overcoming or alleviating the illness—all of these things capture a person’s mind when 
ill. Depending on the severity of the illness, people may reflect on their pain and suffering, as 
well as their mortality. People can become optimistic, seeing something positive about the 
prospects of pain or death. On the other hand, people can also become pessimistic, lamenting 
their situation, seeing something unfair about their suffering. Almost invariably people begin to 
reflect on their lives and the meaning of their suffering.   
Arthur Danto offers a helpful remark that shows the impact that physiological sickness 
and suffering can play in a person’s life. He distinguishes two kinds of suffering: (1) what he 
calls extensional suffering, which is the purely physiological suffering that humans undergo, e.g., 
the physical pain that a person experiences as cancer ravages her body; and (2) what he calls 
intensional suffering, i.e., the psychological suffering that arises from a person’s attempts to 
                                                                                                                                                                           
reduces me to complete misery. Five times I have called for Doctor Death, and yesterday I had hoped it was the 
end—in vain” (179). The contrast with his expressions of recovery, as documented in the prefaces to HH and GS, 
are striking. 
7
 See the preface to HH, especially sections 1, 4-7. Cf., EH HH 1, 4-5. 
[6] 
 
come to terms with the ways she suffers. Danto says that what he calls intensional suffering 
consists in an interpretation of what he calls extensional suffering. He continues:  
“The main sufferings human beings have been subject to throughout history are due to 
certain interpretive responses to the fact of extensional suffering. It is not clear that 
Nietzsche believes he can deal with extensional suffering. But he can deal with 
intensional suffering, thus helping reduce, often by a significant factor, the total suffering 
in the world. For while extensional suffering is bad enough, often it is many times 
compounded by our interpretations of it, themselves often far worse than the disorder 
itself.”8  
 
Why might this be so? As Nietzsche argues, and I think quite correctly, people seek some kind of 
explanation for why they are sick and suffering. And failing to find a satisfactory answer, or 
arriving at an incorrect answer, they increase their suffering. Nietzsche recognized that how we 
respond to physiological sickness plays a significant role in our general psychological well-
being. Thus we should keep in mind that while physiological sickness is not Nietzsche’s primary 
interest, it is never far from his purview. In fact, part of his project is to see what can be done to 
prevent the harmful and irrational interpretations people have of their illnesses.
9
  
That people experience sickness and pain is a brute fact about human existence; as such, 
suffering registers for many as a question mark against existence. Pain and sickness cause 
suffering, giving rise to a kind of existential sickness, a fact which necessitates some kind of 
explanation, lest the meaninglessness further infect people. For example, the harrowing cries of 
                                                     
8
 Danto, “Some Remarks on The Genealogy of Morals”, in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, ed. Schacht, 1994. 
9
 “To calm the imagination of the invalid, so that at least he should not, as hitherto, have to suffer more from 
thinking about his illness than from the illness itself—that, I think, would be something! It would be a great deal! Do 
you now understand our task?” (D 54)  
[7] 
 
pain and the omnipresent stench of death during the bubonic plague in Europe in the middle of 
the fourteenth-century: for what reason, man asked, do we suffer so? Sickness and the suffering 
necessitate some kind of response: though we often attempt to do so, we cannot simply ignore 
this fact. My psychological well-being demands some kind of account of why the world is filled 
with sickness and suffering, to say nothing of why I specifically suffer. As Nietzsche claims, any 
kind of meaning at all, even a meaning that carries with it even greater suffering, is better than no 
meaning at all. One aspect of Nietzsche’s project will be to show that this is not a good response, 
let alone the only effective response to the problem of suffering.  
*** 
Turning to what it is that causes sickness, Nietzsche offers a number of speculative 
answers about how humanity has become sick. Sometimes Nietzsche seems to take sickness as a 
simple fact of life. Nietzsche also suggests that the development of society and the new 
constraints placed upon humanity contributed to humanity’s sickness by creating a conflict 
between our animal nature and our social nature. Oftentimes Nietzsche identifies morality—most 
notably Platonic and Christian morality
10—to be the causes of humanity’s sickness. We should 
thus not expect one simple answer, but rather different explanations for different kinds of 
sickness, as I will attempt to show in sections 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5.  
At the heart of the matter, Nietzsche discerns in human beings a fundamental tension in 
their being, pushing and pulling us in different directions. We vaguely feel a kind of 
                                                     
10
 This claim fits with one of the arguments Nietzsche offers against morality. Nietzsche’s critique of morality 
consists of a number of arguments directed at various aspects of Platonic-Christian morality, including (1) the fact 
morality stultifies higher humanity and excellence with demands that are contrary to human nature; (2) the fact that 
morality rests upon mistaken presuppositions, including erroneous conceptions about human agency and ontological 
errors about values; and (3) the immorality of morality, which has suspect motives and sets the good of the group 
against the individual. Turning to the three primary sicknesses I argue Nietzsche is concerned with, he explicitly 
states that the Greeks were able to keep one form of sickness, the sickness of bad conscience, at bay. The other two 
forms of sickness seem to be absent in Greek culture, at least according to Nietzsche’s analysis. This suggests that 
the types of sickness he diagnoses ultimately owe their origins to Platonism and Christianity. 
[8] 
 
incompleteness that both wants to be complete, but is at the same time is spurred by this 
incompleteness. This quality is at once the source of much discomfort and sickness, but also one 
of the sources of our potential. This is a point that must not be overlooked, for Nietzsche spoke 
often of the value of sickness, specifically that, for some people, it could be a spur to a higher 
health. (I return to this point below.) 
When reflecting on humanity, Nietzsche speaks of “the unsatisfied, unsatiated one … the 
one yet unconquered, the eternally future one who no longer finds any rest from his own pressing 
energy, so that his future digs inexorably like a spur into the flesh of every present” (GM III.13). 
The human condition seems to be such that, in virtue of having risen above our basic animality, 
human beings are a conflicted, sick animal. Not only do the demands of our animality conflict 
with the demands of society, but Nietzsche contends that, no longer guided by our animal 
instincts, we have entrusted ourselves to our consciousness, which is believes is still young and 
prone to mistakes, and thus not the best guide (GS 11); we have developed desires that we are 
often unable to satisfy; we have become attuned to life beyond the present, continually haunted 
by the past, and by the uncertainty of the future. Elsewhere, Nietzsche refers to human beings as 
“the undetermined animal” (BGE 62).11 All of these characteristics of our being point to the 
unique position human beings are in, full of potential, but also experiencing self-torment which 
routinely undermines our ability to become something more.
12
  
We can imagine Nietzsche also saying that human beings are future-directed animals. As 
a valuing, future-directed being, we can understand the fact that, within a recalcitrant world, we 
are creatures who are often unsatisfied. In effect, the many developments, choices, experiments, 
                                                     
11
 Relevant to his assessment of human beings, Nietzsche remarks in full, that “with humans as with every other 
type of animal, there is a surplus of failures and degenerates, of the diseased and infirm, of those who necessarily 
suffer. Even with humans, successful cases are always the exception and, since humans are the still undetermined 
animals, the infrequent exception” (BGE 62). 
12
 Cf., GM II.16. 
[9] 
 
and successes and failures that have made man into the interesting animal he is, pregnant with 
possibilities, have also brought the potential for ever greater challenges, new uncertainties, new 
desires that cannot be satisfied, and with these, new forms of suffering. For these reasons 
Nietzsche holds that such an animal could not help but be so deeply sick and psychologically 
tortured. When understood in this way, we should not be surprised that human beings are sick 
animals.
13
 
*** 
In connection with talk about what human beings are, as well as how Nietzsche diagnoses 
the majority of human beings as sick, there is a worry that must be mentioned, though it will only 
be fully addressed over the course of the chapter. The worry is that Nietzsche’s diagnosis of 
sickness, instead of capturing an objective problem, simply latches on to a particular social 
construct that was emerging in the nineteenth century to denigrate what he does not like. If 
Nietzsche’s critique is just an expression of his preferences, then his critique would have little to 
no force.
14
 There is the worry that Nietzsche has not only drawn on pre-existing social 
constructions of sickness, but has also helped enable its social construction. The question, then, 
is whether Nietzsche is guilty of this charge or is engaged in a project that avoids this criticism. 
One of the goals of this chapter, as well as those that follow, is to show that Nietzsche is 
offering an objective account of the nature of sickness and health. That is to say, he will show 
that sickness and health are not dependent on our values and beliefs, but rather that they are 
                                                     
13
 “For man is sicker, more unsure, more changing, more undetermined than any other animal, of this there is no 
doubt—he is the sick animal” (GM III.13). 
14
 For example, in History of Madness, Foucault argued that whereas mental illness was accepted in the Middle 
Ages, once it became medicalized during the Enlightenment, madmen (formerly mystics or village idiots) became 
subjects that had to be removed from society and treated. The issue that Foucault illuminated was that the notion of a 
madman was itself a social construction. That is to say, without the institution of a mental asylum, as well as the 
narrative that creates the madman, there would not be madmen as we know them today. William Schroeder voiced 
this general criticism to me, and his treatment of Foucault in his Continental Philosophy: A Critical Approach 
helped to clarify the basic point Foucault was making in works like History of Madness, The Birth of the Clinic, and 
Discipline and Punishment on the social construction of various social distinctions. 
[10] 
 
grounded in our nature as human beings. Thus one aim will be to show that Nietzsche’s notions 
of sickness are rooted in something real and do not fall prey to the criticism that sickness is 
merely a social construct. Among the various forms of sickness Nietzsche diagnoses, I will seek 
to show that there is an underlying physiological basis, which can be understood as objectively 
grounding the various forms of sickness. 
With this in mind we should consider that Nietzsche was aware of the ways in which 
various ideas were socially constructed (of course this would not necessarily make him immune 
to misusing them). Furthermore, Nietzsche can be understood as criticizing the dominant 
standards of health and sickness in western civilization. For example, Nietzsche levels his 
criticisms against how health and sickness were conceived within the Platonic-Christian 
tradition, offering pointed criticism of the ways it “improves” us.15 While criticism was at the 
fore, Nietzsche’s project was more than just polemics, it was diagnostic. After his diagnostic 
work he could move on to his positive project, a project that sought to help us overcome what 
had gone wrong with human well-being. Thus part of Nietzsche’s project is to show what well-
being is for human beings. 
To that end, part and parcel of this diagnostic project were the genealogies Nietzsche 
undertook to uncover the natural development(s) of morality, seeking to show the disjointed 
twists and turns that have brought us the institution of morality as it is today. Thus we should 
keep in mind that while he was prone to hyperbole and might purposely write in hyperbole and 
criticisms, he is working against the dominant institutions that have already decided what it is for 
a person to be good and healthy or evil and sick. While acknowledging that Platonic-Christian 
                                                     
15
 See GM III.21 and TI VII.2, where Nietzsche elaborates on how morality “improves” man. Morality 
“improves” humanity, where “improves” should be understand as meaning “they become weak, they 
become less harmful, they are made ill through the use of pain, injury, hunger, and the depressive affect 
of fear.” This “caricature of a human being” is “sick, miserable, full of malice against himself, hating the 
drive for life, suspicious of everything that was still strong and happy” (TI VII.2). 
[11] 
 
morality has worked for many people, Nietzsche’s project should be understood as trying to set 
right what was flawed and has ultimately hindered humanity. Among those sicknesses that have 
harmed and hindered humanity, I now turn to offering an account of one of the main forms of 
sickness Nietzsche is interested in diagnosing and treating, the sickness of bad conscience. 
1.3 The Sickness of Bad Conscience  
In essay two of the Genealogy Nietzsche turns his attention to “the psychology of the 
conscience”, which he later describes as, “the instinct of cruelty that is turned inwards after it 
cannot discharge itself outwards anymore” (EH GM). Grounded in the repression, redirection, 
and extirpation of the instincts and drives, Nietzsche describes what he calls bad conscience, or 
“the consciousness of guilt” (GM II.4).16 I will argue that the development of bad conscience, 
i.e., consciousness of guilt, is one of the major types of sickness that Nietzsche diagnoses in his 
writings. Nietzsche describes this sickness as “the greatest and most uncanny of sicknesses … 
one from which man has not recovered to this day” (GM II.16).17 At the core of this sickness is 
the fact that man turns against himself. Bad conscience is not simply man turning against himself 
though; rather, he believes this action is both warranted and good, because he sees it as justified 
punishment for his irredeemable guilt. 
Nietzsche’s treatment of guilt, bad conscience, and “related matters” in essay two of the 
Genealogy is one of his most diffuse discussions, which makes painting a clear portrait of bad 
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 There is some debate about whether or not bad conscience and consciousness of guilt are the same thing or 
different. Risse (2001) and Leiter (2002) hold that there is a difference. I agree with Ridley (2005) and Janaway 
(2007), that, while Nietzsche at times seems to make some conceptual differences, the two are the same. Janaway 
offers the best account explaining Nietzsche’s diffuse discussion and the reasons why bad conscience and 
consciousness of guilt are the same. At the same time, I also agree that, while Nietzsche targets the effects of the 
internalization of man, as Janaway and others attest, Nietzsche’s primary target of criticism is bad conscience as 
consciousness of guilt. See also May (1999). 
17
 He goes on to say that “here there is sickness, beyond all doubt, the most terrible sickness that has thus far raged 
in man” (GM II.22). Interestingly, elsewhere Nietzsche says “it is a sickness, bad conscience—this admits of no 
doubt—but a sickness as pregnancy is a sickness” (GM II.19). This points towards the positive aspects of the 
internalization of man, insofar as it made man a deeper, more interesting animal, with a hitherto unseen future before 
him.  
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conscience no easy task. Given the interweaving threads of the second essay, I do not claim to 
present a complete treatment of the many issues it deals with, but instead focus on explicating 
the basic problems that arise with bad conscience.
18
 The goal in this section is to clarify the ways 
in which bad conscience is a sickness; with a clear diagnosis of the issues at hand, this will 
ideally point us towards what might be done to overcome this sickness.  
Within the essay Nietzsche offers two theses, which can be seen to structure the nature of 
bad conscience.
19
 Nietzsche begins by telling us that guilt and conscience have their origin 
“thoroughly and prolongedly drenched in blood” (GM II.6). While this may be difficult to 
accept, especially with our modern sensibilities, people recognized that seeing others suffer and 
making others suffer both felt good; cruelty, Nietzsche claims, is pleasurable. Here we have 
Nietzsche’s first thesis, which he takes to be an empirically justifiable claim: human beings have 
a deep-seated drive to take pleasure in cruelty. 
While Nietzsche had raised the question about the origin of bad conscience in section 4, 
he does not venture an answer until section 16. Prior to his answer he offers a second thesis 
which he calls “the internalizing of man.” This thesis claims that “all instincts that do not 
discharge themselves outwardly turn themselves inwards” (GM II.16). At this point Nietzsche 
owes an explanation for what brings about “the internalizing of man,” because he needs an 
account of why instincts would no longer be able to discharge themselves outwardly. He claims 
that this occurs because of “the pressure of that most fundamental of all changes he ever 
experienced—the change of finding himself enclosed once and for all within the sway of society 
and peace” (ibid).  With this change “all at once all of their instincts were devalued and 
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 For thoughtful and thorough treatments of the many issues from the second essay, see Ridley 1998 and 2005, May 
1999, Risse 2001 and 2005, Leiter 2002, Owen 2007, Janaway 2007, and Hatab 2008. 
19
 Janaway (2007) was crucial for breaking down Nietzsche’s position into two basic theses that combine to create 
his explanation of the origin of bad conscience. See chapter 8 for a concise and thoughtful account of bad 
conscience. 
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‘disconnected’”20; nonetheless, “those old instincts had not all at once ceased to make their 
demands” (ibid). Thus without recourse to any other means of discharging one’s instincts, they 
are turned against the individual.
21
    
 At last Nietzsche explains the origin of bad conscience: “Hostility, cruelty, pleasure in 
persecution, in assault, in change, in destruction—all of that turning itself against the possessors 
of such instincts: that is the origin of ‘bad conscience’” (GM II.16).22 The two theses Nietzsche 
offered are combined to explain bad conscience. In virtue of the facts that (1) human beings take 
pleasure in inflicting cruelty, and (2) under the constraints of civilization, which demands the 
extirpation of this and other instincts, man’s instinctive drive towards cruelty is turned inwards 
back upon himself. Thus we have what Nietzsche characterizes as a sickness “from which man 
has not recovered to this day, the suffering of man from man, from himself” (ibid).  
At this point it appears as if Nietzsche’s explanation of bad conscience is complete: 
human beings are creatures who take pleasure in inflicting cruelty, and, denied other outlets, 
direct this cruelty upon themselves.
23
 This is undoubtedly a kind of sickness, a sickness with us 
still today. But as Leiter and Janaway point out, the internalization of cruelty need not have 
manifest itself in feelings of guilt. This is where the final element of the account that Nietzsche 
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 In the end, “the creature ‘man’ finally learns to be ashamed of all of his instincts” (GM II.7). 
21
 Nietzsche continues by noting that these instincts often “had to seek new and as it were subterranean 
gratifications” (GM II.16). Here one might object that, given the importance of culture and society, there were surely 
other avenues through which one could give vent to those instincts that were denied their usual outlet. Nietzsche has 
even gone so far as to note how the redirection and sublimation of these very instincts are the preconditions for 
civilization and culture. For example, he writes that “almost everything we call ‘higher culture’ is based on the 
spiritualization and deepening of cruelty” (BGE 229). Keeping in mind that Nietzsche is giving an account of the 
period when civilization and culture are first emerging. I think this gives an answer as to why there were not yet 
other outlets available.  
22
 Nietzsche adds a section later: “This instinct for freedom [will to power], forcibly made latent … driven back, 
suppressed, imprisoned within, and finally discharging and venting itself only on itself: this, only this, is bad 
conscience in its beginnings” (GM II.17). 
23
 Nietzsche later remarks in the third essay of the Genealogy that “[t]he previous treatise briefly suggested its 
origins [the feeling of guilt]—as a piece of animal psychology, no more: there the feeling of guilt first confronted us 
in its raw state as it were” (GM III.20). 
 
[14] 
 
offers enters, specifically, the idea that the origin of guilt evolves from the concept of debt, an 
insight Nietzsche draws from the etymological link between debt [Schulden] and guilt [Schuld].
24
 
“The critical question is how a consciousness of debts turned into a feeling of guilt” (Leiter, 
2002; 236). 
Early in the essay Nietzsche argues that feelings of guilt and personal obligation had their 
origin in the creditor-debtor relationship (GM II.8). To explain how feelings of guilt arise, in 
section 19 Nietzsche returns to his earlier discussion of the relationship between the debtor and 
creditor. This relationship takes various forms, including the relationship between the 
community and its members, and more important to Nietzsche’s argument, the relationship 
between the past members of a society and its current members. As a people become more 
powerful, the debts owed to one’s ancestors grows, until these same ancestors become gods. 
Nietzsche states that “for several millennia the feeling of debt toward the deity did not stop 
growing” (GM II.20).25 At the end of this process is Nietzsche’s explanation of the moralization 
of debt: “the entanglement of bad conscience with the concept of god” (GM II.21). 
Human beings find themselves indebted to a god they cannot possibly repay. Human 
beings are in the wrong, they are responsible for this, and yet there is nothing that can be done to 
settle this debt. With this we see the moralization of guilt. May helpfully defines “guilt, in its 
most general form” as “a highly reflexive feeling of regret or inadequacy at failing to honour 
one’s obligations” (May, 1999; 57). Man is guilty against God: his very nature is defective and 
an affront to God. As Janaway helpfully clarifies, “it belongs to the human essence to be 
transgressive against absolute values [God], and so the consciousness of guilt is inbuilt, 
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 See GM II.4-8. Nietzsche begins his account with the thesis that “that central moral concept ‘guilt’ had its origins 
in the very material concept ‘debt’” (GM II.4). 
25
 Leiter argues that Schuld should be translated here as debt and not as guilt. In the context, this makes sense. Thus 
the conclusion would be that Christianity elevates (maximally) the feeling of debt, as opposed to guilt (which has 
not been explained). See Leiter, 2002; 238. 
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perpetual, and profound” (Janaway, 2007; 139). Humanity’s drive to cruelty is then harnessed as 
a legitimate form of self-punishment, and taken to its extreme in self-torture. Animal instincts are 
reinterpreted as evidence of guilt against God, in such a way that there can be no atonement (GM 
II.22).
26
 Human beings become transfixed by an ideal that reinforces their guilt and utter 
defectiveness, about which they can—seemingly—do nothing. 
With Nietzsche’s introduction of the debtor-creditor relationship, he attempts to explain 
naturalistically how it is that human beings have developed deep-rooted feelings of inadequacy 
and guilt. Nietzsche’s account on these issues is rather diffuse, and he is assuredly at his most 
speculative here, but in offering the story he gives, he addresses how it is that human beings have 
come to have a perverse need for inflicting pain on themselves, as well as feeling guilty for their 
nature.
27
   
We have a sickness that “has come to its most terrible and most sublime pinnacle” (GM 
II.19).
28
 Beginning with the delight in making-suffer and the fettering of man’s instincts, adding 
the evolution of guilt from the creditor-debtor relationship, we come to a destructive piece of 
anti-nature where man’s instincts, an affront to God, were turned against him.29 Man has not only 
                                                     
26
 May writes that “[b]ad conscience and guilt are moralized … when they are blamed on, or interpreted in terms of, 
some putatively innate corruption of human nature (or, more generally, of ‘life’ or ‘the world’) which one must 
therefore strive to suppress, extirpate or ‘transcend’” (70). 
27
 One might imagine a scenario in which, if people merely took pleasure in inflicting pain upon themselves, then 
there would not be the profound sickness Nietzsche diagnoses. However, in giving justification for the infliction of 
pain, human beings see themselves as deserving of it, and with that, they find themselves inherently in the wrong. 
To justify self-torture human beings find themselves guilty of failing to live up to certain values—values that are not 
their own. 
28
 In sections 20-22 Nietzsche makes reference to the Christian God, e.g., “The rise of the Christian god as the 
maximum god that has been attained thus far therefore also brought a maximum of feelings of guilt [debt] into 
appearance on earth” (GM II.20). Nietzsche is clearly not arguing that only Christians have bad conscience or that 
no one experienced consciousness of guilt prior to Christianity. See Ridley (2005) and Janaway (2007) for full 
treatments of this issue. Risse (2001) offers a contrasting view. Nietzsche’s general interest is in the origin and 
nature of bad conscience, which is something he believes all people suffer. At the same time, as the aforementioned 
quote indicates, there is something about “Christianity’s stroke of genius” (GM II.21) that creates the fever pitch of 
guilt that makes Christianity’s approach the worst. 
29
 As Janaway succinctly explains: “[W]e need to be cruel to ourselves, so we invent the notion of ourselves as 
wrongdoers in order to legitimize the self-cruelty; then in order to sustain the notion of ourselves as wrongdoers we 
[16] 
 
found himself guilty, but there is no possibility of atonement; out of a debt that cannot be repaid 
he has constructed a punishment through which he tortures himself without relenting; he has 
erected an ideal that continually reiterates his unworthiness. For these reasons we can understand 
why Nietzsche laments that this “is a kind of madness of the will in psychic cruelty that has no 
equal” (GM II.22). If the second essay of the Genealogy ended with section 22, the account 
Nietzsche offers would leave us with a deeply pessimistic view about our future prospects. 
However, against our expectations, as some of the closing sections indicate, there is some reason 
to hope about humanity’s promise.30  
Nietzsche describes the sickness of bad conscience as the “most terrible” sickness, 
turning a person against herself. Accepting Nietzsche’s account as credible, we should take stock 
of where this sickness leaves us. First and foremost, there is no going back; we must 
acknowledge that this sickness cannot be undone. Whatever humans do next, bad conscience is 
the inevitable starting point. But that does not mean nothing can be done to address this sickness. 
For example, given the domestication of human beings, internalization seems inevitable, but the 
repression or redirection of instincts need not be harmful.
31
 To repress instincts that had hitherto 
constituted human strength and well-being would undoubtedly cause great pain and precipitate 
great changes, but as Nietzsche himself notes, this made human beings interesting and pregnant 
with a future, for new developmental possibilities opened up that would have otherwise been 
                                                                                                                                                                           
resort to a metaphysical picture in which we are bound to transgress against something absolute that is placed there 
for that very purpose” (137). 
30
 See GM II.16, which Nietzsche concludes by saying that “man has been included among the most unexpected and 
exciting throws of dice played by Heraclitus’ ‘great child’, call him Zeus or fate,– he arouses interest, tension, hope, 
almost certainty for himself, as though something were being announced through him, were being prepared, as 
though man were not an end but just a path, an episode, a bridge, a great promise . . .”  
31
 However, the needless extirpation of our instincts is something Nietzsche condemns unequivocally. In contrast, 
Nietzsche sees much potential in the sublimation of one’s natural instincts. For example, the instinct for cruelty can 
be put to positive use, as it has been in the creation of culture. Similarly, the sexual instinct can be put to positive 
use, as Nietzsche suggests it was with respect to art. But the problem in the case of bad conscience is that the 
instincts are not sublimated under the service of something higher and life-affirming, but rather something anti-
nature and thus harmful. 
[17] 
 
impossible.
32
 In a similar way, the notion of guilt is not in itself bad, for there are assuredly times 
when a person fails to live up to a particular expectation before her and should feel guilt. And 
finally, neither being cruel nor taking pleasure in cruelty are inherently bad. For example, the 
ascetic’s self-discipline often incorporates cruelty, yet this very asceticism and self-discipline are 
things Nietzsche values. 
1.4 The Sickness of Life Negation 
Within Nietzsche’s treatment of bad conscience are a handful of references to the 
question of suffering.
33
 This issue is left untreated within the discussion of bad conscience, only 
to be dealt with in the third essay of the Genealogy. Suffering is ubiquitous, routinely affecting 
both the physical and the psychological aspects of our lives. However, this is not what makes 
suffering a problem; rather, the problem is its meaninglessness. When there is no reason or 
deeper meaning for suffering, this cuts into human being, leading to a devaluation of the world 
and life, because people require a meaning for suffering.
34
   
Given the ubiquity and meaninglessness of suffering, what Nietzsche calls the ascetic 
ideal responded. It can be understood as a structural turning away from the values of this world, 
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 “With the appearance on earth of an animal soul turned against itself ... something so new, deep, unheard of, 
enigmatic, contradictory, and full of future had come into being that the appearance of the earth was thereby 
essentially changed” (GM II.16). Nietzsche goes on to say that “bad conscience is a sickness, there is no point in 
denying it, but a sickness rather like pregnancy” (GM II.19). 
33
 “What actually arouses indignation against suffering is not suffering in itself, but rather the senselessness of 
suffering” (GM II.7). Interestingly, Nietzsche notes that there were times when suffering had an explanation and was 
neither meaningless nor a mark against existence; rather, cruelty was a stimulus and joy of life. “When suffering is 
always marshalled forth as the first among the arguments against existence, as its nastiest question mark, one would 
do well to remember the times when one made the reverse judgment because one did not wish to do without 
making-suffer and saw in it an enchantment of the first rank, an actual seductive lure to life” (GM II.7). I will return 
to this issue within this chapter, and in much greater detail in chapter III, which examines Nietzsche’s understanding 
of life and how humanity might come to affirm it. 
34
 “The meaninglessness of suffering, not the suffering itself, was the curse that thus far lay stretched out over 
humanity” (GM III.28). “What actually arouses indignation against suffering is not suffering in itself, but rather the 
senselessness of suffering” (GM II.7). 
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in which one rises above them, fostering hatred of the world.
35
 The ascetic ideal offered a 
comprehensive interpretation about the meaning behind our suffering, as well as a more general 
meaning for man’s will and existence.36 While humanity was rescued by this ideal, Nietzsche 
saw that it expressed “an aversion to life” (GM III.28). Thus, while the ascetic ideal rescues man 
from one form of life-negation, specifically the problem of suffering, it has the repercussion of 
inculcating a different set of life-negating values. Specifically, it fosters a negative attitude 
towards desire, the body, and the world. As Nietzsche discovers, the ascetic ideal is, at the core, 
a devaluation of the various natural endowments constitutive of human beings.
37
  
Nietzsche’s analysis leaves us with a powerful disjunctive claim, where both of the 
disjuncts lead to the devaluation of life: either life is devalued (i.e., life is worth less, potentially 
so much so that it does not matter) because it is filled with meaningless suffering, or life and its 
essential elements are devalued because of the meaning the ascetic ideal gives suffering. As 
Nietzsche’s diagnosis continues, he claims that the ascetic ideal under the Christian 
interpretation has failed, which brings us to our current crisis. Having eliminated the second 
disjunct, life is, at least for some people, once again devalued for being filled with meaningless 
suffering. Nietzsche’s diagnosis, if I have reconstructed it correctly, points to the seemingly 
inevitable conclusion of life-negation. 
*** 
                                                     
35
 Nietzsche says the ascetic ideal expresses a “hatred of the human, still more of the animal, still more of the 
material, this abhorrence of the senses, of reason itself, this fear of happiness and of beauty, this longing away from 
all appearance, change, becoming, death, wish, longing itself” (GM III.28). 
36
 As Nietzsche says, man’s “existence on earth contained no goal; ‘to what end man at all?’—was a question 
without answer; the will for man and earth was lacking” (GM III.28). The ascetic ideal fills the great void 
surrounding humanity. Interestingly, Nietzsche goes on to say that, “[t]hus far it has been the only meaning”. This 
seems to sit in tension with his understanding of the Greeks, who did not suffer from meaninglessness, and thus did 
not need the power of the ascetic ideal. One way of distinguishing the Greeks from the Christians, is to note that the 
Greeks had an explanation behind suffering, but there was no meaning for it. In contrast, the interpretation of 
Christianity gives an explanation, as well as a complex meaning behind suffering and life. 
37
 Additionally the ascetic gives rise to an even more potent form of life-negation, which ultimately sees this life as 
nothing more than a means to an other-worldly existence. 
[19] 
 
To better understand what, according to Nietzsche’s diagnosis seems the inevitable, life-
negating conclusion to which humanity is fated, let us look at the above disjunction in greater 
detail. Part of what we learn from Schopenhauer and in BT is that suffering and life are indelibly 
intertwined. This indubitable fact necessitates that one come to terms with suffering one way or 
another. As Nietzsche writes, the “diseased animal” man suffers, in a myriad of ways, but 
“suffering itself was not his problem, rather that the answer was missing to the question: ‘to what 
end suffering?’” (GM III.28). The problem of suffering commands our attention and demands an 
answer. This is because the inexplicable fact of suffering has the potential to undermine our trust 
in life. Whether or not life actually deserves our trust is a different question. As I will argue in 
chapter 3, Nietzsche presents an alternative view in which love of life can be cultivated such that 
trust in life takes a radically different form.   
Given the ubiquity of suffering, “every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his 
suffering” (GM III.15). The fact of the matter is that people need reasons for why suffering 
occurs, because with reasons they can endure life because the suffering (and so life) has 
meaning.
38
 The first reason why humanity devalues life is due to the ubiquity of suffering. 
Meaningless suffering is such a powerful mark against existence that it provides sufficient 
grounds for concluding it is best not to live.
39
 Suffering is not the sole evidence presented to 
indict life though. Life is also seen to be inhospitable to the kinds of values we take to be 
                                                     
38
 See GS 1, where Nietzsche writes at length about the need for believing in a purpose to life. The “teachers of the 
purpose of existence” help to instill the belief in meaning. “Man has gradually become a fantastic animal that must 
fulfil one condition of existence more than any other animal: man must from time to time believe he knows why he 
exists; his race cannot thrive without a periodic trust in life—without faith in the reason in life!” 
39
 Nietzsche writes, “Wretched, ephemeral race, children of chance and tribulation, why do you force me to tell you 
the very thing which it would be most profitable for you not to hear? The very best thing is utterly beyond your 
reach not to have been born, not to be, to be nothing. However, the second best thing for you is: to die soon” (BT 3). 
Of course, as evidence shows, the vast majority of people are not following this advice.  
[20] 
 
valuable, and for this reason life is similarly indicted
 40
. To look upon the world and see what is 
strange and questionable, a world filled with strife, horror, and death, is to look upon a world that 
one would generally prefer to be otherwise. For many people, such a world is one which 
deserves to be condemned.  
The ascetic ideal, as manifest in the Christian interpretation of existence, rescues 
humanity: “In it suffering was interpreted; the enormous emptiness seemed filled; the door fell 
shut to all suicidal nihilism” (GM III.28). Under the power of the ascetic ideal the devaluation 
and negation of life continued, albeit in a different form. Not only did the ascetic ideal and the 
emphasis on a life of self-denial give man a meaning, it also brought “new suffering with it, 
deeper, more inward, more poisonous, gnawing more at life” (GM III.28).41 This suffering arises 
from the internal discord that each person feels under the interpretation the ascetic ideal offers, 
particularly in the explanation of the cause of this suffering. Given the need for some reason 
behind suffering, the ascetic ideal offers a simple explanation: each person is the reason for her 
own suffering; we deserve it.
42
   
With this account we have an explanation and interpretation of suffering, which rescues 
humanity from suicidal nihilism, while at the same time giving rise to more poisonous feelings 
that have had an even more harmful effect. What I have sought to emphasize is that not only 
does the problem of meaningless suffering create an attitude of life-negation, so too does the 
meaning the ascetic ideal attaches to suffering, arguably an equally bad form of life-negation.  
                                                     
40
 “What does nihilism mean? That the highest values devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking; ‘why?’ finds no 
answer” (WP 2). 
41
 Thus Nietzsche writes that “there is hardly anything else … that has pressed so destructively upon health … as 
this ideal” (GM III.20). 
42
 “Man, suffering from himself in some way or other, physiologically in any case, somewhat like an animal locked 
in a cage, uncertain why, to what end? desirous of reasons—reasons alleviate—desirous also of cures and narcotics” 
(GM III.20). And the reason is clear: “’I am suffering: for this someone must be to blame’—thus every diseased 
sheep thinks. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest, says to him: ‘That’s right, my sheep! someone must be to blame 
for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for it—you alone are to blame for yourself!’” (GM 
III.15). 
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*** 
We can fill out our understanding of the second form of life negation by looking at the 
ways it is manifest in Nietzsche’s writings. At the most basic level, Nietzsche contends that 
Platonic-Christian morality “negates life” (CW, P). That is, moral values, by their nature, both 
condemn life and express demands contrary to life.
43
 We can delineate the various ways in which 
this negation manifests itself. The first form of negation is the fact that the moral values of the 
Platonic-Christian tradition condemn this life. That is, these values are created with the explicit 
purpose of condemning this life as imperfect and inhospitable to their realization in this world.
44
 
Within the basic Christian moral picture, this world is at best an imperfect transitional stage and 
means to a transcendent reality.
45
 This hope for another world need not express hatred of this 
world, but it expresses a clear devaluation of this world and this life. Nietzsche focuses much of 
his criticism on this particular point.  
The second way Nietzsche finds moral values to be life-negating also looms large in his 
writings. Values can also be life-negating to the extent that they foster a declining type of life, 
either by condemning the presuppositions of life or by opposing the development of life. 
Nietzsche held that moral values in the Platonic-Christian tradition are opposed to life, insofar as 
they undermine and inhibit self-overcoming. Additionally, notions like God, the “true world”, 
soul, sin, hell, free will, and reward and punishment had long been targets of Nietzsche’s 
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 Nietzsche argues that Christianity expresses “hostility to life, a furious, vengeful enmity towards life itself” (BT 
ASC.5). Within this hostility we find not only disgust and weariness for this life, but the hidden “belief in ‘another’ 
or ‘better’ life”. Nietzsche takes this to express “[h]atred of the ‘world’” (ibid). 
44
 Bernard Reginster focuses on and holds as primary the fact that life-negating values cannot be realized in this 
world. “Strictly life-negating values are, in other words, values that are necessarily unrealizable in this world” (46). 
Reginster continues by noting that life-negating values are invented to condemn life, and this fact explains why they 
cannot be realized in this world. Thus, while Reginster focuses on the fact these values cannot be realized in this 
world, he acknowledges that what explains this fact is that these values are invented to condemn life. I find it 
peculiar then that he argues the fact these values cannot be realized is the primary way they are life-negating, for the 
primary life-negating feature is that they are invented to condemn life. 
45
 For that reason, the Christian picture is not as negative as the Platonic picture, while holds this world to be mere 
appearance, a corrupt world to be overcome. See Plato’s Phaedo for a vivid account of his condemnation of this 
world. This can also be seen in fragments attributed to Pythagoras, who had considerable influence on Plato. 
[22] 
 
criticism.
46
 All of these notions, Nietzsche argues, purport to improve humanity, but in fact “suck 
the blood out of life itself”. That is to say, they are concepts hostile to life; they are fictions 
“invented to devalue the only world there is”; they make the body sick and aim to extirpate the 
instincts (EH IV.8).  
*** 
Having examined meaningless suffering and the interpretation of suffering that the 
ascetic ideal and Christianity advocate, we have seen that in either case, life-negation results, 
albeit different manifestations of life-negation. Thus, as I have argued, the devaluation and 
negation of life is inevitable within the Platonic-Christian interpretation of existence. This 
conclusion follows from a simple argument: either life is devalued because of the problem of 
suffering, or life is devalued by the interpretation offered by the ascetic ideal. The second 
premise can be either of the disjuncts. Accepting these premises, life-negation is the inescapable 
conclusion.
47
  
For a long time the ascetic ideal under the Christian interpretation of existence was able 
to combat the problem of suffering by offering a complex account explaining why we suffer. 
However, the costs of this interpretation were high, including pervasive feelings of guilt, a 
devaluation of one’s body and instincts, and ultimately a devaluing of life and this world, all of 
which significantly stultifies one’s potential for self-development. Beyond these significant 
problems—which ought to make one question just how sustainable this interpretation was—the 
Christian interpretation, with its purported high estimation of truth, was doomed to undermine 
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 Taking this collection of values into account, we can understand how Reginster would hold such values to be 
“unrealizable”, but once again, this is a fact dependent on the more important fact that such values were invented to 
condemn this world. Thus, it is difficult to see how the primary reason these values are life-negating is their 
unrealizability. This fact is a repercussion of their having been invented to condemn this world.  
47
 Ultimately, Nietzsche’s position is that this conclusion is predicated on a false dichotomy. The argument of 
chapter 3 is that an alternative to life negation is possible, specifically a life affirming position predicated on a love 
of life. 
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itself, Nietzsche suggests, by containing the seeds of its own overcoming.
48
 His claim is that as 
the Christian interpretation comes undone, the problem of suffering will reassert itself. For the 
majority of people, Nietzsche notes, this failure has yet to be recognized. For some, this failure 
has been recognized to a degree, but the wide-ranging repercussions have not been understood. 
That is to say, for the majority of people, the death of God, as well as its significance, remains an 
event still too distant.
49
  
What follows from this event is a question of great significance, a question that returns us 
to the point with which this section began. In a world filled with suffering, must we inevitably 
succumb to life-negating, or is it possible to affirm life in spite of all that is strange, terrible, and 
questionable? One of Nietzsche’s primary concerns is with offering an account such that people 
need not turn away from life, but rather learn to love it.  
Modern humanity thus finds itself in a precarious position. With the changes precipitated 
by Christianity, humanity has developed a deeper, richer psychology, transforming us in ways 
hitherto unimagined, making human beings more interesting, and full of new potential.
50
 At the 
same time, human beings are now both more prone to suffering, but also to suffering in more 
insidious ways. The need for some coming to terms with suffering thus becomes all the more 
imperative with the self-overcoming of the Christian interpretation, because we seem to have 
been left with the view that the world and life have no value.  
Worse yet, modernity, instead of adopting a stance towards suffering that was able to 
affirm it as part of life—as opposed to holding suffering as a reason to condemn existence and 
adopt life-negating values—has instead adopted a set of values and a stance towards suffering 
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 See GS 357 and GM III.27. Nietzsche succinctly and powerfully articulates the self-overcoming of Christian 
morality. “One can see what it was that actually triumphed over the Christian god: Christian morality itself, the 
concept of truthfulness that was taken ever more rigorously” (GS 357). Because of this highly refined intellectual 
conscience, belief that God has given meaning is now dishonest, it goes against our conscience, it violates our taste. 
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where the goal is to eliminate it as much as possible. On the face of it this does not seem like a 
problematic goal. However, as I will argue in the next section, one of the highest values of 
modernity is the elimination of suffering, a value that is, in Nietzsche’s eyes, opposed to life. 
How this all unfolds is the subject of the next section. 
1.5 The Sickness of Enervation 
At this point we come to the final form of sickness that Nietzsche diagnoses, what I have 
called the sickness of enervation. What Nietzsche identifies as a form of sickness is instead 
believed to constitute progress for humanity; at the core it is the movement toward the goals of 
pleasure, ease, and comfort. I will argue that for Nietzsche what he criticizes as modern 
“progress” veils a significant problem, as these goals weaken and undermine humanity’s will, 
which is an essential part of what it is to be human. More than that, a strong will is necessary to 
become something greater, which Nietzsche takes to be a particularly important goal for 
humanity.  
We can best understand this form of sickness as enervation, or the loss of vitality, which 
leads to a weakened will and a kind of failure of desire. This can also be understood as the 
diminution of man, a process that Nietzsche saw occurring before him. A frightening, but 
possible repercussion of this process which Nietzsche saw occurring around him was that the day 
would soon come when humanity was no longer able to aim for what we have it in us to become. 
Nietzsche expresses concern that a time could come when humanity no longer had the strong 
will to live up to what it had the potential to become.  
If Nietzsche is correct that people do not see modern “progress” as a form of sickness, 
then he owes an account about how humanity would come to accept a set of values which were 
in fact harmful. Part of the problem is that this form of sickness is so deeply embedded within 
[25] 
 
the values of modernity that we do not see it as a problem at all. The other part of the problem is 
that the values of modernity are seen as good. Consider what Nietzsche identifies as the highest 
values of modernity: the elimination of suffering, equality and equal rights, democracy, and 
compassion. That many people would find these values to be harmful seems unlikely. According 
to Nietzsche, these values mask themselves under the idea of “improving” humanity.51 Thus 
what Nietzsche finds in modern humanity is nothing more than a “caricature of a human being” 
(TI VII.2).
52
  
What further prevents us from seeing the sickness of enervation and the harm 
modernity’s highest values have caused is that these values are not in themselves examples of 
sickness. No one would claim equality and equal rights are inherently bad. Nietzsche does not 
make such a claim; rather the problem he identifies lies in the uses these values are put to, as 
well as the end these values ultimately give rise to: a weak, enervated will.
53
 Thus, instead of 
working towards what man has it in him to become, the highest values of modernity are used as a 
means to pleasure, ease, and comfort.  
For example, Nietzsche laments that the well-being that comes from the elimination of 
suffering “is no goal; it looks to us like an end!—a condition that immediately renders people 
ridiculous and despicable—that makes their decline into something desirable!” (BGE 225). 
Nietzsche paints an evocative portrait of what this type of human being looks like in the Last 
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 Nietzsche admits they “improve” humanity; however, his understanding of “improvement” means “the same as 
‘tamed,’ ‘weakened,’ ‘discouraged,’ ‘sophisticated,’ ‘pampered,’ ‘emasculated,’ (hence almost the same as injured)” 
(GM III.21). 
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full of malice against himself, hating the drive for life, suspicious of everything that was still strong and happy” (TI 
VII.2). See TI “‘Improving’ Humanity” for a succinct treatment of Nietzsche’s criticisms. Elsewhere Nietzsche 
describes modern humanity as “tame domestic animals” (GM II.6).  
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 Nietzsche noted on various occasions that many of the values he criticizes can have a positive value Nietzsche 
notes that compassion has a place (e.g., BGE 293), and that equality is an idea that applies among equals (TI IX.48). 
The elimination of suffering is a slightly more complicated issue, as there are decidedly different forms of suffering, 
some of which have a positive value (e.g., the suffering that comes with self-overcoming) and some that do not (e.g., 
the suffering we inflict on ourselves under the auspices of the ascetic ideal; see GM III).   
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Man, a portrait that is clearly designed to awaken us from our stupor and shame us into seeing 
that we are headed towards the diminution of human being.  
Nietzsche begins, through the guise of Zarathustra, by alerting us to the fact that the "soil 
is still rich enough for [planting the seed of man’s highest hope]. But one day this soil will be 
poor and tame" (Z P.5). His worry should be clear: the time is coming when men will no longer 
be able to create beyond themselves, when there will be no further self-overcoming, when man’s 
desire and will has been extirpated.
54
 As Gooding-Williams succinctly states, “Wholly satisfied 
and without suffering, the last man has no desire to achieve something he has not achieved or to 
make himself into something he is not.”55 Believing themselves to have achieved what humanity 
has sought, the Last Men do not desire anything beyond easily attainable goals. 
In book three of Zarathustra, “On Virtue That Makes Small”, Nietzsche (Zarathustra) 
expands upon and elucidates his description of the Last Man. Specifically looking to see if man 
has become greater or smaller, Zarathustra concludes, sadly, that “everything has become 
smaller!” The cause of their becoming smaller is due to “their teaching on happiness and virtue”, 
which aims at mere “contentment”. Eliminating suffering is of the utmost importance: “At 
bottom these simple ones want one simple thing: that no one harm them”. Thus Zarathustra 
concludes that these people are mediocre, because they hold quiet contentment and the 
elimination of suffering to be their goals. Such goals simply contribute to their becoming 
smaller, just as they accelerates the time when they will no longer be able to create beyond 
themselves. 
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 For the time being Nietzsche sees that “humanity has still not exhausted its greatest possibilities” (BGE 203). But 
as he saw all too clearly, with the diminution of man on the horizon, humanity is moving ever closer to losing such 
possibilities. Thus the urgency of Nietzsche’s rhetoric: modern man is traversing a dangerous path to “the end”. “Is 
greatness possible today?” (BGE 212). 
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 Robert Gooding-Williams, Zarathustra’s Dionysian Modernism, 88. 
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Part and parcel of the goal of the happiness of the Last Man is the contentment that 
comes with having achieved the elimination of suffering. With that, one need only sit back and 
enjoy a life of pleasure, ease, and comfort. In virtue of this Zarathustra condemns these small 
men for having lost the ability to will anything beyond small, easily attainable goals. Thus 
Nietzsche laments that "today the will is weakened and diluted by the tastes and virtues of the 
times" (BGE 212).
56
 The ubiquity of this type is a cause of great concern for Nietzsche, for it 
shows both how seductive and successful the goals of the Last Man are to modern man.  
Having explained the worries Nietzsche holds about where modernity might be headed, I 
now turn to showing how the effort to eliminate suffering achieves something very different 
from what was intended. While the goals of pleasure, ease, and comfort were the ends towards 
which people aimed, in achieving this, their success brought them much more. Specifically, 
Nietzsche argues that in working to eliminate suffering, when the one thing which has enhanced 
humanity—suffering—is removed, it causes enervation and a weakened will.  
*** 
We have seen the general goals of modernity: pleasure, ease, and comfort. Nietzsche 
criticizes modernity because “what they want to strive for with all their might is the universal, 
green pasture happiness of the herd, with security, safety, contentment, and an easier life for all” 
(BGE 44). At the same time, Nietzsche identifies the elimination of suffering as one of the 
highest values of modernity. All things considered, the high value placed on the elimination of 
suffering should not be surprising. Throughout this chapter I have sought to show how Nietzsche 
identifies suffering as one of the most profound problems. As such, the problem of suffering 
warrants some kind of response.  
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 Coming from “the happiness of weaklings, from resignation” Nietzsche notes how “[t]his modernity made us ill—
this indolent peace, this cowardly compromise, the whole virtuous filth of the modern yes and no” (A 1). 
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Nietzsche’s account identifies a change in modernity’s strategy regarding how to address 
the problem of suffering. Having failed to offer an explanation of suffering that did not 
ultimately lead to the devaluation of life—as was the case with the meaning given to suffering 
under the ascetic ideal—modernity has progressed to a new way of treating suffering. If 
suffering cannot be given a satisfactory explanation that makes it meaningful and therefore 
something that can be endured, the obvious way to try and deal with it would be to attempt to 
eliminate it. This is precisely what Nietzsche identifies: modernity “view[s] suffering itself as 
something that needs to be abolished” (BGE 44).57 
Modernity’s goal of completely eliminating suffering is something Nietzsche finds both 
laughable and a portent of a forthcoming calamity.
58
 On the one hand, he finds the goal of 
eliminating suffering to be misguided, because he regards suffering as part and parcel of life 
itself. On the other hand, Nietzsche identifies suffering as essential to humanity’s enhancement; 
without what he calls “the discipline of suffering” (BGE 225), people would not become what 
they had it in themselves to be. Thus we find that Nietzsche recognizes immense instrumental 
value in suffering. People need some kind of suffering in their lives in order to develop. 
Nietzsche claims that “the discipline of suffering” has been, and will continue to be, “the sole 
cause of every enhancement in humanity so far” (ibid). In other words, humanity has grown best 
under conditions opposite those valued today. 
But there are other reasons why abolishing suffering is a problematic goal, for Nietzsche 
worries about humanity’s enervation, which he holds would follow directly from the elimination 
of suffering. After all, Nietzsche’s argument is simple and to the point; he reasons that if 
suffering is “the sole cause” of human development, and modernity works to abolish suffering, 
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 Thus Nietzsche refers to “the comic spectacle of us moderns, with our thickly padded humanity, going to any 
length to avoid bumping into a pebble” (TI IX.37). 
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then human development will be stultified. The supposed “progress” that comes with the 
elimination of suffering, he worries, will actually result in a loss of vitality and undermine 
humanity’s ability to engage in self-enhancement. Accordingly, suffering must not be eliminated, 
but rather should be retained. 
One might object that retaining suffering sounds ridiculous, almost as absurd as if 
Nietzsche were to advocate increasing suffering in the world! At the same time, one might also 
object that the possibility of successfully eliminating all suffering is absurd, and thus Nietzsche 
is getting worked up over nothing. Finally, one might reasonably demand that Nietzsche offer 
some clarification about what kinds of suffering are valuable and what kinds of suffering, 
presumably, even he regards as lacking any value whatsoever. Setting aside these concerns for 
the present—I return to this issue in chapter 4—let us try to understand Nietzsche’s concerns. 
The frequent imagery of a taut bow and tension necessary for shooting for the farthest 
goals indicates Nietzsche’s strong belief in the need for resistance and the general agonistic 
element necessary for the self-enhancement of humanity, an element intricately connected to the 
suffering a person undergoes. What we need to understand, according to Nietzsche, is that there 
is something healthy in suffering, something that drives us forward, that keeps us eternally 
dissatisfied and thus eternally striving to overcome our current state. Thus, where the goal is the 
total elimination of suffering, Nietzsche finds a formula for disaster, depriving humanity of one 
of the necessary elements of self-enhancement and thus potential greatness. There is no drive 
forward, but rather contentedness; there is no dissatisfaction, only quiet contentment; there are 
no strong wills, only weak wills; there is no self-overcoming, only mediocrity masquerading as 
progress.  
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1.6 Whither Humanity?  
With an understanding of the three central types of sickness that Nietzsche has diagnosed, 
now is the time to take stock of the main features of the three types of sickness examined above. 
To begin, we find humanity suffering from the sickness of bad conscience, in which people are 
plagued by pervasive feelings of guilt and engage in various forms of self-punishment, leaving 
them in a state of self-hatred and psychological disarray. If this was not enough to make man a 
thoroughly fractured being, Nietzsche also diagnoses what I have called the sickness of life-
negation, a kind of existential sickness which arises with humanity’s reaction to the problem of 
suffering. This sickness drives man to an extreme form of life-negation in which life is devalued. 
Craving a meaning for this suffering, humanity succumbs to the ascetic ideal, which offers an 
explanation of his suffering. However, the ascetic ideal also turns a person against the world and 
life. With the devaluation of life and this world, we have the sickness of life-negation in its most 
common form.  
As the Platonic-Christian interpretation of existence starts to come undone, we find 
humanity at a pivotal moment. Beset by various forms of sickness requiring some kind of 
response, humanity turns to values Nietzsche associates with an enervated, weakened will and 
the elimination of suffering. With this we return to the point with which we began, where 
Nietzsche laments that "the stunting and leveling of European man conceals our greatest danger” 
(GM I.12). This is where Nietzsche saw humanity headed: “today we see nothing that wants to 
expand” (ibid). Working to abolish suffering, enervated modern humanity aims at small, easily 
attainable goals, like pleasure, comfort, and ease. For this reason Nietzsche expresses great 
worry about where man is headed, lamenting what he sees as the diminution of humanity. 
[31] 
 
Understanding the various ways in which the particular forms of sickness manifest 
themselves, not only helps us understand the many intricate threads of Nietzsche’s overall 
critique, but also illuminates the specific problems that Nietzsche seeks to overcome. Each type 
of sickness manifests a specific form, from the devaluation of the self, to the devaluation of the 
world and life, to a misguided sense of human good that results in enervation. Understanding 
both the ways in which humanity has become sick and the nature of the respective forms of 
sickness is only the diagnostic part of Nietzsche’s project.  
One final aspect of Nietzsche’s diagnosis, only briefly intimated above, has to do with the 
following remark: “And as for illness: are we not almost tempted to ask whether we can do 
without it at all?” (GS P.3). Nietzsche recognized that there was, as peculiar as it may sound, a 
positive aspect to sickness.
59
 Reflecting on the value of sickness, Nietzsche declared several 
times that there is a sense in which we cannot do without it. He clarified how sickness could 
have a positive aspect when he declared that “sickness can actually be an energetic stimulus to 
life” (EH I.2). More than that, sickness acts as a spur to higher health. I will return to this idea in 
chapter 5, where I go on to examine the idea that sickness has a positive role to play in the 
cultivation of both health and the great health. 
Having talked about Nietzsche’s diagnostic project, it should not be forgotten that he 
often emphasized how his project consisted of two parts, a destructive and a creative part. The 
role of philosophical physician who diagnoses the ills of modern humanity is only one of 
Nietzsche’s roles. The diagnosis is necessary for the subsequent project of working to overcome 
the various forms of sickness, which is the other half of Nietzsche’s fundamental project. I have 
sought to elucidate the three principle targets of the diagnostic-critical part of Nietzsche’s 
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project, which will set the stage for the  affirmative project. The affirmative part of Nietzsche’s 
project can be understood as articulating his conception of health, and, having an understanding 
of how he conceives of health, I turn to examining his elusive notion of “the great health.”  
In the positive part of Nietzsche’s project, I will argue that he presents various means for 
overcoming the forms of sickness he has diagnosed. This will be the focus for the next three 
chapters. In chapter two I will argue that Nietzsche offers a handful of strategies in the second 
essay of the Genealogy which suggest the kind of philosophical therapy that is required to 
overcome the sickness of bad conscience and help to cultivate what might be called good 
conscience. In chapter three I will argue that Nietzsche’s conception of life affirmation, or love 
of life, is modeled on how we come to love. With that I believe Nietzsche offers a process that 
will help us address the problem of life-negation and illustrates how we might come to love life, 
despite the presence of suffering and all that is strange, questionable, and terrible. I will then 
argue in chapter four that Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power, with its emphasis on 
overcoming resistances and self-overcoming, offers a means of overcoming the sickness of 
enervation by inculcating a strong will via what he calls “the discipline of suffering”. Finally, 
having shown how the notions of good conscience, love of life, and the will to overcome 
resistances contribute to a person’s health by removing various negative elements, in chapter 5 I 
will show how Nietzsche believes these elements are superseded by a rare, higher notion of 
health, what he calls “the great health,” a portrait of Nietzsche’s conception of super-human 
well-being. With this ideal in view, reflecting at the end of The Gay Science, Nietzsche looks 
upon what lies before him and asks: “how could we still be satisfied with modern-day man?” 
(GS 382). This is one of the questions he is at pains to get humanity to ask.  
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CHAPTER 2: NIETZSCHE ON INNOCENCE, GOOD CONSCIENCE, AND RELATED 
MATTERS 
2.1 Introduction 
Having surveyed and distinguished the sicknesses that collectively characterize what I 
called the diminution of humanity, our attention now turns to Nietzsche’s responses. Just as 
Nietzsche often invokes images of sick, decadent, failed human beings, so too does he repeatedly 
invoke images of various types that had turned out strong, powerful, and healthy.
60
 There is no 
doubt that, as a general goal, Nietzsche seeks to overcome the continued diminution of humanity 
that has been precipitated by the various sicknesses to which people have succumbed. More 
generally he seeks to inaugurate a revaluation of values that helps to put humanity on a path to 
health, culminating in what he calls the great health, or “the ideal of a human, superhuman well-
being” (GS 382).  
To speak of the ideal of great health is to get far ahead of ourselves though, for much 
work needs to be done to create the conditions for the possibility of this new health. Given the 
various forms of sickness Nietzsche diagnoses, there is much work to be done to treat these 
sicknesses. Having illuminated the specific sicknesses, what needs to be done is clear: Nietzsche 
must offer responses so that people no longer see themselves as guilty, worthless, and deserving 
of punishment; so that people no longer look at the world and life as worthless and redeemed 
only by a transcendent world; and so that people no longer resign themselves to a life of apathy 
and lassitude.  
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 “But from time to time grant me … a glimpse, grant me just one glimpse of something perfect, completely 
finished, happy, powerful, triumphant, that still leaves something to fear!” (GM I.12). See also GS 382, GM II.24, 
TI IX.49, and EH I.2 for three of the more evocative images Nietzsche paints of strong, vital, healthy types. 
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The present concern in this chapter will be on constructing an account of Nietzsche’s 
strategies for treating the first of these problems, what I called the sickness of bad conscience.
61
 
The primary problems that arise with this sickness are pervasive feelings of guilt and the 
continuous need to engage in self-punishment. In conjunction with these two major concerns, 
Nietzsche seeks to disabuse us of various related issues, including the devaluation of all that 
makes us human, specifically the instincts, the body, the senses, and desires. Similarly, he seeks 
to disabuse us of the moral world view—including ideas of God, free will, sin, and 
punishment—which legitimizes not only our devaluation of the human, but also legitimizes our 
propensity to self-punishment and torture.  
While Nietzsche is quite vocal about the smorgasbord of problems related to the problem 
of guilt, he often comes across as tentative about how we might genuinely free ourselves from 
deep feelings of guilt, bad conscience, and the related notions that reinforce such feelings. 
Beyond mere diagnosis, Nietzsche offers explicit suggestions in the second essay of the 
Genealogy about what might be done to reduce, if not eliminate feelings of bad conscience and 
consciousness of guilt. These suggestions are not only brief and tentative, but Nietzsche 
questions their efficacy at the same time he is offering them. He nonetheless seems to hold out 
the possibility that at some point in the future we might completely overcome not only belief in 
God, but also the concepts that rest upon and reinforce belief in God, including sin, free will, 
punishment, and guilt.  
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 On the other hand, for all of the problems it has caused, the sickness of bad conscience has transformed humanity 
into something it otherwise could not have become. For this reason Nietzsche recognizes the immense value of bad 
conscience because of the new “developmental possibilities” it has opened up. “Let us immediately add that … with 
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into being that the appearance of the earth was thereby essentially changed” (GM II.16). Nietzsche goes on to say 
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Schacht notes that Nietzsche “is quick to draw attention to the potentiality and promise implicit in this development” 
(Schacht, 1983; 275). Following Schacht, Richardson (1996) and Ridley (1998) similarly emphasize this point.  
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Nietzsche suggests three strategies that might help people emancipate themselves from 
pervasive feelings of guilt. He begins by suggesting that a second innocence, freed from 
consciousness of guilt, might follow the spread of atheism; he then points out that the ancient 
Greeks were able to keep bad conscience and guilt at bay, which at the very least suggests that 
bad conscience and guilt were not inevitable, but rather a contingent development, which means 
that they could presumably be overcome; finally, Nietzsche raises the idea that we might 
someday affix bad conscience to all of our anti-natural feelings (e.g., belief in an afterlife), 
thereby overcoming pervasive feelings of guilt for our nature and natural inclinations. I will 
argue that, while each of these suggestions at the end of GM II is an intriguing idea, taken 
individually, Nietzsche is right to question their efficacy. For that reason I will argue that the 
three ideas collectively point to what ultimately needs to be done, overcoming the ascetic ideal 
which tethers us to the moral modality
62
 that enables and legitimizes pervasive feelings of guilt. 
The method through which Nietzsche seeks to slowly disentangle us from this deeply entrenched 
ideal and the deeply entrenched feelings of guilt: philosophical therapy. 
With Nietzsche’s diagnoses and his goals before us, the rest of the chapter will proceed as 
follows: in section II I briefly summarize the problems of the sickness of bad conscience. The 
goal is to get a clearer sense of what needs to be overcome, which should help show how this 
might be accomplished. In section III I survey Nietzsche's treatment of guilt from 1878-1888, 
working to elucidate both his understanding of guilt as well as the crux of his critique. With an 
understanding of guilt in hand, in section IV I turn to an examination of the three strategies 
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 I take this from Frithjof Bergmann, “Nietzsche’s Critique of Morality”, who contrasts the modality of a code with 
its content. Referring to the [Platonic-Christian] moral modality Bergmann notes that “one could then say that the 
apparatus of agency, selfhood, freedom, responsibility, blame, and guilt furnished the accoutrements for the 
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subject/agent”; “the ultimate goal of the code”; “the basic evaluative dimension”; and “the emotional tenor that 
pervades its experience of the code” (Schroeder, Lecture on Bergmann on Nietzsche, September 2005). 
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Nietzsche suggests in Genealogy II about how one might treat the sickness of bad conscience, 
looking at atheism, what we might learn from the Greek conception of the gods, and affixing bad 
conscience to our “unnatural inclinations”. I argue that, while the strategies Nietzsche offers are 
intriguing, they are also not likely to succeed without additional work, a fact he acknowledges. 
Importantly though, amidst these puzzling strategies, Nietzsche lays the groundwork for what 
might be done to precipitate their success. Finally, in section V, I lay out an account of 
Nietzsche’s philosophical therapy, beginning with an account of his therapeutic method, before 
turning to its application to the problems of guilt and self-punishment.
63
  
2.2 Preliminaries 
To get a better understanding of what might prove the best possible treatment to help us 
overcome the problems of pervasive feelings of guilt and the predilection for self-punishment, let 
us briefly summarize the details of Nietzsche’s diagnosis in the second essay of the Genealogy. 
At the end of the story Nietzsche finds that human beings have become “repulsive creatures who 
could not get rid of a deep displeasure with themselves” (GM III.11). Grounded in the 
internalization of man, his subsequent desire to inflict cruelty on himself, and legitimated by 
indebtedness to God, the sickness of bad conscience can be understood as a pervasive feeling of 
guilt, where one is, by one’s very nature, in the wrong, and for this reason one is turned against 
oneself, engaging in unrelenting self-torture.  
This deep displeasure, marked by torturous feelings of guilt, is one of the primary targets 
of Nietzsche’s diagnosis. The qualification ‘deep’ points to a distinguishing feature of what 
Nietzsche targets: the pervasive nature of guilt, i.e., when displeasure with oneself, unrelenting 
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 While Nietzsche does not use the phrase “philosophical therapy”, his various practical suggestions can be 
understood as a kind of therapy, as will be shown below in section 2.5. What we might call the “therapeutic 
Nietzsche” has become an increasingly common reading. See Magnus (1988), Leiter (2002), Solomon (2003), 
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feelings of guilt, and self-torture become a person’s natural state.64 A source of such guilt that 
continues to persist today can be seen in the common denigration of anything bodily, be it the 
body itself, as well as the desires, sexual or otherwise, that we attribute to the “flesh”.65 The 
natural feelings for many people with respect to the body, desire, and sex, are feelings of guilt, 
embarrassment, and repression.  
Turning to the second major target of Nietzsche’s diagnosis, people’s predilection for 
self-torture, the goal seems straightforward enough: people must find a way to not only stop 
torturing themselves, but also stop creating reasons to torture and punish themselves. This may 
prove particularly difficult, if Nietzsche is correct that people welcome suffering as long as there 
is a reason for it. On Nietzsche’s diagnosis this is due to the fact that when certain drives (e.g., 
domination; control) are denied their former outlets they do not cease to make their demands, 
and with nowhere else to go, they turn inwards against the person.
66
  
Given these features of the sickness of bad conscience, the work that needs to be done is 
clear: human beings must learn to overcome both the poisonous feelings of guilt that chronically 
infect them, as well as the need to torture themselves under the auspices that it is a justified 
punishment. Nietzsche recognized that neither of these problems would admit of a quick or easy 
fix.  
Given how entrenched our feelings of guilt are, given that many other related notions—
God, sin, free will, responsibility, and punishment—help buttress these feelings of guilt, and 
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 This needs to be distinguished from more localized feelings of guilt. This distinction between “deep” guilt, and 
“locally reactive guilt” comes from Risse (2001). Like Risse, I believe Nietzsche’s primary concern lies with deep 
guilt, which he calls “existential guilt”, not with local guilt. More will be said about this in section III below. 
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 For example, consider Plato’s claim in the Phaedo that “a man’s concern is not with the body but that, as far as he 
can, he turns away from the body towards the soul” (64e). Plato goes on to say that the body is a hindrance in the 
search for knowledge, as it is a source of deception (65b). Similarly, in Matthew 26:41 we find that “the spirit is 
willing, but the flesh is weak”. 
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 Janaway’s “Guilt, Bad Conscience, and Self-Punishment in Nietzsche’s Genealogy” (2007) offers an exemplary 
treatment of the narrative Nietzsche presents in the second essay of the Genealogy. 
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given how habituated we have become to torturing ourselves, nothing less than a complete 
revision of our moral modality is necessary. To this end, one might ask, how do we work to 
completely supplant a moral modality that has become second nature? As Nietzsche was wont to 
say, before one could create a new edifice, one must first destroy the edifice in place. How then 
might we destroy the moral modality of the ascetic ideal that feeds our belief about our own guilt 
and helps to legitimize self-torture? We need to learn to think differently, Nietzsche says, which 
includes seeing fictions for what they are. To this end he engages in a kind of philosophical 
therapy. I believe it is this project which has the greatest likelihood of helping a person overcome 
both belief in guilt and the ideal that sustains it, to say nothing of our predilection for beating 
ourselves up. 
2.3 Guilt in Nietzsche’s Writings  
 Despite the centrality of bad conscience and guilt in essay two of the Genealogy, 
elsewhere Nietzsche spends comparatively little time on the subject. This is surprising, and may 
lead one to underestimate the significance of guilt as a target in Nietzsche’s overall critique of 
morality. However, as I sought to show in chapter one, pervasive feelings of guilt and bad 
conscience are a serious problem Nietzsche seeks at once to understand and overcome. In spite 
of the fact Nietzsche offers no sustained analysis or evaluation of guilt elsewhere in his writings, 
the forays against guilt he does undertake can nonetheless sharpen our understanding of his 
critique. Having a better understanding of Nietzsche’s critique should also provide insight into 
how guilt might be treated, which is our overarching goal. 
Surveying his writings from Human All Too Human through Ecce Homo we find a 
consistent view of guilt. One of Nietzsche’s primary claims, which he frequently notes, is the 
idea that guilt derives from false or imaginary causes. As such, guilt is used to inveigh against 
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humanity’s natural inclinations. Nietzsche also expresses concern that, along with other notions 
like sin and punishment, guilt is used “to block every elevation and ennoblement of humanity” 
(A 49).
67
 Nietzsche’s central claim about guilt can be seen in an evocative aphorism from GS: 
“Although the shrewdest judges of the witches and even the witches themselves 
were convinced of the guilt of witchcraft, this guilt still did not exist. This is true 
of all guilt” (GS 250, emphasis mine). 
 
Nietzsche’s point is clear: while the feeling of guilt is real, there is no real justification for it. If 
the feeling of guilt is due to imaginary causes, then it is a mistake to feel guilty. Moreover, to 
believe in guilt, he later says, is to corrupt the soul (A 58). This is in line with his belief that guilt 
is a means to devalue the human. Given this position, Nietzsche states his goal in a remark in 
1888, where he says that “we immoralists in particular are trying as hard as we can to rid the 
world of the concepts of guilt and punishment and cleanse psychology, history, nature, and social 
institutions and sanctions of these concepts” (TII VI.7).68 That his goal is to cleanse human 
psychology, and to get us past not only belief in guilt, but also the conceptual machinery that 
posits and reinforces belief in guilt, points to the therapeutic nature of his positive project. 
With his emphasis on the idea that there is no justification for guilt, one might worry 
tension exists between these claims and Nietzsche’s naturalistic account about the origin of guilt 
lying in the material concept of debt.
69
 This apparent tension can be resolved if, as was briefly 
noted above, we distinguish between what Risse calls locally-reactive guilt, i.e., “a responsive 
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 “The concepts of guilt and punishment … invented against science”, they are “lies through and through”, and are 
used “to destroy people’s senses of causation.” For these reasons Nietzsche pronounces guilt as a crime meant “to 
block every elevation and ennoblement of humanity” (A 49). 
68
 If there was any ambiguity in Nietzsche’s position, he remarked in a note that “we immoralists prefer not to 
believe in ‘guilt’” (WLN 10 [108]).  
69
 Nietzsche first presents this thesis in GM II.4. “The feeling of guilt, of personal obligation … had its origin … in 
the oldest and most primitive relationship among persons there is, in the relationship between buyer and seller, 
creditor and debtor” (GM II.8). 
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attitude” which “captures a tension in one’s agency that arises from a local failure”70, and 
existential guilt, which is “a condition that shapes one’s whole existence” and includes “a 
persistent feeling of imperfection” (Risse, 2005; 46). Risse argues, rightly I believe, that 
Nietzsche is not particularly concerned with locally-reactive guilt, but instead directs his 
attention to existential guilt. Existential guilt, or what I have called a pervasive feeling of guilt, is 
the kind of guilt that Nietzsche diagnoses as grounded in a fiction and thus unjustified.
71
 
Similarly, belief in the inherent corruption of human nature, which legitimizes feelings of 
existential guilt, is likewise diagnosed as a fiction. Existential guilt is the locus of Nietzsche’s 
concern, and, in virtue of how deeply harmful it is to humanity, must be overcome.  
The distinction between locally-reactive and existential guilt, while never explicitly 
stated by Nietzsche, is clearly at play in his work. Having pointed to existential guilt as 
Nietzsche’s true target, Risse goes on to add that Nietzsche’s “vision of the future of humanity 
can accommodate [locally-reactive] guilt” (Risse, 2005; 46). More than that, May claims that 
Nietzsche is not—and could not be—arguing for the complete abolition of all forms of guilt. 
“The elimination of such guilt would be impossible: for guilt is an entirely natural—indeed, 
inevitable—feeling on the part of the self-responsible individual who has failed to respect 
standards to which he or she is loyal” (May, 1999; 68). In line with common sense, May suggests 
that locally-reactive guilt is an indelible part of human life and may also play a positive role in a 
person’s life. In line with Nietzsche’s emphasis on self-discipline and self-mastery, May 
continues, noting that “guilt plays a major role in inducing the individual to persevere with 
arduous ethical ambitions that, for Nietzsche, are indispensable to life-enhancement” (ibid).  
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 Risse then adds that it is “an experience of reprehensible failure in response to specific actions”. 
71
 One might question whether all forms of pervasive guilt are unjustified. For example, one might imagine a 
situation in which a person is responsible for a great number of deaths, causing him to experiences pervasive 
feelings of guilt because of the sheer magnitude of the number of deaths. This guilt could become all-encompassing, 
and yet be justified. This kind of example will be addressed below, after some important distinctions about the kinds 
of existential guilt have been made, and after examining what we might call Nietzsche’s rehabilitated notion of guilt. 
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How then are we to understand guilt here? May helpfully defines guilt as “a highly 
reflexive feeling of regret or inadequacy at failing to honor one’s obligations” (May, 1999; 57). 
Reginster offers a definition of ordinary guilt, describing it as “the diminution of one’s worth as 
a person experienced when one falls short of certain normative expectations” (Reginster, 2011; 
57). There is no reason to believe Nietzsche would have any serious qualms with these accounts. 
Furthermore, both May and Reginster capture the basic idea of Nietzsche’s account in GM II 4-
6. This is the form of guilt that maps on to what Risse called “locally reactive guilt”, and it is this 
form of guilt which is not the problematic kind of guilt under Nietzsche’s diagnosis. The 
problem is the pervasive feeling of guilt, i.e., existential guilt. 
Returning to Nietzsche’s understanding in “On the Pale Criminal”, he offers a penetrating 
analysis of the debilitating sickness of one kind of existential guilt. In doing so, he also intimates 
the more honest idea of locally-reactive guilt. In this section Nietzsche writes of a person who 
was able to perform an action, but could not live up to it once it had been done.
72
 In these cases, 
the sting of conscience is powerfully felt. As Nietzsche sees it, the criminal commits an act and 
should be done with it. However something after the act cuts into him, filling him with 
consciousness of guilt. “An image made this pale human pale”, Nietzsche says. “He was equal to 
his deed when he committed it, but he could not bear its image once he had done it” (Z I.6). This 
is the “madness” Nietzsche refers to that comes after the act. But it is not just guilt for this one 
act, but instead becomes all-consuming. The worry is that, as the criminal is unable to face up to 
his actions, the action comes to define him, where “the exception reversed itself to the essence” 
(ibid). In this type of case the criminal becomes poisoned by bad conscience: feeling that he has 
not only violated the values of society, but is perpetually in violation as guilty, the criminal 
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 Elsewhere Nietzsche laments that “often enough the criminal is no match for his deed” (BGE 109). Cf., TI I.10, 
where Nietzsche writes: “Don’t be cowardly about your actions! Don’t abandon them afterwards!—The pang of 
conscience is obscene.”  
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comes to violate his own values, e.g., by later accepting society’s values as his own.73 The 
madness of which Nietzsche speaks comes to infect the criminal in his thoughts, his deeds, and 
his image of himself. He is now guilty through and through. 
But there is more to it, according to Nietzsche’s analysis, for he also talks about another 
form of “madness” related to his act. Nietzsche calls it madness “before the deed”, as it comes 
with the motive prior to the act. Despite an apparent thirst for “the bliss of the knife”, the pale 
criminal convinces himself that he undertook the act not for the blood his soul wanted, but rather 
to rob his victim. Peculiarly, Nietzsche claims that this way the criminal would not have to be 
ashamed of his act. Nietzsche seems to be gesturing at a point he would examine in the second 
essay of the Genealogy: the aggression-instinct has been denied its natural outlet with the advent 
of society. Thus we see a person who exhibits the guilt that comes with the pressures of being a 
part of society and the repression of his animal instincts. The pale criminal feels a twofold sting 
of guilt: both for what he was doing, which he sought to cover up with his purported motive, and 
for allowing the exception to become constitutive of who he is.  
The problematic form of guilt, as Nietzsche sees it, is a deep sickness, pervasive and all-
consuming, and it is this kind of existential guilt that Nietzsche seeks to understand and treat. 
While not explicitly distinguished by Nietzsche, there appear to be two kinds of existential guilt 
that he diagnosed, what we might call inherited guilt and developed guilt. In virtue of its name, 
inherited guilt should be clear enough; it is the kind of guilt that we take to be part and parcel of 
who we are. Then there is what might be called developed guilt, which is the kind of guilt 
Nietzsche diagnosed in “On the Pale Criminal”, where a singular act comes to define a person. 
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 This comes out in what Nietzsche refers to as madness “before the deed”, where the criminal persuades himself 
prior to the act that he was not aiming to kill, but rather to commit robbery. As Nietzsche describes the pale 
criminal, he is haunted by the image of the deed; what he is pointing to in the madness before the deed is that the 
feelings of guilt he feels are compounded by how he feels guilt regarding the motivation of his act. 
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More than defining a person, this kind of guilt develops to the point where it torments a person 
unremittingly. 
Beginning with inherited guilt, we have what is a deeper kind of existential guilt. As 
Nietzsche describes it in the Genealogy, it is defined by a “hatred of the human”. People have 
inherited pervasive feelings of guilt towards the very things that constitute human being: the 
animal in man, the instincts, the body, the sensual, and desires. This is a peculiar aspect of 
human psychology that persists today with people’s attitudes towards sexuality and the body. 
One can trace this denigration of the body back through the history of Christianity all the way 
back to Plato.
74
 This kind of guilt, to which many people are subject, often unbeknownst to them, 
arises in response to our supposedly corrupt nature. Cal Trask, in Steinbeck’s East of Eden, is an 
example of someone suffering from a deep sense of inherited guilt.
75
 He feels that there is 
something dark inside him, something that makes him gravitate towards cruelty, and thus 
something for which he feels continuous guilt. Upon learning the truth about his mother, a 
woman who can be best described as a sociopath, Cal feels that he has inherited the same basic 
nature, essentially confirming his beliefs. He thus looks at himself as fatally flawed, that his path 
is determined for him, and that he must somehow atone for his inherent guilt.
76
 
To get a clearer view of developed guilt, we can look to Tom Hamilton in East of Eden. 
His sister, Dessie, had been experiencing stomach pains, which she described as a pain that 
“scampered up from her side and across her abdomen, a nibbling pinch and then a little grab and 
then a hard catch and finally a fierce grip”, during which “the outside world was blotted out” 
(Steinbeck, 393). Despite trying to hide her excruciating pains, Tom inevitably sees her pale and 
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 For example, see Paul’s Letter to the Romans and Plato’s Phaedo and Republic.  
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 Belief in original sin is one example of the supposed corruption of our nature. Steinbeck offers an evocative 
meditation on the idea of original sin and the generational transmission of sin and guilt in East of Eden. 
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 Interestingly, the Trask family servant, Lee, acts as a therapist for Cal Trask, ultimately getting Cal to see that 
neither his supposed inherited dark nature, nor his various acts of wanton cruelty, define him. Rather, through his 
actions, Cal can forge his own destiny. 
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in obvious pain, at which time he gives her a concoction of “good old-fashioned salts” 
(Steinbeck, 402), which he believes will help treat her stomach pains [what he believes to be a 
stomach ache, based on what his sister has told him]. However, her condition immediately gets 
worse, he contacts a doctor, who upbraids him for what he had given her, and then she dies. 
While the cause of death is not revealed, Tom believes that he caused his sister’s death and is 
beset by profound feelings of guilt. This one event in his life comes to define Tom; as Nietzsche 
said, the exception became the essence. These feelings become so pervasive that Tom 
reinterprets much of his life, e.g., his frequent daydreams about future projects, as well as his 
inability to carry them through to fruition, as a series of failures for which he is guilty. In 
essence, because of one particular failure, Tom comes to look upon his entire life as a failure, for 
which he feels an all-encompassing guilt.
77
 
These two examples from East of Eden capture precisely the deep sickness that needs to 
be treated: pervasive feelings of guilt and the will to self-punishment. Having diagnosed the 
problem, Nietzsche would proceed to characterize this guilt in the same way that he 
characterized the guilt of so-called witches: even though the witches, Cal Trask, and Tom 
Hamilton all felt guilty, this guilt had no justification; it was grounded in imaginary causes. We 
have seen Nietzsche’s diagnosis, just as we have seen his explanation for such guilt and self-
torture in GM II. What we most desire from Nietzsche is an account of how to successfully treat 
it. 
With respect to this final question, there is evidence that Nietzsche was not entirely 
certain if existential guilt could be fully overcome, certainly not in the immediate future, nor 
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 One might counter that these two kinds of existential guilt are exceptions and not the rule. Examples like the ones 
Steinbeck offers are, I would argue, not uncommon. The nature of guilt was clearly one of Steinbeck’s concerns in 
East of Eden, and his novel taps into concerns that have been the source of meditation as far back as the book of 
Genesis. Such examples show that people do have a tendency to turn an isolated act into an act that defines them, 
just as people have a tendency to see themselves as inherently corrupt. And for both of these reasons, people come 
to see themselves as irrevocably guilty. 
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what measures might be most effective in freeing people from deeply entrenched feelings of 
guilt. This seems to be the case in a note from 1888, titled “Redemption from all guilt”, where 
Nietzsche writes that “we halcyonians especially are trying with all our might to withdraw, 
banish, and extinguish the concepts of guilt and punishment from the world, when our most 
serious endeavor is to purify psychology, morality” (WP 765). While Nietzsche and those like 
him are trying, Nietzsche never offers an explanation of how one might purify psychology or 
redeem people from guilt. It is one thing to point out that we have been seduced by a fictitious 
psychology, but it is another thing altogether to untangle ourselves from the grips of a fictitious 
psychology that has held us captive for millennia. Ultimately, this project is an ongoing project, 
as Nietzsche recognized. 
One could argue that one of the goals of the Genealogy is cleansing psychology, though 
this goal animates Nietzsche’s writings from Human All Too Human onwards. Furthermore, if 
we understand “cleansing psychology” as part of Nietzsche’s therapeutic project, we can 
understand most of his writings as being engaged in philosophical therapy in one way or another. 
However, prior to explicating the therapeutic method that runs throughout Nietzsche’s works, 
and just what it needs to “cleanse”, our attention will turn to the specific strategies he briefly 
contemplates at the conclusion of the second essay of the Genealogy. In these three passages 
Nietzsche directs our attention not only to three strategies, but within these three strategies he 
points to the ideal that reinforces pervasive feelings of guilt and our tendency to torture 
ourselves, and thus what ultimately needs to be done to overcome this particular sickness.   
2.4 A Survey of Strategies 
Towards the end of the second essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche ruminates on three ways 
a person might overcome the sickness of bad conscience. He surveys these three ideas with great 
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brevity, never devoting more than a page or two to each respective idea. Furthermore, he never 
goes into any detail on how to put these ideas into practice. He makes a few remarks about the 
potential success of these strategies, pointing out that, at best, they seem to be strategies for 
which humanity is not yet ready, though we may be ready at some time in the future; at worst 
they are not likely to succeed. Given the pessimism about these strategies, one might wonder 
why Nietzsche mentions them at all. It seems highly unlikely that Nietzsche would suggest three 
ideas that he feels are non-starters. Thus we find a puzzle about what we should take from the 
suggestions Nietzsche offers at the end of Genealogy II. 
My claim is that, while these suggestions might not work on their own, they point us in 
two related directions. First, they point to what Nietzsche saw as necessary for overcoming 
feelings of existential guilt: a new ideal to overcome the ascetic ideal (which helps entrench the 
moral modality that supports existential guilt, among other insidious feelings). Secondly, the 
strategies suggested in Genealogy II point to more general approach on how we might work to 
free ourselves from the clutches of the ascetic ideal: philosophical therapy. More than that, 
Nietzsche’s therapeutic practices work to transform a person’s beliefs, emotions, and her general 
approach to life, and thus offer a means of treating pervasive feelings of guilt and the need to 
engage in self-punishment. The aim of this section will be to examine and elucidate what 
Nietzsche had in mind in suggesting atheism might initiate a “kind of second innocence” (II.20); 
what he was trying to convey in saying that “there are more noble ways of making use of the 
fabrication of gods than for this self-crucifixion and self-defilement of man” (II.23); and what is 
necessary to successfully separate bad conscience from humanity’s natural inclinations and wed 
it to humanity’s unnatural inclinations (II.24).   
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Atheism 
“Assuming that we have by now entered into the reverse movement, one might with no 
little probability deduce from the unstoppable decline of faith in the Christian god that there 
would already be a considerable decline in human consciousness of debt [Schuldbewusstseins]
78
 
as well; indeed the prospect cannot be dismissed that the perfect and final victory of atheism 
might free humanity from this entire feeling of having debts to its beginnings, its causa prima. 
Atheism and a kind of second innocence belong together” (GM II.20). The idea here is fairly 
clear: if consciousness of debt [Schuldbewusstseins] is predicated on indebtedness to God that 
can never be repaid, for which human beings are eternally in the wrong, then no longer being 
indebted to God would reduce and ultimately eliminate feelings of this indebtedness. It stands to 
reason that if there is no God to be indebted to, then there should be no feelings of 
indebtedness.
79
 Thus Nietzsche concludes by saying that atheism goes together with a new 
innocence, free from the pervasive feelings of debt [guilt] human beings feel.  
Given the inference Nietzsche draws, one cannot help but look at the religious climate 
today and ask what went wrong with his prediction. There are good reasons to think that “the 
unstoppable decline of faith in the Christian god” was greatly exaggerated.80 Already in the 
1880s Nietzsche saw both that belief was not being undermined, as well as the reason for this. 
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 I agree with Risse (2001) and Leiter (2002) that Schuld should here be translated as ‘debt’, as Diethe translates it, 
and not as ‘guilt’ as Kaufmann, Smith, and Clark & Swensen translate it. First, ‘debt’ fits the context of section 20 
and the preceding section, and makes the context of section 21 clearer, when Nietzsche introduces the moralization 
of debt into guilt.  
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 One might question if the Christian’s experience of God is grounded in this indebtedness about which Nietzsche 
talks. If it isn’t, then it seems that a different explanation of the feeling of guilt is in order. Given the belief that 
existence is a gift from God, to say nothing of the belief that God sacrificed his son for humanity, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the Christian’s experience of God is one of infinite indebtedness, as Nietzsche surmises. 
80
 Europe may have become progressively less and less religious, though it is not clear if there has been a decrease 
in feelings of guilt. In comparison, the United States and the Middle East seem to have seen an increase in 
fundamentalist Christian and Islamic beliefs. Not surprisingly, pervasive talk of sin, responsibility, guilt, and 
punishment mark these cultures. Not only does this infect the people who genuinely believe in it, but the constant 
barrage of religious language can affect those who seek to overcome it. That this is so points to the possibility that 
such beliefs have become a deeper part of us than we realize. 
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People do not have any real understanding about what the death of God means.
81
 The problem 
goes deeper, a fact which Nietzsche also recognized: for even with the decline in the belief in 
God, most people still needed it, and thus the belief persists.
82
 These facts go some way in 
explaining the apparent failure of the diminution of feelings of guilt at present, though they do 
not preclude a genuine change in the future. However, the problem runs deeper still. 
In theory the atheist rejects the whole God-centered world and all of the related elements, 
including not only God, but importantly, the atheist should also reject many conceptions of free 
will, responsibility, sin, guilt, reward, punishment, and the afterlife. What is most peculiar—and 
most problematic—is how deeply embedded in our psyche consciousness of God has become, to 
say nothing of all the associated beliefs that are part of the moral modality. The depth to which 
these ideas are embedded constitutes a serious challenge, suggesting why atheism might not be 
wholly effective in overcoming bad conscience. People may come to profess that they no longer 
believe in God, but the rest of the moral modality remains firmly in place. 
As a telling example, let us recall how Nietzsche diagnosed Schopenhauer, who was an 
ardent atheist who still believed in the basic moral edifice that was supported by belief in God. 
People fail to understand that with the destruction of the foundation—God—everything else 
should crumble with it. “If you break off a main tenet, the belief in God, you smash the whole 
system along with it” (TI IX.5). However, the fact of the matter is that the destruction of the 
foundation did not bring down everything else with it. Nietzsche was clearly aware of this 
problem, for he noted already in 1882 that, while God is dead, like the madman, he had come too 
soon. “Given the way people are, there may still for millennia be caves in which they show his 
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 See GS 343 for a concise statement of Nietzsche’s concern that the recognition and understanding of the death of 
God has not arrived yet. In GS 125 Nietzsche offers a similar, albeit more poetic assessment about how “this 
tremendous event is still on its way”.  
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 See GS 347. 
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shadow” (GS 108).83 Thus we should expect that many of the related beliefs, like belief in sin, 
free will, responsibility, punishment, and guilt will remain part of our moral landscape.
84
 For 
these reasons we can understand how pervasive feelings of guilt have not subsided in any 
significant way. 
Nietzsche clearly anticipated that the “shadows of God” would remain for the foreseeable 
future, and he had a clear understanding why this was the case. Nietzsche notes how “for many 
people’s power of comprehension, the event is itself far too great, distant, and out of the way 
even for its tidings to be thought of as having arrived yet” (GS 343).85 But the claim that is most 
relevant here is that only a select few “know at all what this event really means—and, now that 
this faith has been undermined, how much must collapse because it was built on this faith, leaned 
on it, had grown into it—for example, our entire European morality” (ibid). What follows, he 
goes on to say, is a long period of destruction. One could justifiably question if this period of 
destruction has in fact followed. At most, the battle continues to be fought. 
While Nietzsche was able to see that the repercussions of the death of God were still to 
come, we can question if atheism would precipitate a second innocence. The fact of the matter is 
that people are still prone to overwhelming feelings of existential guilt. Given that, we want to 
know why atheism fails to precipitate a new innocence, where we are free from pervasive 
feelings of guilt. Ridley notes, interestingly, that “it is certainly part of Nietzsche’s project, then, 
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 Nietzsche made very clear one of the tasks that lay before him: “And we—we must still defeat his shadow as 
well!” (GS 108). The question is how to defeat this “shadow”. Intriguingly, five years later Nietzsche would write 
“that the belief in the Christian God has become unbelievable—is already starting to cast its first shadow over 
Europe” (GS 343). 
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 Interestingly, as Nietzsche noted in TI IX.5, the very death of God would result in (Christian) morality becoming 
more entrenched. “They [the English] have got rid of the Christian God, and now think that they have to hold on to 
Christian morality more than ever”. Nietzsche makes a suggestive remark when he observes that “it seems to me that 
the religious instinct is indeed growing vigorously” (BGE 53). 
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 Pippin helpfully explains Nietzsche’s point, stating that “it is certainly true that these atheists do not yet appreciate 
that a great more of the stability of their moral lives is affected by the ‘death of God.’ They do not appreciate that 
their whole picture of human psychology, human sociality, and virtually all nonreligious value is now threatened, 
that belief in God cannot be so isolated and simply given up” (Pippin, 2010; 51, 13n).  
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to show how the valuations of Christian morality can survive the advent of atheism, at least for a 
time” (Ridley, 2005; 42). With this, Ridley goes on to say, we see that part of Nietzsche’s project 
is also to show how guilt can similarly withstand the advent of atheism.
86
 Beyond Ridley, several 
commentators, including May, Risse, Leiter, Owen, and Hatab, have sought to address this very 
question.  
May notes that, even with the advent of atheism, Nietzsche saw that the religious instinct 
was too deeply embedded in humanity, and thus it was left “untouched” by atheism (May, 1999; 
38). May goes on to say that “atheism, in the simple sense of not believing in a deity, is 
insufficient to abolish belief in [timeless, absolute, impartial] standards; and so such atheism will 
not, itself, lead to a ‘second innocence’” (May, 1999; 68). Owen offers a clear and concise 
statement of the core issue: “the decline of belief in God does not weaken our sense of guilt 
because we remain captivated by a metaphysical picture (what Nietzsche will address in the next 
essay as ‘the ascetic ideal’) in which this moralized concept of guilt is held in place” (Owen, 
2007; 109). May and Ridley capture Nietzsche’s basic point: our Platonic-Christian-based values 
are too deeply a part of us to be summarily destroyed by the advent of atheism alone.  
 Leiter offers an additional thought on the issue, writing that “the concept of ‘debt’ [guilt] 
has been ‘moralized’ in a way that makes it invulnerable to atheism” (Leiter, 2002; 239). To say 
that debt [guilt] is invulnerable to atheism just reiterates the question, for we want to know why 
guilt is invulnerable to atheism, why moralization has this effect. Leiter asks the question about 
the “entanglement” of belief in God and guilt, and why no longer believing in God fails to 
eliminate feelings of guilt. Getting to the crux of his interpretation, Leiter claims that 
“Nietzsche’s implicit suggestion is that this drive towards self-torture is too powerful a psychic 
                                                     
86
 Surprisingly, in Ridley’s excellent book on the Genealogy, Nietzsche’s Conscience, he remains silent on the 
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force for a mere cognitive proposition, like the denial of God’s existence, to have any force” 
(Leiter, 2002; 240).
87
  
Hatab also considers Nietzsche’s suggestion that a “second innocence” might follow the 
ascendance of atheism. Hatab explains that it is unlikely to succeed “because of the two-track 
development of religion joined with ‘moralization,’ with the internalization of debt and guilt 
culminating in bad conscience” (Hatab, 2008; 103). Hatab elaborates by pointing to “a 
distinction between mere religious ‘belief,’ which might succumb to the force of modern 
atheism, and moral-religious values that are not a matter of mere cognition but the full shaping of 
a meaningful way of life” (ibid). That is to say, it is not religious belief, e.g., belief in god, that 
atheism will be unable to overcome, but rather the “moral-religious values” that have developed 
in tandem with belief in god. 
According to May, Owen, Leiter, and Hatab, Nietzsche’s suggestion is beset by an almost 
insuperable problem: our entrenched belief in the whole Platonic-Christian moral modality. Is 
this reason though to downplay Nietzsche’s apparent optimism? As Risse asks, “what we want to 
know is whether there is a hope for us to leave the bad conscience behind” (Risse, 2001; 70). 
Risse goes on to characterize Nietzsche’s message as one that evinces optimism, while making 
clear that we need to be cautious. Reflecting on Nietzsche’s optimism and confidence, Risse 
reasons that in time, perhaps in 200 years as Nietzsche imagines, this development will be 
underway. That is to say, people will have come to recognize and understand the full scope of 
the death of God, including all that must perish with it. However, Risse is right to note that just 
as the advent of bad conscience was a change of great magnitude, its disappearance would 
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 In a latter adumbration on this, Leiter reiterates that “the reason, then, that atheism cannot defeat the moralized 
concept of ‘debt’ is because the reasons for this moralization—the drive to self-torture that grows out of the bad 
conscience as internalized cruelty—are so powerful in the psyche that they make real atheism impossible. Indeed, 
the suggestion appears to be that belief in God has become an epiphenomenon of the will to self-torture; giving up 
belief in God, by itself, would simply not affect the deep, underlying structure of internalized aggression that 
originally gave rise to that belief” (Leiter, 2002; 241). 
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likewise be a great change. The big question is what needs to be done to precipitate a genuine 
understanding of what the death of God means. 
The problem, as Nietzsche has worked to get us to see, is that for two millennia we have 
had the entire Christian salvation machinery—God, sin, free will, responsibility, guilt, 
punishment—burned into our being. To simply remove God from the story will not immediately 
undo everything that comes with it, for the entire system is too deeply a part of us. The crucial 
task is figuring out how to treat a problem that has had two millennia to root itself in our 
psychological make-up. In light of the problems with mere atheism as the cure, the work that 
needs to be done should be clear. Hitherto people have simply ripped off the top of the weed, 
without any consideration that the root system, much larger than the weed we see above the soil, 
is still deeply embedded in the soil. What needs to be done is to dig out the root of the weed, for 
then and only then will the weed be completely removed. Similarly, the roots on which guilt 
grows must be completely removed. 
People need to see that atheism alone is not a sufficient condition for overcoming belief 
in and/or feeling of existential guilt, though it seems to be a necessary condition.
88
 More work 
needs to be done to completely untangle a person from the whole moral modality to which we 
adhere.
89
 Nietzsche not only recognized this, but has the resources to address this issue. The 
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 Pippin equates “pale atheists” with the “last man” (see Pippin, 2010; 30). This seems right to me, and helps 
explain the superficial “comprehension” of the meaning of the death of God that we see in GS 125 and elsewhere. 
Pippin thus reminds us of the reaction to the madman’s claim about the death of God, for the madman’s audience 
mock the announcement, indicating their thoughtlessness. These “pale atheists” are clearly missing the significance 
of the event announced, a worry Nietzsche was right to express. Pippin goes on to say that “Nietzsche goes out of 
his way to suggest that what we normally regard as ‘atheism’ is far too simplistic a description of what it would be 
truly to ‘incorporate’ this truth [that God is dead]” (Pippin, 2010; 50). Nietzsche was surely right to say that “if we 
simply called ourselves godless (to use an old expression),  or unbelievers, or even immoralists, we would not think 
that these words came near to describing us” (GS 346). 
89
 One might here ask: how it is that people have overcome the Platonic-Christian moral modality? Legitimately one 
could ask: has anyone genuinely and completely overcome the Platonic-Christian moral modality? 
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suggestion about the additional work that must be undertaken has been repeatedly emphasized: 
philosophical therapy. 
The Greek Gods as a Model 
In roughly one page, Nietzsche makes an intriguing observation in GM II.23 that 
suggests an alternative way of treating, if not avoiding, the problem of existential guilt. He 
begins by noting “that there are more noble ways of making use of the fabrication of gods”. That 
is, the gods need not be used as a means for self-punishment, nor as a legitimization of self-
punishment. The gods can be put to a positive use, like the Greek gods, whom Nietzsche 
characterizes as manifestations of the animal in man, the very things that Christianity would go 
on to devalue with its conception of God. Nietzsche notes that the Greek gods represent a 
different ideal from the Christian ideal.
90
 In contrast to Christianity, which exploits bad 
conscience and legitimizes man’s self-punishment, the Greeks “used their gods precisely to keep 
‘bad conscience’ at arm’s length”.  
In this enigmatic section, what is Nietzsche trying to suggest with his reference to the 
Greeks and their gods? On the one hand, he reminds us that there are alternative conceptions of 
gods, conceptions which can be put in the service of humanity’s well-being, as opposed to 
conceptions that are both the source and a constant reminder of humanity’s supposed corruption. 
Nietzsche says that the Greek gods were able to deify the animal in man
91
, whereas the Christian 
God condemns the animal in man, simultaneously inculcating feelings of guilt for this very 
animal nature. The upshot is that there are conceptions of gods that need not belittle us. 
Nietzsche concludes the section by pointing to how “bad things” were explained for the Greeks: 
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 Leiter (2002) points to the fact that whereas Christianity operates under the ascetic ideal, the Greeks had a 
different ideal, which helped keep the consciousness of guilt at bay. 
91
 “The Greek gods, these reflections of noble and autocratic human beings in whom the animal in man felt itself 
deified and did not tear itself apart, did not rage against itself!” (II.23). 
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“a god must have beguiled him”. Thus the cause of doing bad should not be attributed to man, 
but rather to the gods.
92
 Nietzsche concludes the section by noting that it was not man who 
would feel the sting of guilt, but rather the gods who took guilt upon themselves.
93
  
All the same, this recognition fails to offer a strategy on how to overcome pervasive 
feelings of guilt. While Nietzsche exclaims in A 19 that there has not been a new god in two 
thousand years, there is no reason to believe he is asking us to create new gods that can be put in 
the service of ennobling humanity. Setting aside the implausible idea that this is the aim of GM 
II.23, what else, if anything, can we take from this passage? There are a few points to take from 
this section, a series of minor points about the Greek gods, as well as an important general 
conclusion pointing to what needs to be done to effectively treat pervasive feelings of guilt. 
Starting with the minor points Nietzsche makes about the Greek gods, we can draw the 
following three conclusions about the Greek gods: (1) they were not used to legitimize self-
punishment; (2) they did not serve to devalue humanity; and (3) they could be used to shoulder 
the bulk of the blame, so that individuals were not left to suffer it alone. Given the differences 
between the Greek gods and how the Greeks saw themselves versus the Christian God and how 
Christians see themselves, Nietzsche claims that how we conceive the gods is a reflection of how 
we look at ourselves. Interestingly, Nietzsche later explained that how we look at ourselves 
influences our conception of the gods (A 16-18). If this is the case, then we can infer that 
pervasive feelings of guilt would have existed prior to the Christian God, for God was conceived 
to reflect this feeling people already felt. Furthermore, we then have reason to conclude that 
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 “In this manner the gods served in those days to justify humans to a certain degree even in bad things, they served 
as causes of evil—in those days it was not the punishment they took upon themselves but rather, as is more noble, 
the guilt…” (II.23).  
93
 One might question how plausible an interpretation of the Greeks this is, and May does just that, pondering 
“whether or not these particular conjectures are sound—and it is questionable, for example, whether Homer’s gods 
really claimed the guilt for worldly evil” (May, 1999; 97). 
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there was something grounding the pervasive feeling of guilt prior to belief in the Christian 
God.
94
 What grounds these feelings should be clear by now. 
As noted above, Leiter suggests that while Christianity operates under the ascetic ideal, 
the difference with the Greeks is that they did not, and for that reason they were able to keep 
feelings of guilt at arm’s length. Nietzsche intimates that, instead of operating under the ascetic 
ideal, as Christianity does, there have been other ideals; importantly, this suggests there can be 
other ideals in the future. The point to take then is not that there are alternative conceptions of 
the gods, but that there were, and are, alternative ideals (behind alternative conceptions of the 
gods). I argued above that Nietzsche’s suggestion about atheism points us to the role the ascetic 
ideal plays in grounding the Platonic-Christian moral modality, and that for atheism to be 
victorious, the ascetic ideal must be overcome. In light of this, we should notice how GM II.23 
not only shows that there are alternatives to the ascetic ideal, it also conveys the need for a new 
ideal, even if at this point Nietzsche has said very little about its nature.
95
 In GM II.24-25 
Nietzsche goes on to say a little more about this new ideal, while also offering further thoughts 
about what needs to be done to overcome pervasive feelings of guilt.   
Reversing Bad Conscience 
In the penultimate section of the second essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche offers his third 
and final suggestion on how we might overcome the sickness of bad conscience. Nietzsche 
begins by asking a series of questions, including whether he is here creating or destroying an 
ideal. In response he reiterates a common motif in his thought: for an ideal to be created, an ideal 
must first be destroyed. He proceeds to remind us that our history is defined by continued self-
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 Janaway’s interpretation seems right: the Christian God helps to legitimize feelings of guilt and the self-torture 
with which we punish ourselves; that is to say, the whole Christian interpretation legitimized feelings people had 
already developed. More than that, we have further evidence why no longer believing in God would suffice to free 
one of pervasive feelings of guilt. 
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 One key point Nietzsche gestures at is that this new ideal will not devalue the human, nor will it be justification 
for man’s self-punishment. 
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punishment. For too long humanity has looked upon its natural inclinations as something evil, 
and thus something for which we should not only be ashamed, but something for which we are 
deserving of punishment. Nietzsche then makes it clear that it is the ideal supporting this 
worldview which he seeks to destroy, that is, the ideal which devalues humanity, as well as the 
senses, the body, the drives, desires, and all that makes man a human being.
96
 While he does not 
name this ideal yet, as he has been intimating in the closing sections of GM II, he makes it very 
clear that it is the ascetic ideal that is his target.  
With the target clearly before us, Nietzsche quickly offers a suggestion on how to 
overcome “all ideals hostile to life, ideals of those who libel the world” (GM II.24). One might 
imagine a “reverse attempt”, he suggests, working “to wed to bad conscience the unnatural 
inclinations”. Nietzsche ponders whether we could come to a point where we felt guilty for our 
belief in the beyond and in the devaluation of the human, and thus beat ourselves up for such 
beliefs. This idea seems straightforward on the face of it, though there are obvious questions that 
arise. For example, by what means would we turn our beliefs upside down such that we came to 
feel guilt for what had hitherto been our highest values? If we compare this to abruptly changing 
one’s feelings about enjoying the taste of a food one had hitherto found genuinely repulsive, the 
difficulty of what Nietzsche is asking becomes all too clear. One can no more decide to suddenly 
enjoy the taste of a food that one has always found repulsive than one can suddenly feel good 
about the things one has always felt bad about.
97
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 “The unnatural inclinations, all those aspirations to the beyond, to that which is contrary to the senses, contrary to 
the instincts, contrary to nature, contrary to the animal—in shorts the previous ideals which are all ideals hostile to 
life, ideals of those who libel the world” (GM II.24). 
97
 Setting aside this obvious difficulty, Nietzsche’s seemingly straightforward idea has vexed many readers. Several 
commentators find Nietzsche’s suggestion in GM II.24 not only wishful thinking, but also nigh impossible. For 
example, Ridley (1998) characterizes Nietzsche’s suggestion as advocating that one “learn to feel bad about oneself 
for one’s transgressions against immanence” (Ridley, 1998; 134). Ridley goes on to note the interpretive difficulties 
of Nietzsche’s suggestion, to the point that Ridley concludes that “the idea is incoherent” (ibid). Ridley offers a 
detailed set of distinctions through which he attempts to clarify the various ways that Nietzsche uses the idea of ‘bad 
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Nietzsche does not find the idea incoherent, nor does he seem to think that the task is an 
impossible one, though he does question if this is possible at present. Initially he questions if 
anyone would be strong enough for such a tremendous task. “For this goal one would need a 
different kind of spirits than are probable in this of all ages” (GM II.24). Nietzsche concludes 
that such an undertaking would necessitate great health. Nietzsche, realist that he is, expresses 
uncertainty about whether such a type is at all possible today, but adds that “he must one day 
come” (ibid). Setting aside questions about the possibility of such a type, as well as when he 
might come, given the central concern of this chapter, it behooves us to consider how having the 
great health would help a person overcome the sickness of bad conscience. Additionally, how 
would the great health help a person “wed to bad conscience the unnatural inclinations”? 
While Nietzsche does not directly address any of these questions, the questions are, in a 
sense, asking of Nietzsche something that misunderstands the crux of GM II.24. Great health 
does not help a person overcome the sickness of bad conscience; a person who has great health 
has already overcome this sickness. If we consider GS 382, we find that the person of great 
health is operating under a different ideal than the ascetic ideal. As Nietzsche makes clear in GS 
382, the ideal he has in mind, an ideal his associates with Zarathustra, is an ideal that inverts and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
conscience’. Ridley discerns a “raw” form of bad conscience, a bad form, and a good form in Nietzsche’s various 
uses. In the end Ridley claims that “the only way that Nietzsche’s model of conscience could be squared with having 
one’s natural inclinations entirely out from under the ‘evil eye’ would be to have no conscience at all” (Ridley, 
1999; 135). Risse briefly mentions Nietzsche’s proposal and remarks that “just what this would mean is hard to 
figure out, in particular since it is clear that it must be a process, undoing the bad conscience” (Risse, 2001; 70). 
Hatab captures the concern more succinctly, noting that Nietzsche’s suggestion is confusing, before going on to say 
that “if the natural inclinations stem from bad conscience, then the remedy of bringing bad conscience to these 
inclinations amounts to curing bad conscience with bad conscience” (Hatab, 2008; 105). Hatab finds it peculiar that 
the weapon to be used against bad conscience is bad conscience. This gets at a serious problem, as Nietzsche seems 
to want to continue using the very means (feeling guilty in a moralized sense) he desires to eliminate. However, like 
Ridley, Hatab ponders whether bad conscience admits of different kinds, here examining Nietzsche’s reference to an 
“active” bad conscience before pondering if there is a life-denying sense and a more neutral sense. In the end Hatab 
essentially throws his hands up and concludes that whatever Nietzsche might have in mind with this “reverse 
attempt”, the idea seems at best a future one. In contrast, May (1999) briefly adumbrates Nietzsche’s account, 
without noting any incoherence to the idea proposed. May concludes that “bad conscience is not only residually 
present in this great figure [the redeeming human of the great love and contempt] but is essential to his historic task” 
(May, 1999; 69). At the very least Risse is right in describing this process as involving a momentous change. 
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supplants the values extolled by the ascetic ideal.
98
 Thus we could conclude that this person 
would feel guilty about adhering to the values of the ascetic ideal. In contrast to the gloomy 
seriousness of the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche’s counter-ideal “is the ideal of a spirit that plays 
naively”. As essay two of the Genealogy draws to a close, Nietzsche speaks about “redemption 
from the curse that the previous ideal placed upon it [reality]”, as well as all that had to grow out 
of this ideal, i.e., the devaluation of the human, the world, and life.  
Here one might interject that we have strayed far from the primary topic, asking what this 
has to do with overcoming pervasive feelings of guilt. As I have sought to show, Nietzsche 
recognized that the prospect of overcoming pervasive feelings of guilt and the need to engage in 
self-punishment will not be accomplished solely with a localized treatment, e.g., mere atheism. 
Give how entrenched existential guilt is, how it is buttressed by a host of related notions—God, 
sin, free will, responsibility, and punishment—that are part and parcel of the entire Platonic-
Christian moral modality, nothing short of overcoming the whole modality will completely 
eradicate the host of problems Nietzsche diagnoses. In overcoming the ascetic ideal we should, 
in theory, also overcome the pervasive feelings of guilt and the drive to self-torture that were 
valorized by this ideal. Successful treatment of existential guilt and the need to engage in self-
punishment necessitates getting to the bottom of the matter and addressing the problem at the 
foundation. 
Connecting GM II.20, 23, and 24  
 Individually, the three ideas Nietzsche suggests at the end of GM II are at best modest 
suggestions about how one might possibly attempt to overcome pervasive feelings of guilt. And 
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 There is no doubt that the ideal to which Nietzsche continuously refers as an ideal that can overcome the ascetic 
ideal is the ideal he associates with Zarathustra. Not only does the second essay of the Genealogy conclude with a 
reference to Zarathustra, but Nietzsche later remarks that “there was no counter-ideal—until Zarathustra” (EH 
GM).  
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yet Nietzsche seems to dismiss these ideas as quickly as he raises them, or point to the fact the 
time has not yet come for them now. This creates the puzzle noted at the beginning of section IV. 
We have seen how Nietzsche raises the prospect of a second innocence precipitated by atheism 
in GM II.20, only to then all but deny the possibility in the following section. The reference to 
the Greek gods in GM II.23 is not so much a suggestion about how to keep bad conscience at 
bay, as it is an example of people who plausibly managed to keep it at bay. And we could no 
more return to the Greek gods than create new gods modeled on them. Thus we might wonder 
just what we can possibly take from the idea of GM II.23. Finally, in GM II.24 we find 
Nietzsche’s suggestion to wed bad conscience to our unnatural inclinations. Beyond the question 
of just how this might be accomplished, beyond the possible incoherence of the idea, it is not 
clear how this would address the sickness under consideration. Furthermore, Nietzsche goes on 
to say that to accomplish this goal we would need a different type, people stronger than the 
people of today. Overall, despite Nietzsche’s claim that this type must come someday, GM II 
ends with uncertainty. It seems unlikely that Nietzsche would simply raise a series of strategies 
that were bound to fail. This ought to give us pause. Let us not forget that in Ecce Homo 
Nietzsche described the conclusions of the essays as “ending with absolutely terrible detonations, 
a new truth visible between thick clouds” (EH GM). 
 To come to a stronger conclusion about the “new truth visible between thick clouds” that 
Nietzsche has in mind, we should ask what, if anything, the final sections of GM II have in 
common. As I have sought to show, despite the apparent inadequacy of each suggestion, all three 
do share a common element: a gesture at the ascetic ideal and the need for a counter-ideal to 
overcome it. Atheism is not likely to work, because guilt and the mechanisms that keep it in 
place, including the ascetic ideal, have become too entrenched. The Greeks are an important 
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example of a people who were not overwhelmed with pervasive feelings of guilt, and this was 
due in part to the fact they did not live under the influence of the ascetic ideal. Finally, in the 
penultimate section of GM II, despite initially raising the idea of using bad conscience against 
anti-natural ideals, Nietzsche seems to be directing our attention to his proposed counter-ideal to 
the ascetic ideal, an ideal he associates with Zarathustra.  
 If this is correct, Nietzsche’s implicit suggestion raises more questions than it answers, 
for it is one thing to see what Nietzsche is building towards at the end of GM II, but it is quite 
another to see how overcoming the ascetic ideal is supposed to help us overcome pervasive 
feelings of guilt at present. Nietzsche is uncertain and tentative about the nature of this counter-
ideal. Furthermore, just like the victory of atheism, this ideal is clearly a future ideal, as the time 
for the ideal is not the present. In the immediate future this does not leave us with the most 
optimistic stance on overcoming our pervasive feelings of guilt and predilection for self-torture. 
Nietzsche’s assessment is clear: to genuinely overcome the sickness of bad conscience and its 
associated problems, we must overcome the entire moral modality that keeps this in place. This 
will, of course, take time; for this reason we should not be surprised that Nietzsche repeatedly 
talks about this as a future event. If we are honest about the task before us, we should expect 
nothing less than a long, arduous task to completely liberate ourselves from the reach of the 
ascetic ideal.  
To reiterate the obvious criticism, many will ask what this does for the present, 
particularly the pervasive feelings of guilt from which we suffer today. There are good reasons to 
believe Nietzsche was not only aware of this pressing issue, but that he has also given us an 
example of what needs to be done in the present. We can understand Nietzsche’s project as 
having two related, but separate goals. As we have seen, there is the global goal, overcoming the 
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ascetic ideal and associated values it supports, God, sin, free will, responsibility, punishment, 
and guilt. There is also a local goal, overcoming pervasive feelings of guilt and the need to self-
torture. While these are ostensibly two separate goals, given the interconnectedness of the 
problems, working to overcome one of the problems will invariably help work to overcome the 
other problem. Nietzsche recognized this with the attempt to overcome pervasive feelings of 
guilt and the need to overcome the entire moral modality that supports the notion of guilt. 
Working on the local problem of guilt, though it may not be completely effective in eliminating 
guilt, will help to loosen the grip of the ascetic ideal. Just as the ascetic ideal reinforces guilt, so 
too does guilt reinforce the ascetic ideal. As a means of treating these problems, just as working 
against the ascetic ideal will help overcome feelings of guilt, so too will working to overcome 
feelings of guilt help loosen the grip of the ascetic ideal. 
Throughout Nietzsche’s critical project, be it his genealogical method, his internal 
critique of morality, even the hyperbole, parody, and satire he uses against the Platonic-Christian 
moral modality, part of this project has been to uncover the errors that have been at the 
foundation of many common moral beliefs. This critical project has the basic aim of working to 
free people from the aforementioned moral modality. Similarly, Nietzsche’s therapeutic project 
seeks to disabuse us of feelings of guilt. It is to this topic that we finally turn our attention. 
2.5 Philosophical Therapy 
 In essay two of the Genealogy Nietzsche suggests some intriguing ideas about how we 
might work to overcome pervasive feelings of guilt. A new atheism carries with it potential, but 
atheism alone is not likely to succeed, as Nietzsche recognized. The project of affixing bad 
conscience to the unnatural inclinations suffered from the deep implausibility of asking us to 
“rewire” ourselves. These ideas succeed to the extent that they intimate an alternative method of 
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treating pervasive feelings of guilt. Nietzsche’s therapeutic project sought to realistically treat 
guilt and bring about a new kind of innocence. Thus the project of philosophical therapy offers 
the best treatment, and the strongest possibility, for overcoming the sickness of bad conscience in 
the long term.  
Nietzsche remarks in D 103 that “we have to learn to think differently—in order at last, 
perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel differently”. This succinct remark encapsulates 
the project at hand. Nietzsche’s point is straightforward, illuminating how our beliefs, e.g., in 
God, sin, guilt, punishment, and so forth, have left us psychologically tethered to thinking a 
particular way. And thinking the way we do, within the constraints of a particular moral 
modality, has significantly impacted the way we act and feel, leaving us sick and suffering.
99
 
Thus, prior to successfully treating the damage inflicted by our beliefs, we must come to think 
differently about a whole cluster of mutually supporting beliefs. Philosophical therapy is an 
omnipresent, albeit understated part of Nietzsche’s project designed to help change the way we 
think, thereby laying the groundwork for a psychic revolution. 
Reading Nietzsche as a philosophical therapist has become common, with philosophers 
such as Bernd Magnus, Ken Gemes, Christopher Janaway, and Keith Ansell-Pearson having 
identified this element of Nietzsche’s project.100 To understand how this project works we can 
turn to Magnus, who sees “[Nietzsche’s] texts as self-referentially illuminating diagnostic tools” 
(Magnus, 1988; 153).
101
 Magnus continues by noting that Nietzsche’s texts also serve as “an 
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 “The interpretation … brought new suffering with it, deeper, more inward, more poisonous, gnawing more at life: 
it brought all suffering under the perspective of guilt” (GM III.28). 
100
 Beyond Magnus (1988), Gemes (2006), Janaway (2007), and Ansell-Pearson (2011), see Leiter (2002), Solomon 
(2003), and Ure (2009) for a selection of the work that identifies Nietzsche as engaging in a therapeutic project in 
his writings. 
101
 Magnus reads Nietzsche as a kind of psychoanalytic therapist, who assumes that the reader-patient is ill and 
unlikely to grasp the nature of her illness; to think, perhaps, that she is not ill; that she came to the “physician” for 
different reasons than she acknowledges; and that she will resist treatment, consistently obfuscating the situation at 
hand (Magnus, 1988; 154). 
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invitation to look at the data from a given, altered perspective” (ibid).102 Janaway helpfully 
elaborates on these ideas, pointing out that “the first part of the therapeutic process is to diagnose 
the functions that such evaluations (concepts, beliefs, desires, emotional attachments, and 
aversions) fulfil for those who make them” (90).103 In essence, Nietzsche’s philosophical therapy 
effectively begins with his many diagnoses, where the nature of the illness is determined. Once 
the nature of the illness has been determined, the difficult part of the project, treatment, begins: 
getting a person to think differently and then getting her to feel differently.  
Ansell-Pearson, in his afterward to Dawn, has written a thoughtful commentary that 
captures both the diagnostic and the positive goals of Nietzsche’s therapeutic project.104 The 
positive notion of philosophical therapy, which Ansell-Pearson takes from Pierre Hadot, is 
“centered on a concern with the healing of our own lives” (381). While vague, this captures part 
of Nietzsche’s positive project. Ansell-Pearson continues by characterizing Nietzsche’s 
philosophical therapy as working to emancipate man “from fear, superstition, hatred of the self 
and the body, the short cuts of religion, and the presumptions of morality” (366).105 Ansell-
Pearson is surely correct to highlight the goal of healing in Nietzsche’s thought, as it is a goal 
that is under-appreciated. Nietzsche is clearly working to help humanity overcome “hatred of the 
human” in all of its manifestations, just as he is seeking to demystify the world.  
Ansell-Pearson continues, describing Nietzsche’s goal as the “search for an authentic 
mode of existence (398) and “new possibilities for life” (407). These are surely goals, at the end 
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 To help achieve this, Magnus highlights that the reader must be attentive to not only what Nietzsche has to say, 
but also the way Nietzsche says it. This point will be dealt with below. 
103
 Janaway continues, explain how “the second part of the therapeutic process is to overcome the need to hold the 
evaluative attitudes one has inherited, and to create new evaluations which are expressive of one’s own strength, 
unity of character, or affirmation of life” (91). 
104
 Dawn, as found in the 2011 Stanford UP translation of the critical edition of Nietzsche’s writing.  
105
 Elsewhere Ansell-Pearson describes this therapeutic element as part of a larger project aiming at demystification 
(384) and freeing us from our delusions (378). Janaway identifies the same goal, noting that in “Nietzsche’s mature 
writing, and the Genealogy in particular, aim to release the reader from the ‘illness’ allegedly manifest in adhering 
to moral evaluations of a Christian or post-Christian nature” (91). 
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of which we might characterize Nietzsche’s goal as helping humanity regain a joyful existence. 
This is a distant goal, of course, a goal that is preceded by several intermediate goals. We can 
identify one of Nietzsche’s goals by keeping in mind the primary issue at hand, overcoming 
pervasive feelings of guilt. As this is our present concern, we can characterize one of Nietzsche’s 
intermediate goals as attaining a more measured, more realistic view of ourselves, our agency, 
and our place in the world. If this can be accomplished, we should be able to ward off, if not 
prevent debilitating feelings of guilt. The simplest formulation of a key part of Nietzsche’s 
project has already been articulated: we need to learn to think differently. And Nietzsche has 
identified many of the areas where we need to learn to think differently.   
Having laid out Nietzsche’s therapeutic goals above, we can turn to how he works to 
effect such changes. Nietzsche recognized that both argumentation and direct evidence against a 
belief routinely fail to convince a person.
106
 For these reasons, Nietzsche informs us that he does 
not refute, he puts on ice.
107
 Similarly, he said that it is not our reasons that refute something, but 
rather our taste.
108
 The question then is how Nietzsche works to accomplish the task of changing 
a person’s tastes. One of Nietzsche’s strategies, as a number of commentators have identified, is 
to affectively engage people, to which I will turn momentarily.
109
 Nietzsche’s affective 
engagement, as well as his general provocations, aims at creating an inner tension, getting people 
to smell the “bad air”, and arousing feelings of disgust. 
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 Recent studies in psychology have shown that people obstinately stick to their beliefs in the face of contradicting 
evidence. Given this peculiar quirk of human psychology, an alternative strategy is necessary to get people to 
change their beliefs. See Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler’s “When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political 
Misperceptions” in Political Behavior, June 2010, Volume 32, Issue 2, pp 303-330. This article explains the 
“backfire effect”, where “individuals who receive unwelcome information may not simply resist challenges to their 
views. Instead, they may come to support their original opinion even more strongly.” 
107
 A 53, EH HH.1 
108
 For example, Nietzsche writes that “what decides against Christianity now is our taste, not our reasons” (GS 
132). 
109
 Owen (1995, 2007), Gemes (2006), and Janaway (2007) all give treatments of Nietzsche’s affective engagement 
with his readers. 
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Nietzsche had remarked that is writings reflect “the most multifarious art of style that 
anyone has had at his disposal”, necessary to “communicate a state, an inner tension of pathos” 
(EH III.4). Nietzsche’s stylistic display ranges from strident polemics, to the use of irony, to 
parody, and to hyperbole.
110
 This “multifarious art of style” was essential to Nietzsche’s 
provocations, as the disgust and inner tension he sought to arouse were fundamental to the 
success of his project. To the degree he can arouse disgust and inner tension, Nietzsche has set 
the groundwork for changes in belief, taste, and ultimately a psychic transformation. 
Janaway, in his insightful treatment of Nietzsche’s philosophical styles and the ways he 
affectively engages his readers, focuses on Nietzsche’s use of rhetorical devices designed to 
provoke the reader and her affects. Janaway remarks that Nietzsche “sets out to embarrass, 
amuse, tempt, shame, and revolt the reader” (91). The expectation is that, when successful, 
Nietzsche will have not only emotionally affected us, but in doing so will have unveiled 
something hitherto veiled, forcing a person to genuinely reflect on her value commitments. It is, 
of course, one thing to provoke one’s readers, for that is not a difficult task. It is another thing to 
provoke one’s readers in such a way that the discomfiture they feel triggers deep psychic 
upheaval, forcing a genuine reevaluation of their values and commitments.  
This brings us to the crux of the matter, how Nietzsche’s rhetoric could be put into 
service to create psychic tension, thereby provoking people to genuinely reflect on their values, 
and ideally, precipitating changes in a person’s deeply held values. Janaway offers some ideas on 
how this might be done before turning to a compelling example in essay one of the Genealogy: 
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 As Ansell-Pearson describes it, Nietzsche engages his readers by dramatizing the issues “through a series of 
parables, thought experiments, imagined conversations, and the like” (Ansell-Pearson, 2011; 373). Through this 
Nietzsche makes “his work an unsettling provocation for both his philosophical antagonists and his readers” (Ansell-
Pearson, 2011; 374).  
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“Detach people from their practice of making moral judgments, thereby enabling them to 
feel non-moral inclinations and aversions. … Show them the inherited affects of which 
these [moral] judgments are the ex post facto rationalizations. … Provoke affective 
responses in them, and invite them to reflect on the explanation for their having them” 
(99).  
 
As an example of how this works, Janaway argues that Nietzsche makes his readers 
uncomfortable through his characterizations of the noble and the slave types. Focusing on his 
description of the nobles, he describes them as “monsters” who act in “hideous” ways, evincing 
“horror”. Janaway is surely right that Nietzsche’s descriptions evoke feelings of disgust from our 
modern standpoint.
111
 Yet at the same time, Nietzsche’s language also evinces different reactions 
from the reader, who may see the nobles as exhibiting various admirable qualities. And it is this 
mixed response, feelings of disgust and admiration, which can get the reader to reflect on her 
value commitments.
112
 Similarly, as the recognition of who triumphed over the “evil” nobles 
becomes clearer, Nietzsche’s readers “become conscious of himself or herself as an inheritor of 
affects whose origin is ‘slavish’” (Janaway, 2007; 101). This can bring about genuine rumination 
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 Janaway writes that with GM I.14 Nietzsche turns his attention from “a past-directed enquiry into a critique who 
focus is the here and now, the present attitudes of the reader” (Janaway, 2007; 103). Janaway is right to note this 
aspect of Nietzsche’s writing in the Genealogy, the oscillation back and forth between the historical and the present, 
a strategy very evident in GM I.12, where Nietzsche clearly addresses the problems of modernity.  
112
 Furthermore, we (the reader) get to see the contradictory claims denigrating the power of the nobles, while at the 
same time seeing the desires of the weak as themselves being rooted in a desire for power. Power is, on the one 
hand, condemned in the strong, and yet at the same time coveted by the weak. As Janaway describes it, feeling the 
pull of these two claims the reader will feel disgust. He continues by noting how “barbaric domination over others 
makes us uneasy; a value system whose origin is in a drive to domination over others, but which pretends that its 
origin is in something ‘higher’, should trouble us as much, or more” (Janaway, 2007; 102). 
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on one’s value commitments, the kind of thinking differently that is necessary to learning to feel 
differently.
113
  
While we find evidence of Nietzsche doing this in the Genealogy, what we want to see is 
concrete examples showing that this kind of therapeutic work can bring about genuine changes. 
Evidence suggests that this method of affective engagement does work, as can be seen in a recent 
example.
114
 Studies have shown that when people try to reason with others about the supposed 
connection between vaccinations and autism, they have been unsuccessful in convincing those 
who are opposed to vaccinations to change their beliefs. Reasoning with people “that their belief 
is not scientifically supported often backfires”, as contradicting evidence can actually help to 
reinforce a false belief.
115
 One of the issues is that people focus on the supposed risks of 
vaccines. Instead of focusing on the risks of getting vaccinated, the study sought to convey the 
risks of not getting vaccinated. By seeing images of what could happen to their children if they 
opt against vaccination, and by hearing accounts from parents of disease-stricken children, 
people’s attitudes towards vaccinations changed in a positive way. Where reasoning and 
argumentation fail, a person can be emotionally affected by seeing harmful effects and what will 
horrify, both of which can generate the psychic tension needed to precipitate reflection, new 
beliefs, and a psychic transformation.
116
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 “If [Nietzsche’s] reader has arrived at and adheres to his or her values in the manner hypothesized by Nietzsche’s 
moral psychology, then Nietzsche’s chosen way of writing is well calculated to begin the process of detaching him 
or her from those values and enabling the revaluation he prefigures in the Preface to the Genealogy” (91). 
114
 https://news.illinois.edu/blog/view/6367/234202 See “Countering Antivaccination Attitudes”, Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 112:33 (2015): 10321-10324. See also “When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of 
Political Misperceptions” in Political Behavior, June 2010, Volume 32, Issue 2, pp 303-330. This article explains 
the “backfire effect”, where “individuals who receive unwelcome information may not simply resist challenges to 
their views. Instead, they may come to support their original opinion even more strongly.” 
115
 “A previous study attempted to moderate people’s anti-vaccination views using a variety of approaches, 
including challenging anti-vaccine fears and sharing science-based information about the dangers of preventable 
diseases. All of the approaches failed” (ibid). 
116
 In Camus’ “Reflections on the Guillotine”, we have another example of how seeing the horrors of something 
firsthand can precipitate a radical reorientation in ways argumentation does not seem capable. Camus recounts that 
his father went to witness the execution—which he supported—of a man who had killed a family of farmers. “What 
[68] 
 
In a similar way, Nietzsche shows the negative effects that follow from belief in God, sin, 
and guilt, often in evocative, deliberately provocative ways. It is one thing to try and overcome 
feelings of guilt by arguing that God does not exist, or arguing that our grandiose conceptions of 
free will and responsibility are misguided and need revision. It is quite another thing to read 
accounts of people cruelly punished for being witches, or hear accounts of people tormented by 
guilt because they believe their natural sexual desires are impure and a sign of something deeply 
wrong with them. Nietzsche’s rhetoric clearly aims to get a visceral reaction from his readers. 
Only in seeing the harmful effects of such beliefs will people begin to question these deeply held 
beliefs.
117
  
Nietzsche’s texts effectively become the “therapist” with whom the reader is conversing. 
Through a patient reading of Nietzsche’s texts, the reader is engaging in a similar kind of therapy 
to that which one might undergo with an actual therapist. Of course, Nietzsche’s writings differ 
from an actual therapist in that a therapist can offer personal responses to a patient, whereas 
Nietzsche’s writings cannot. Nonetheless, if the reader does as Nietzsche asks, if she slowly 
works through the text, if she genuinely ruminates on the issues at hand, the text can take on a 
more personal nature. As the goal is cleansing a person of her psychological disorder, Nietzsche 
suggests that one must slowly work through the problems. This is what Nietzsche’s texts 
                                                                                                                                                                           
he saw that morning he never told anyone. My mother relates merely that he came rushing home, his face distorted, 
refused to talk, lay down for a moment on the bed, and suddenly began to vomit. He had just discovered the reality 
hidden underneath the noble phrases with which it [execution] was masked” (Camus, 175; 1960). 
117
 A particularly good example of this can be found in GM I.15, where Nietzsche quotes Tertullian and Aquinas. 
While Nietzsche might not be focused on showing us the harmful effects of beliefs—though one could easily argue 
that taking joy in the profound suffering of others is an indicator that a person’s moral compass has been deeply 
corrupted—he is presenting an example clearly intended to horrify us. In GM I.15 Nietzsche quotes Tertullian and 
Aquinas about the bliss Christians will feel in paradise, a bliss magnified by seeing the torment of the damned. 
Reading Tertullian at length about the great joy experienced in seeing the damned suffer should be unsettling to the 
reader, thereby creating psychic tension or discomfort. There are, no doubt, many questions that could be asked 
about GM I.15, e.g., whether the Aquinas and Tertullian passages Nietzsche has quoted are truly representative of 
Christianity. One might also worry that some Christians will read the passages from Aquinas and Tertullian and 
agree with them, delighting in the torment of the damned. In such cases we see that what might be used to provoke, 
horrify, and create psychic tension, can backfire and generate radically different emotions. 
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frequently do. They are not only diagnostic, but they also work to illuminate perspectives we 
typically do not see, let alone think about.  
More than that, through a kind of affective engagement, Nietzsche creates the possibility 
of getting a person to feel an inner tension, which, if felt, can lead to genuine reflection on her 
value commitments. For example, if Janaway is correct, Nietzsche expertly unveils the drive for 
power, which we condemn in the nobles, as underlying our values of good and evil.
118
 If we 
genuinely feel this tension, instead of just pushing our awareness of it away, then we are forced 
to reflect on our value commitments. Thus we see that one of the goals lies with getting people to 
not only feel this tension, but to force people to reflect upon it. 
*** 
Having elucidated Nietzsche’s general therapeutic strategies, our attention can return to 
guilt, applying Nietzsche’s lessons to this particular case. To begin, we should recall that the 
object of Nietzsche’s criticism is existential guilt, i.e., the pervasive, debilitating feeling of guilt 
that, as Risse describes it, is “a persistent feeling of imperfection” and thus “a condition that 
shapes one’s whole existence” (Risse, 2005; 46)119. As May and Risse have rightly noted, what 
Risse called “locally reactive guilt” is neither Nietzsche’s target nor something we would want to 
eliminate, as it can play a positive role in a person’s life, depending on the person and the 
situation. What then would Nietzsche have us do to overcome the pervasive feeling of guilt? 
The first lesson, the new perspective which Nietzsche hopes to open our eyes to, which 
he reiterated time and time again, is that existential guilt is, in most cases, nothing more than a 
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 “A system of values which exists to fulfill (in imagination) the drive towards power should falsely pass itself off 
as in opposition to the drive towards power” (Janaway, 2007; 105-106). 
119
 May echoes this, describing “moralized guilt” as “when guilt becomes conceived as constitutive of life” (May, 
1999; 59). 
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belief in a false or imaginary cause.
120
 People may believe they are naturally imperfect or 
corrupt, and people may believe a particular action comes to define them as forever guilty, but 
Nietzsche argues that this is not so. Echoing a line from D 103, we can succinctly capture 
Nietzsche’s position as follows: “I deny existential guilt as I deny alchemy, that is, I deny its 
premises; but I do not deny that there have been those who believed in its premises and acted in 
accordance with them.” It is one thing to point out that existential guilt has no legitimate 
justification (and thus should not be felt), but quite another to get a person to a point where she 
not only acknowledges that such guilt is grounded in imaginary causes, but also feels an inner 
suspicion and disgust toward this belief in guilt. Both the cognitive and the non-cognitive 
changes are necessary to get to a point where a person is no longer crushed by pervasive feelings 
of guilt.  
One of the strategies that can help precipitate these changes in a person is affective 
engagement. As Janaway explains Nietzsche’s therapeutic approach, one of Nietzsche’s goals is 
to communicate an inner tension. We have seen this at work in essay one of the Genealogy, 
where the reader comes to feel the tension between her inheritance of certain values, for which 
she feels admiration, but at the same feels disgust. The person feels an inner tension, which, at a 
minimum, forces reflection on her values. The rhetorical detonations of GM I do not seem to 
have any obvious analogues in GM II, which might actively work to create the same inner 
tension that we find in the first essay.
121
 Given that, how does Nietzsche affectively engage the 
reader on the question of existential guilt?  
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 There are good grounds for thinking that, in certain horrific cases, e.g., Truman’s decision to authorize dropping 
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when most high-ranking U.S. military officials felt their use was 
unnecessary, pervasive feelings of guilt can undoubtedly arise. In such a case, these feelings would have a legitimate 
justification, differentiating them from the imaginary causes, e.g.,  indebtedness to God, Nietzsche criticizes. 
121
 See GM I.14 for an excellent example of Nietzsche’s rhetoric, where he unveils the disquieting origin of many 
cherished virtues like justice, humility, patience, and so forth, in hatred, revenge, cowardice, and a desire for power. 
The closest Nietzsche comes to GM I.14 might be in GM II.18, where he tells us of the pleasure the “selfless, the 
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While GM II seems to lack the same “increasing unrest” present in GM I, there are 
unpleasant truths rumbling in the distance (EH GM). Existential guilt (and plausibly, locally-
reactive guilt too) is shown to not only have its foundation in indebtedness, but as Nietzsche 
points out, its origin was “drenched in blood” (GM II.6). This might give the reader pause. 
Toward the end of the essay Nietzsche builds on this claim, emphasizing that indebtedness to 
God reaches a fervor pitch when God sacrificed himself for humanity’s sins and guilt. Nietzsche 
describes this as “the paradoxical and horrifying remedy” (GM II.21). This sacrifice should give 
the reader pause, not only for how paradoxical it is, but also for how gruesome a remedy it is. 
And yet, it is not an actual remedy, but rather deepens the sickness, resulting in “the will of man 
to find himself guilty and reprehensible to the point that it cannot be atoned for … to be tangibly 
certain of his absolute unworthiness” (GM II.22). Another disconcerting tension is brought to 
light: “in this night of torture and absurdity the cry love resounded … of redemption in love”. 
Those who understand Nietzsche’s illuminations will “turn away, seized by an invincible horror” 
(ibid). If Nietzsche is able to convey the absurdity of the whole Christian salvation machinery, 
God sacrificing himself, humanity’s absolute worthlessness, the self-punishment humanity 
subjects itself to, and the idea that it was all done out of love, then we should feel a profound 
inner tension. This should force a person to begin to reflect on her feelings of guilt and 
everything that supports these feelings. More than that, feeling this tension can help to precipitate 
the psychic transformation that ultimately needs to occur to free a person from existential guilt. 
While creating an inner tension through affective engagement is a start, Nietzsche’s 
therapy also aims to “cleanse psychology” in other ways. Broadly speaking, Nietzsche’s critical 
project works to show us that with the death of God, not only the edifice, but everything that it 
                                                                                                                                                                           
self-denying, the self-sacrificing feel from the very start: this pleasure belongs to cruelty”. The unegoistic as a moral 
value, Nietzsche concludes, derives from the will to self-punishment. Thus one might acknowledge Nietzsche has 
cast a shadow over selflessness, making people get their first glimpse of an uncomfortable truth. 
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supports, must also fall.
122
 However, as we saw above, and as Nietzsche quickly recognized, 
knocking over the first domino does not immediately get the rest of the dominoes to fall. Thus to 
merely remove God (or certain conceptions of agency, freedom, and responsibility) from the 
picture will not immediately free us from dark, pervasive feelings of guilt.  
Recognizing the difficulty of the full work that needs to be done, initiating both a 
cognitive and a psychic transformation, one of Nietzsche’s initial goals is to awaken us to the full 
significance of the death of God. People need to intellectually comprehend the ramifications of 
the death of God, but ultimately, people need to emotionally supersede the need for God. While 
removing God from the picture is no easy achievement, Nietzsche reasons that existential guilt 
should begin to diminish when a person has accomplished the psychic transformation he has in 
mind. If a person can bring about a genuine emotional catharsis necessary for a complete psychic 
transformation, this would help make ideas of God, original sin, humanity’s innate corruption, 
and guilt all lose their hold on a person.  
Here one might question just how much of a problem deeply-rooted existential guilt is in 
modernity. While fewer people today are susceptible to the belief that we are innately corrupt 
because of religious reasons like original sin, there can be no doubt that many people continue to 
see themselves as deeply guilty, even inherently guilty. We can attribute this to how deeply 
entrenched guilt consciousness is in human beings. Though it persists, there is no longer any 
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 Bergmann succinctly explains what Nietzsche is at pains to communicate about the death of God: “the entire 
coterie of concepts [free will, responsibility, punishment, guilt] that articulate morality are in the same position as 
that in which common agreement places the idea of ‘sin’”, which is “by definition nothing other than the 
transgression of a commandment pronounced by God” (Bergmann, 1988; 37). Bergmann then concludes that, as 
God goes, so too must belief in transgressions against God’s commandments. Applying this to guilt, Bergmann 
rightly points out that “it was highly defined and specific, and it was only possible in the web of quite particular 
stories and ideas” (Bergmann, 1988; 37). In effect, like Bergmann and others have argued, these concepts can no 
longer apply at present in the ways they did in the past. To retain these concepts as if nothing had changed is to 
commit a serious error. “The claim is that the connection is conceptual, that the full meaning of any of these terms 
… cannot be captured or restated if one separates them off the belief in God” (Bergmann, 1988; 38). Similar 
arguments can be found in Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958), MacIntyre’s After Virtue (1981), and 
Williams’ Shame and Necessity (1993). 
[73] 
 
need for the religious supposition to explain such guilt. The sources of deeply-root guilt are 
abundant today.
123
  This can be seen all the time, as a person’s sense of self is routinely crushed 
by everyday failures, generating deep feelings of guilt. A person who has caused a calamitous 
disaster almost invariably feels intense guilt. Following Sartre, there is the gaze of the Other, so 
pervasive in modern life, which can deeply affect the way we look at ourselves and our 
actions.
124
 As Rousseau diagnosed modernity, we are constantly comparing ourselves to others, 
seeing the ways in which we do not live up to our own (corrupted) normative expectations, 
which leads to feelings of inadequacy and guilt. This brings us to what may be the most frequent 
source of existential guilt.
125
  
One of the most common reasons people feel existential guilt is because a local failure is 
unjustifiably generalized into a global failure. As we saw above, the case of Tom Hamilton in 
East of Eden illustrates this development: because of a local failure (if it was even that), Tom 
Hamilton inferred that he was inherently guilty, which pushed him to commit suicide. This 
example points to the second lesson to take from Nietzsche, that we should not generalize local 
failures into global failures that are taken to be indicative of a person’s existential guilt. As we 
saw in section III, Nietzsche’s discussion in “On the Pale Criminal” diagnoses this very point, 
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 In talking with a colleague, she noted that the demands of being a mother and the dean of academic affairs have 
often precipitated feelings of intense guilt that she is not being the best mother to her children that she could be. 
When she is unable to reconcile these two aspects of her life, guilt casts a pall over her and everything she does. 
Recognizing how this is only one aspect of her life, and thus does not define her, helps to alleviate these feelings. 
She added that understanding life will go on even when she misses her daughter’s recital, and that another recital 
will be forthcoming, similarly helps to alleviate feelings of guilt that can otherwise quickly subsume her. While my 
colleague put to use various strategies that helped to alleviate, and possibly prevent, overwhelming feelings of guilt, 
the fact she would still occasionally feel this way suggests that she was still under the influence of the moral 
modality Nietzsche seeks to overcome.  
124
 See Being and Nothingness, particularly Sartre’s discussion of “The Look” in Part Three, Chapter One, section 
IV. 
125
 This is only one of the many problems Rousseau diagnoses in the First and Second Discourses. See Discourse on 
the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men for Rousseau’s remarks on the problems that stem from 
comparing ourselves with others, as well as conjectural remarks on the cause. 
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describing the madness that drives a person to such reasoning.
126
 People need to understand that 
who they are is not defined by a single act, that it is a kind of madness to reason this way. 
Beyond that, Nietzsche points to the need to better understand not only our motivation for acting, 
but in acting, we must learn to live up to what we do, difficult as it may be. Achieving this kind 
of self-understanding and self-confidence would help to prevent the roots of existential guilt 
from growing in us. 
Even for the person who develops this new self-understanding and learns how to live 
with her actions, there are times when her actions may bring about unintended and unexpected 
consequences, consequences which can be horrific, leaving her crushed by what has happened. 
Given this unpredictability, people may find themselves in situations where they develop 
pervasive feelings of guilt. Such feelings arise not only because people generalize local failures 
into a global failure, but also in virtue of the horrific consequences. One might thus criticize 
Nietzsche for not acknowledging how an unpredictable world impacts a person’s feelings of 
responsibility and guilt. Nietzsche was aware of both the unpredictability of the world as well as 
our prejudices with respect to agency and responsibility. Part of his project was to help us to see 
when responsibility and guilt were justified and when they were unjustified. In cases where 
something unexpected and horrible happens, while there may be grounds for feeling some degree 
of fault, the inference that one is thus guilty is unwarranted.    
Thus we see that not only do we generalize local failures into global failures, but we fail 
to even distinguish mere failures from those things for which we should feel guilt. Nietzsche is 
surely right that we are prone to egregious errors in reasoning about our own agency. Given this, 
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 It is one thing to illuminate that people do have a tendency to reason this way, but an important question that 
needs to be answered is: why do we reason this way? One possibility about why a person concludes that one act (the 
exception) comes to define who she is may be a direct result of a fragmented understanding of her self, as well as a 
narrow understanding of the role of situational factors in any given act. People are quick to place responsibility for 
an act on themselves or others. More than that, as Nietzsche said in Daybreak, “guilt is always sought wherever 
there is failure” (D 140). 
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part of Nietzsche’s project is to disabuse us of such errors. For example, we need to learn to 
distinguish those things for which we should feel guilt from those for which we should not. To 
return to Tom Hamilton’s case, there can be no doubt that he is the recipient of bad luck.127 Not 
knowing the nature of his sister’s sickness, a sickness she was always dissembling, there should 
be no doubt that he was not responsible for her death. Whatever failure(s) Tom committed, while 
he may acknowledge some degree of fault, he errs when he infers that he was solely and 
completely at fault. More than that, it is a terrible inference to conclude that his failure made him 
guilty beyond the possibility of atonement. 
One might ask how it is that we are to distinguish acts that our own versus those that we 
should not claim as our own. This would go a long way towards helping a person discern when 
she should feel guilt and when she should not. Knowing when an act is truly one’s own can be 
quite difficult, as we saw in Tom Hamilton’s case. There is no doubt that people are prone to bad 
reasoning, but people also routinely avoid engaging in any serious self-evaluation. Given this, an 
important lesson to take from Nietzsche is that people need to engage in genuine self-evaluation. 
Even when we engage in serious self-reflection, our motives and desires are frequently more 
hidden than people realize, or want to realize. This seriously complicates the task of knowing 
which acts are my own and which acts are not.
128
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 Here we see one of the lessons that can be taken from Nietzsche’s discussion of the Greeks in GM II.23 and how 
instead of feeling guilty for an act that had gone wrong they looked at the situation as arising from “foolishness” and 
“lack of understanding”. 
128
 To help facilitate this, Nietzsche draws a lesson drawn from the Stoics, who offer a suggestion about how we 
might come to see our actions in a new way. “Nietzsche recognizes that a therapy of the (painful) emotions is 
possible only through some kind of cognitive reorientation—or shift—in our evaluative judgments of such events” 
(Ure, 2009; 66). To gain genuine insight into our reasons for action, as well as what we may or may not be 
responsible for, we need to see experiences in a detached, objective manner, moving past biases against ourselves 
and the need to find someone (ourselves) responsible. According to Nietzsche, “we adjudge the value and meaning 
of an event more objectively when it happens to another than we do when it happens to us”. Thus Nietzsche 
contends that we need “to view our own experiences with the eyes which we are accustomed to view them when 
they are the experiences of others” (D 137). This will help us achieve not only a new perspective on our experiences, 
but in doing so will help us see our failures in a clearer manner. Ideally this will help us avoid immediately inferring 
guilt where failure occurs. While this may offer a helpful way to look at our acts and ourselves in a different light, 
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Nietzsche frequently questioned to what degree we could know the cause(s) of our 
acts.
129
 Bergmann highlights this difficulty with the helpful example of artistic inspiration, noting 
that “one does not know where one’s best ideas come from—which chance encounter, which 
fragment of an overheard conversation, which whiff of passing air, may have triggered or 
inspired them” (Bergmann, 1988; 43).130 This might be qualified by noting that “one does not 
always know”, and for this reason it seems questionable to feel completely responsible for one’s 
best ideas. However, that is not reason to summarily dismiss any responsibility. We should 
cultivate a more measured view of responsibility, just as we should cultivate a more measured 
view of the kind(s) of guilt that a person should feel.
131
 This point can be seen across many areas 
of life, not just the artist in Bergmann’s example. The complex web of connections in scientific 
research, or athletics, to take two straightforward examples, should make us question just how 
careful we should be about attributing responsibility to a particular scientist or athlete. The same 
can be said about attributing responsibility and guilt in any situation.
132
  
Athletic competition provides an example from which we might draw other important 
lessons. To take a common example, if a basketball player misses a game-winning shot at the 
end of the game, or a baseball player strikes out with the tying run at third base, the players often 
                                                                                                                                                                           
there are reservations to keep in mind, for we may judge others more fairly than we judge ourselves, but all too often 
we can be much harsher on others than we are on ourselves. If we adopt this harsher perspective on ourselves, the 
potential for holding ourselves responsible and ultimately finding ourselves guilty at all costs only increases. In 
effect, the way we judge others can be a useful model, but it needs to be used with caution.  
129
 See D 115, 116, 119, 130, and GS 335. How then, one might interject, can I learn to engage in critical self-
evaluation about whether or not I am responsible and guilty if I cannot know the cause(s) of my acts? 
130
 Bergmann notes that something close to “divine omniscience” would be needed to truly adjudicate whether a 
person was or was not responsible and guilty in a given situation. 
131
 It is one thing to understand the limits of one’s responsibility, but coming to feel the limits of one’s responsibility 
does not always follow such understanding. While understanding is an important element in overcoming pervasive 
feelings of guilt, understanding alone will not bring about this change. Nietzsche’s treatment of the topic suggests 
that understanding can only get us so far; coming to truly feel the limits of one’s responsibility takes not only time 
and effort, but a complete psychic transformation. 
132
 The ideas of acknowledged fault and degrees of fault, and their contrasts with responsibility and guilt, I owe to 
William Schroeder. Over the course of several conversations he helped me to see the ways in which a person can 
acknowledge her faults, take responsibility for them, and yet avoid succumbing to feelings of guilt. This idea, I came 
to see, was a much healthier alternative to the poisonous kinds of guilt that Nietzsche sought to overcome. 
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beat themselves up about such failures. Interestingly though, players often quickly come to 
acknowledge their failures (as local) and move on, even using their failure, heartbreaking though 
it was, as an impetus for self-improvement. At the same time, the ability to forget—a point 
Nietzsche briefly highlights at the beginning of essay two of the Genealogy—is of the utmost 
importance, for a successful athlete cannot allow themselves to be undermined by past 
failures.
133
 While some athletes continue to beat themselves up for a local failure, transforming it 
into a global failure, this seems less common. And it is rare to hear that an athlete feels pervasive 
feelings of guilt about being responsible for a devastating loss.
134
 This seems a more measured 
view of failure, but more than that, it seems a justified view given the misplaced importance on 
that late-game plays, decisions, and errors. For example, statisticians have shown that missed 
shots late in an NBA game are no more important than earlier missed shots in a game. In the 
same way, we should work to reach a point where we can acknowledge our failures, forget them 
or learn from them, and ultimately move past them, though this is all much easier said than done. 
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 The value of forgetting is not unique to Nietzsche’s later writings, as he had emphasized the value of forgetting 
and its role in a person’s psychological health as early as the Untimely Meditations, particularly HL and SE. To take 
one example, Nietzsche writes that, “it is always the same thing that makes happiness happiness: the ability to 
forget” (HL, 1). Nietzsche goes on to say that “forgetting is essential to action of any kind” and that “it is altogether 
impossible to live at all without forgetting” (ibid). One must learn to forget things, lest one be crushed by the past. 
134
 The infamous Bill Buckner case in the 1986 World Series offers an interesting example about failure, 
responsibility, and guilt. With the Red Sox holding a 5-3 lead in the bottom of the tenth inning, the Mets hit three 
consecutive singles to get within 5-4. At that point a wild pitch brought home another runner, tying the game at 5-5. 
Then a ground ball was hit to Buckner at first, which he misplayed, allowing it to go between his legs, giving the 
Mets a 6-5 victory in game six of the World Series. Buckner had lost the game, and ultimately the World Series, so 
the reasoning went, despite the fact that the Mets had only tied the World Series at 3-3. The Red Sox would 
collectively lose game seven of the World Series, yet Buckner is widely regarded as the reason the Red Sox lost the 
World Series. That one man and one play—in game six, no less—should be seen as the primary reason for Boston’s 
loss, is to completely inflate the importance of one act amidst a complex web of related acts. No one remembers the 
other two errors that occurred for the Red Sox, though they were equally important in the overall outcome of the 
game. Two decades later Buckner recounted that "I have come to the understanding that it is here to stay, so I try to 
look at it in a positive way. Everybody still remembers me, they say, 'Yeah, he was the guy that made the error, but 
he was a pretty good player.' So I guess that is a positive about it." (Retrieved from 
http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2615471) Instead of being poisoned by pervasive feelings of guilt, and 
despite the vitriol directed at him for misplaying a ground ball, Buckner was able to take a more comprehensive 
view of his act as one among many others that make him who he is; the error does not define him, and he does not 
evince any guilt about his failure. 
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The example of how athletes handle responsibility and failure illuminates some important 
lessons that should translate to everyday life. (1) One should acknowledge a failure and move on, 
which may occur quickly or may take more time; (2) in some cases one simply has to learn to 
forgot certain failures, lest they paralyze future action or develop into full blown guilt; on the 
other hand, (3) some failures can be used as an impetus to self-improvement; (4) this necessitates 
taking a more measured view of not only one’s responsibility in a given situation, but also (5) 
recognizing the many situational factors that play a role in a given outcome, some of which can 
be known and some which cannot, but which are outside of one’s influence. 
At the same time, we have to learn to distinguish guilt from failure, just as we need to be 
able to distinguish failure from bad luck. Part of this project involves looking at failure in a new 
manner, understanding that genuine failure, for which we should acknowledge our fault (and 
possibly the localized guilt that follows), differs from failure that warrants no real 
acknowledgement. Related to this is the need to prevent local failures from transforming into 
existential guilt, as people frequently allow to happen. Thus there is good reason to be attentive 
to local failures, as Nietzsche suggests localized feelings of guilt can overwhelm a person, 
particularly a vulnerable person, and develop into pervasive feelings of guilt. People need to 
develop a new attitude towards such failures. One suggestion about how we might accomplish 
this is making sure that there is something in our lives that is positive, be it one’s work, one’s 
friends and loved ones, or art. Such things can help to insulate us from feelings of negativity and 
guilt taking root. The idea is that having something positive to support us, we are less susceptible 
to falling off the cliff into existential guilt. With respect to these pervasive feelings of guilt, what 
people need to realize is that there are no legitimate reasons for finding ourselves to be inherently 
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corrupt, there are no singular acts that come to define us as perpetually guilty, and thus there are, 
in most cases, no reasons to feel pervasive feelings of guilt.  
In essence, the new attitude towards failure that a person has to cultivate is one where 
failure is recognized as part and parcel of life; where a person acknowledges her fault, but 
accepts that the failure is not constitutive of who she is; where a person acknowledges that the 
limits of responsibility are not always something we can know, nor can a person know all of the 
causes of her acts. Nietzsche advocates taking a more nuanced perspective on our failures and 
those times we feel inadequate, such that we recognize such feelings as localized, and thus learn 
to live with them. With that comes a time when we achieve a standpoint where our faults and 
failures are seen as mere failures and nothing more; they do not become things for which we feel 
pervasive feelings of guilt and deserving of self-punishment. As Nietzsche recognized, “guilt is 
always sought wherever there is failure” (D 140); what needs to be done is to sever that 
connection. If the therapeutic work described above is successful, then a profound affective shift, 
possibly even a psychic transformation, should occur. Having learned to think differently, 
through much work a person slowly comes to feel differently, no longer susceptible to the 
negative feelings of existential guilt. 
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CHAPTER 3: LEARNING TO LOVE LIFE 
3.1 Introduction 
That Nietzsche, the self-proclaimed “advocate of life” (ASC 5), placed immense value on 
life, is a point made immediately clear in his writings.
135
 But how he understood life, what he 
meant when he referred to life, and how it functioned as a criterion of value is a matter of much 
debate.
136
 Throughout Nietzsche’s writings he makes many forays into the disparate ways we 
understand life. For example, he contemplates the basic nature of life; he examines individual 
human lives as well as different types of human lives; he sought to understand both how a 
person’s life influences her values, and what a person’s values indicate about her life; he 
examines the relation between life and valuing; and finally he considered how life can be 
hindered and harmed.  
Among Nietzsche’s many concerns with life, life affirmation holds a place of primacy.137 
We should understand life affirmation as his response to the problem of life negation, though it is 
more than just a response to this problem: it is an ideal. Given the importance of life affirmation, 
the primary goal in this chapter will be to examine and evaluate Nietzsche’s account of how a 
person might come to love and affirm life. I will argue that Nietzsche’s account of how we learn 
to love offers a paradigm of how we might come to a genuine love of life despite all that is 
strange, questionable, and terrible in life.  
                                                     
135
 Nietzsche also describes Zarathustra as “the advocate of life, the advocate of suffering, the advocate of the 
circle…” (Z III.13). 
136
 The best work that sought to clarify the significance of Nietzsche’s treatment of life can be found in Schacht 
(1983), Hunt (1991), Reginster (2006), May (2011), and Richardson (2013). See also Hussain (2011) for an 
examination of the role life plays in the Genealogy. 
137
 Schacht (1983) writes that two of Nietzsche’s most basic concerns are “the idea and possibility of a total 
‘affirmation of life’ and of the world (as they are, rather than merely as one might wish them to be), and with the 
emergence of an enhanced form of life strong and rich enough to stand as a ‘justification of life’” (261). Solomon 
(2003) writes, “There is little question that the ultimate aim of Nietzsche’s philosophy is ‘the affirmation of life,’ but 
what this vague phrase means is by no means obvious” (201). Finally, Reginster (2006) writes that “Nietzsche 
regards the affirmation of life as his defining philosophical achievement” (2). 
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In §334 of The Gay Science, Nietzsche discusses how one comes to love a piece of music 
in all its strangeness and oddity. More than a discussion of how one comes to love music though, 
Nietzsche says this is how we learn to love everything we love. Using this passage as a guide can 
help illuminate how a person might come to love life in all its questionableness, and with that, 
the nature of life affirmation. I begin with a brief gloss on the particular movements that 
Nietzsche lays out in GS 334, as it offers a schematic for the development of this chapter. The 
movement begins with a person working to know and understand something, after which she 
puts forth good will and patience to cultivate an openness to that thing, during which time she 
slowly becomes accustomed to it, and in the final movement comes to love it for what it is. I take 
this to tie together Nietzsche’s ideas on life affirmation that he presents during the 1880’s, 
including important ideas like eternal recurrence and amor fati.  
This chapter will follow the broad outline of the movement Nietzsche presents in GS 334 
on how one learns to love. With this passage as a guide, I will show how Nietzsche’s many 
disparate forays into life can be collectively understood as part of a strategy about how to 
respond to the problem of life negation.
138
 I begin in section 3.2 by elucidating the first 
movement in how we learn to love, that is, by learning about a given thing. In this section I 
survey how Nietzsche understands the concept of life.
139
 In doing so I try to distinguish and 
organize the disparate threads throughout his writings. Despite the frequent poetic-metaphorical 
language, the talk of biological life, and distinctly human life, I conclude that Nietzsche 
understood life to be defined by resistances, struggle, and self-overcoming. With this in hand, in 
section 3.3 I turn my attention towards the second movement in how we learn to love, focusing 
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 The sickness of life negation is such that, in Nietzsche’s eyes, the need to both understand and revalue life 
becomes imperative. 
139
 The idea is that, in order to support Nietzsche’s revaluation of life and initiate the movement towards love of life, 
we must illuminate his understanding of life. 
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on the role good will, patience, and kindheartedness play. These virtues help a person cultivate 
what Nietzsche took to be necessary in learning to love, specifically an openness to life. In the 
main section, section 3.4, I examine what it means to love and affirm life. The central argument 
of this section uses the aforementioned paradigm of how a person learns to love, in conjunction 
with Nietzsche’s notions of eternal recurrence and amor fati, to present a new reading of life 
affirmation.  
Through the model of how we learn to love, I argue that Nietzsche offers a realistic 
account of how a person develops a new understanding of the nature of life, cultivates an 
openness to life, and finally how a person comes to a genuine love of life. It is this new love of 
life, signified in the ideal of life affirmation, where we find Nietzsche’s vision of the ideal 
orientation towards life. What is more, with this, we have Nietzsche’s answer on how to 
overcome the life-denying standpoint of the sickness of life negation. 
3.2 Learning About Life 
The first step in learning to love is to work towards understanding the thing in question. 
Our concerns lie with life. To begin, we must survey, collect, and clarify Nietzsche's disparate 
pronouncements on the nature of life. Not only is this an important  task, it is also a difficult one 
given the multiplicity of ways in which Nietzsche discusses life. At the same time, we must not 
forget that this is only the first step on how one learns to love.
140
 Given the present concern with 
responding to the challenge of life negation, the task at hand is to come to the most honest 
understanding of life possible. There is the possibility that an honest view of life could prove to 
have harmful effects, as we will examine below. However, coming to an honest view of life is a 
                                                     
140
 “First one must learn to hear a figure and melody at all, to detect and distinguish it, to isolate and delimit it as a 
life in itself” (GS 334). 
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crucial step, for to fail in this first task would undermine the possibility of coming to a genuine 
love of life. 
What is life, according to Nietzsche? As intimated above, it is obvious that there are a 
number of ways one might answer this question.
141
 Does Nietzsche have the notion of an 
individual life in mind? Does he have types of life in mind? Does he mean the life process? 
Schacht helpfully distinguishes the “biological-scientific” sense of life from the “experiential-
psychological” sense of life (1983; 234). Richardson divides these two divisions further, raising 
the question of Nietzsche referring to life in the biological sense, the sense of what it is to be a 
human being, the phenomenal sense, the personal sense, and what he calls the poetic sense 
(2013; 759).  
While there is no doubt that clarifying the different senses of life in Nietzsche’s thought 
is important in itself, there are further considerations to keep in mind. One consideration has to 
do with the role that life might play in Nietzsche’s philosophy. For example, a common answer 
is that Nietzsche offers an account that life is will to power, and uses this to ground his 
conclusions about the good for human beings.
142
 While I am sympathetic to this argument, I will 
not be pursuing this line of thought here.
143
 Instead, I will work under the guiding idea that 
Nietzsche seeks to understand life with the ultimate goal of learning to love life. After a person 
comes to an understanding of life, she can then work towards becoming accustomed to it, and 
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 Michael Thompson's "The Representation of Life" offers an interesting meditation on ways of answering this 
question. Thompson describes the various “abstract categories” we might focus upon when considering life: “that of 
a concrete individual; of a thing’s being a part of something; of order or organization; of one thing’s following 
another in a process; of a thing’s doing something” (47). Nietzsche seems to use life in all of these ways, focusing 
on the life of the individual, various types of life, e.g., the noble, the slave, the priest, the artist, and the life process. 
142
 This argument is made in various forms by Schacht (1983), Hunt (1991), Geuss (1997), and Richardson (2013). 
Not surprisingly, their arguments focus on the claim that life is the will to power and use that to ground Nietzsche’s 
evaluation of sick and declining life contra healthy and flourishing life. While I am partial to this argument, I think 
there is also something else important going on with Nietzsche’s investigation of life. It is, in some ways, a related 
point, but a point focused on coming up with a response to the sickness of life negation. 
143
 I turn to an examination of the will to power in chapter 4. 
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finally coming to affirm and love life as it is, including both what is beautiful and what is 
terrible.  
Nietzsche on Life: A Survey of His Writings 
Nietzsche’s various forays into understanding life might best be described as offering a 
poetic-metaphorical account of life, as a brief survey will show. For example, in his early 
writings he describes life is "that dark, driving power that insatiably thirsts for itself" (UM II.76); 
at the beginning of his mature philosophy Nietzsche ruminates on the question ‘what is life?’ by 
describing it as “continually shedding something that wants to die … being cruel and inexorable 
against anything that is growing weak and old in us” (GS 26); in Zarathustra, where his 
description of life reaches its most poetic-metaphoric, Nietzsche describes life as "that which 
must always overcome itself" (Z II.12); and in his late works Nietzsche often writes that “life is 
will to power” (BGE 13, 259; cf., GS 349; GM II.12; TI IX.14; A 6). Speaking in this poetic-
metaphoric language, his answers often leave us with more questions. Nietzsche was well aware 
of the difficulty of the questions before him, as was clear from his initial attempts to elucidate the 
abstract notion of life, to say nothing of the frequent appeal to metaphors and images in 
describing life. I will begin by looking at Nietzsche’s first serious forays into the nature of life in 
Zarathustra, after which I will turn to surveying his post-Zarathustra works. As we will see, the 
metaphoric-poetic language of Zarathustra gives way to a clearer description of life in the works 
that follow.  
As I will argue, what it is to be a living being, or something growing, might best be 
characterized by self- overcoming
144. With Nietzsche’s description of life he subsequently 
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 Nietzsche frequently used the word ‘growth’ to characterize life when it is well-functioning. Self-overcoming 
better captures the idea he has in mind, and, as we will see below, avoids some of the problems the unqualified use 
of ‘growth’ carries. While more will be said about self-overcoming below, the notion gets a more substantive 
treatment in chapter 4. 
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unveils its fundamentally amoral nature, which will undoubtedly alienate the majority of people 
who continue to hold the prejudice that life unfolds according to a moral order. For what is 
strange, questionable, and terrible often strikes a person as something that should be other than it 
is. If this is how life appears to people, it will be reason enough to desire a better world than this 
one, driving them to life negation. Nietzsche’s goal, however, is to give an honest account of life, 
to learn about it, and see how it should be understood. He wants to undermine what drives a 
person to deny this life in favor of some life beyond. One might object that an honest glance at 
life will, in unveiling what is strange and terrible, drive people further away from life. Thus the 
first step towards learning to love life seems like it will simply exacerbate the problem. Part of 
Nietzsche’s task then must be to show how an honest view of life can turn a person away from 
life negation and starting on the path to life affirmation.
145
  
*** 
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, when 'Life' is personified and speaks to Zarathustra, 
Nietzsche provides a strikingly rich account of life, despite Life's stated desire not to reveal her 
secret to Zarathustra. The goal before us is to take the highly poetic-metaphorical language and 
translate it into a simpler, more straightforward account, so as to get a clear conception of 
Nietzsche’s understanding of life. 
How then does Life characterize herself when speaking to Zarathustra? In “The Dance 
Song” Life speaks in a most elusive way. Gazing into the eye of Life, Zarathustra begins by 
stating that Life is unfathomable; Life then seems to acknowledge this, only to later intimate 
there is something in her depths.
146
 Continuing, Zarathustra claims to talk of wisdom, 
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 A related question involves when genuine honesty is called for and when “honest illusions” might be necessary. 
Nietzsche clearly oscillated back and forth between the value of honesty and the value of illusion. See GS 107. 
146
 Z II.10. Writing on this section of Zarathustra, Richardson (2013) helpfully notes “the image of depth” which 
signifies that “we can’t see to the bottom, above all, of what [life is] for, of [life’s] purpose or meaning”. As he 
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questioning whether it is beautiful or evil, noting that it is stubborn, as well as seductive. In 
response Life inquires if Zarathustra is taking about her or Wisdom. Just as Life surmises, surely 
Nietzsche is offering a brief characterization of how people perceive Life, being filled with much 
that is beautiful, but also much that is evil. And yet, before anything has been conveyed with any 
clarity, Zarathustra once again sinks into the unfathomable. Thus, we see that his earliest attempt 
to seriously fathom life brings more questions than answers. 
Two sections later in “On Self-Overcoming”, Life opens up considerably. This is also 
where Nietzsche offers his first substantial discussion of the will to power.
147
 Initially the will to 
power is characterized as “the unexhausted begetting will of life”.148 At this point Zarathustra 
realizes that in order to be understood he must speak of life and everything that lives as he has 
seen it. Zarathustra discerns that life is marked by commanding and obeying. Wondering if he 
had “crept into the very heart of life”, Zarathustra states that wherever he found the living, there 
he found the will to power. Continuing, Zarathustra quotes Life herself, who elusively 
characterizes herself as "that which must always overcome itself”. Life elaborates on this, noting 
that it has been characterized as a "drive to a purpose, to something higher, more distant, more 
manifold". Life here becomes coy, noting that she "would rather perish than renounce" her 
secret. And yet she continues, characterizing herself as struggle, becoming, as “purpose and the 
contradiction of purposes”, as creating something and then opposing that very creation.   
 Later in the third part of Zarathustra, Life reappears in “The Other Dance Song”. 
Zarathustra, having looked into the eyes of Life, paints an evocative image of her, noting both 
                                                                                                                                                                           
continues though, Richardson points out that Life alludes to the fact it has a grounding, though we are unable to 
discover it. Lampert (1986) notes that Life presents herself as fathomable, while holding herself as a mystery (115). 
147
 Nietzsche’s first published reference to the will to power occurs earlier in Part I, “On a Thousand and One goals”, 
though he says very little explicitly about the will to power in this section. The will to power is the focus of chapter 
4; given that, as well as the goal of understanding life, I defer any substantive discussion of the will to power until 
the next chapter. 
148
 Montinari (2003) claims that the will to power “is simply another way of saying ‘life’, of designating ‘life’” (81). 
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his love and fear of Life. Ponderingly, he asks who would not love Life, and yet who would not 
hate life? These two questions, particularly the latter, will prove to present the basic challenge 
Nietzsche must address. In the course of her response, Life chides Zarathustra for not loving her 
enough. Given Zarathustra’s struggles to come to terms with the eternal recurrence, Life’s 
rebuke to Zarathustra is revealing about what Nietzsche was beginning to think about life and 
whether or not it could be affirmed. Finally, the section ends with Zarathustra whispering into 
Life’s ear; and while we are not told what he says, Life’s surprise indicates that he has told her 
that he knows of the eternal recurrence.  
Beyond the abundant poetic-metaphoric language that marks Zarathustra as a whole, Life 
is both forthcoming and illuminating here, despite her continuing coyness. There is no doubt that 
Nietzsche is working to paint a picture of how we perceive and understand the life process, and 
that any picture will of necessity invoke metaphor and bold imagery. Nietzsche does offer a 
characterization here that, once unpacked, sits in harmony with the less poetic-metaphoric 
statements he makes in his subsequent published writings, to which we will turn shortly. All 
together, the basic portrait of life that Nietzsche offers in Zarathustra is one in which life is 
defined by: (1) struggle; (2) continuous change, captured in the notion of becoming; likewise 
made determinate in (3) the interplay of creation and destruction; (4) purpose and then a new, 
contradictory purpose that has superseded the previous purpose; and most mysteriously, that (5) 
life is will to power.
149
  
Breaking Life's characterization down into these individual descriptions reveals what 
Nietzsche means by the esoteric notion that life is "that which must always overcome itself". Life 
is inherently a movement, a continuous process of becoming, moving along “crooked paths”; in 
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 Then there is the question of how eternal recurrence relates to life, an issue that Life intimates in “The Other 
Dance Song”. More will be said about the significance and role of eternal recurrence below. 
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its movement life encounters and at times seeks resistances and obstacles, attempting to 
overcome them, and having done so, moves on to new challenges. As such, life’s movement is 
defined by “crooked paths” insofar as life’s paths often undermine themselves. In other words, 
for life to continue on a forward path, life must continually overcome itself. To not cast away 
certain parts of one’s life would be tantamount to stagnation. Nietzsche appeals to the metaphor 
that life is akin to creation to make his point: just as a creation is completed and set aside for the 
next project, so too does life move through a cycle of continuous creation. The same reasoning 
underlies Nietzsche’s characterization of life as becoming. In effect, life is defined by a cycle of 
struggle, overcoming, and in a word Nietzsche frequently uses, growth.  
 Nietzsche’s post-Zarathustra works, while they might not be models of clarity, do offer a 
less poetic, more philosophical account of life. Focusing on Beyond Good and Evil we find 
Nietzsche describe the life process, elements of distinctly human life, and the various ways 
human life is served, in a rich assortment of ways. On the subject of the former, Nietzsche 
reiterates the claim from Zarathustra that "life is will to power" (BGE 13, 259). In one of his 
most provocative descriptions of the life process, Nietzsche states that "life itself is essentially a 
process of appropriation, injuring, overpowering . . . oppressing, being harsh, imposing your own 
form, incorporating, and  ... exploiting," for these are simply part of what it is, in essence, to be 
alive (BGE 259).
150
 In developing the basic claims about the life process presented in 
Zarathustra, Nietzsche offers much the same picture outlined above, albeit with a caveat that is 
surely designed to shock us: exploitation, he says, “belongs to the essence of being alive”. What 
is more, wanting to “grow, spread, grab, win dominance”, is a consequence [Folge] of “the will 
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 This idea is reiterated in what might be even harsher terms in GM II.11, where Nietzsche writes that “life acts 
essentially—that is, in its basic functions—in an injuring, violating, pillaging, destroying manner and cannot be 
thought at all without this character”, continuing by speaking of “the true will of life—which is out after power” 
(GM II.11). Already in the Untimely Meditations Nietzsche had noted that, "To live and to be unjust is one and the 
same thing" (UM II.76). 
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of life” (ibid). Nietzsche provocatively emphasizes how exploitation and domination are part and 
parcel of life and the way it functions.
151
 
Continuing our survey of BGE, we find an intriguing multiplicity of ways in which 
Nietzsche approaches and understands human life. Nietzsche begins by stating that perspectivism 
“is the fundamental condition of life" (BGE P, 34). Contrary to the traditional philosophical 
importance placed on the unquestionable value of truth, Nietzsche holds that life can be served 
by untruth, deception, and appearance (BGE 2, 4, 34); similarly, ignorance and stupidity may be 
necessary for joy in life (BGE 24, 188). Not surprisingly, there are many dangers in life, dangers 
which can undermine even the strongest (BGE 29). A common concern Nietzsche expresses is 
that one can take revenge against life through falsification (BGE 59), where revenge is sought 
because lower types suffer from life as if it were a disease (BGE 62). As Nietzsche often 
advocated—contrary to the ideals of modernity—conflict and war can act as a stimulus to life 
(BGE 200); less surprisingly, art can help us endure life (BGE 28); similarly virtue, music, and 
reason can make life worth living (BGE 188); surprisingly, so too can religion (BGE 61). Given 
this diverse assortment of claims, one might wonder how they all fit together. While it is a 
general point, Nietzsche seems to be offering a selection of the various ways in which life can be 
served, for better or for worse. 
Diving quickly into Nietzsche’s account of life in his post-BGE writings—book V of The 
Gay Science, the Genealogy, and the 1888 writings—we find fewer pronouncements on the 
nature of life. Nonetheless, when Nietzsche does talk about life in these works, he reiterates, in 
essentials, the same as what he offers in BGE. For example, Nietzsche adds that “the truly basic 
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 One might object that by introducing notions of exploitation and domination, Nietzsche has gone beyond talk of 
self-overcoming, and introduced something new with respect to life. However, if we are attentive to what he says, 
domination and exploitation are simply the [potential] consequences of growth (i.e., self-overcoming). GS 118 
offers a clear example of what Nietzsche has in mind. Nietzsche is asking us to be honest about this, difficult though 
it may be. As a cell dominates another cell, or a lion dominates a wildebeest, so too can we understand a human 
being dominating another human being in various daily activities. 
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life-instinct … aims at the expansion of power” (GS 349). The struggle that is life “revolves 
everywhere around preponderance”. Thus he concludes the passage by repeating an earlier claim, 
that the will to life is the will to power. In the Genealogy he reiterates again that “the essence of 
life” is will to power” (GM II.12). Like in BGE 259, life is characterized as “attacking, 
infringing”, but Nietzsche also adds that “the will of life appears active and form-giving” (ibid). 
Finally, speaking of the “law of life”, Nietzsche reiterates the idea that the essence of life is “the 
law of the necessary ‘self-overcoming’” (GM III.27). Interestingly, he adds that this same law of 
life wills it that “all great things perish through themselves, through an act of self-sublation 
[Selbstaufhebung]” (ibid). Finally, in The Antichrist Nietzsche offers a concise account of life, 
stating that it is “an instinct for growth, for endurance, for the accumulation of force, for power” 
(A 6). As is clear from this short survey,
152
 not only does Nietzsche develop his understanding of 
life on a number of levels, but he comes to a number of definite conclusions on the nature of life 
and what it is to be a living being.  
Understanding life 
Given the various descriptions of life—most notably in Zarathustra and BGE—what are 
we to take from Nietzsche's broad survey? Having elucidated the ideas from Zarathustra above, 
we can see that Nietzsche is working in his post-Zarathustra writings to develop and clarify his 
initial poetic-metaphoric insights further. Thus we see both a restatement of many of the ideas 
presented in Zarathustra as well as many new ideas about distinctly human life. If we place 
Nietzsche’s thoughts on life in the context of how one learns to love, we can see repeated 
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 Similar claims are made in Nietzsche’s notebooks at the time, as a brief selection of notes accumulated in The 
Will to Power illustrates. “For this is the doctrine preached by life itself to all that has life: the morality of 
development. To have and to want to have more—growth, in one word—that is life itself” (WP 125). “But what is 
life? Here we need a new, more definite formulation of the concept ‘life.’ My formula for it is: Life is will to power” 
(WP 254).  These ideas are further corroborated in Nietzsche’s unpublished writings, e.g., WP 642, 647, 689, 695, 
704, and 706.  Given the explicit connections Nietzsche makes between life and the will to power, it is tempting to 
turn to an explicit examination of the will to power. However, I refrain from delving into Nietzsche’s notion of the 
will to power here, as it is the focus of chapter 4. 
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attempts to genuinely learn about life. This is most obvious in Nietzsche’s presentation of 
Zarathustra’s conversations with Life. Similarly, Nietzsche’s attempts to learn about life in BGE 
show him working to present an unvarnished description of what it means to be a living thing. In 
each case, the goal is to learn about and attempt to understand life. 
What we find in Nietzsche’s description is that the life process has been “stamped with 
slanderous intentions” (BGE 259), and thus often appears immoral. However, he is quick to 
point out that life itself is neither moral nor immoral, neither good nor evil; rather, life is 
fundamentally beyond good and evil. We should no more slander life for being evil than we 
should condemn an erupting volcano or a bird of prey eating a little lamb.
153
 The belief that life 
is evil or immoral betrays the ideals of modernity, ideals which Nietzsche finds harmful and is 
working to overcome. More than that, a condemnation of life as evil and immoral indicates to 
Nietzsche that the estimation comes from someone who exhibits a declining life. 
Given the descriptions Nietzsche offers, what are we to make of it all? To begin, we must 
keep in mind that he is offering a purported description of life. Nonetheless, one might object 
that he fails to remain value-neutral with his description of life, for Nietzsche clearly lets his 
values infect the account he offers. To be fair though, we should not forget that one of his tasks 
is to challenge the way life has traditionally been conceived, to say nothing of how it has 
traditionally been valued. Ideally, the reader will keep this in mind and evaluate the merits of 
Nietzsche’s claims. He clearly wants us to think about his claims, to think about the way life 
unfolds; for all too long humanity has looked at life under the belief it operated according to 
some moral order. If we can learn that this is not the case, then, presumably, we will have made 
progress. In the end, Nietzsche is simply asking us to see that, from a descriptive standpoint, 
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 Nietzsche is quite explicit about this, writing in 1886 that “life is essentially something amoral” (BT ASC.5). 
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living things behave by exploiting, growing, and dominating in various ways. To take one 
example, let us consider the following: 
“Is it virtuous when a cell transforms itself into a function of a stronger cell? It has to. 
And is it evil when the stronger cell assimilates the weaker? It also has to; this is 
necessary for it, since it strives for superabundant replenishment and wants to regenerate 
itself” (GS 118). 
 
One might object that Nietzsche is selectively choosing examples to support his claim while 
ignoring the great beauty and harmony of nature. In Nietzsche’s defense, he could respond that 
those who ignore the exploitation, domination, and destruction of life that occurs are the 
disingenuous ones. And there is plenty of evidence to support Nietzsche’s claim that life can be 
decidedly ugly. Stephen Jay Gould presents a particularly evocative example with the 
ichneumonid wasp, where 
“The mother wasp seeks another insect, usually a caterpillar, as a host for her young. She 
then either injects her eggs into the host’s body, or paralyzes the host with her sting and 
then lays the eggs on top. When the eggs hatch, the larvae eat the living, often paralyzed, 
host from the inside—but very carefully, leaving the heart and other vital organs for last, 
lest the host decay and spoil the bounty” (Gould, 2002; 183). 
 
If my argument is correct, then getting people to see the basic characteristics of what it is to be a 
living being, including what is ugly and painful, is a necessary step. 
Nietzsche is undoubtedly being deliberately provocative in emphasizing the supposedly 
"immoral" aspects of life, given how often he notes these particular features when talking about 
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life. There is surely a purpose for his provocations. On the one hand, Nietzsche’s examination of 
life shows that it is a dynamic process of continuous struggle, involving not only conflict, but 
also appropriation and exploitation. Setting aside the rhetoric, this is assuredly Nietzsche’s way 
of highlighting life’s essential features of struggle and self-overcoming. Life is, without question, 
filled with much that can be questionable and terrible, all of which may make us recoil and 
condemn it. The point Nietzsche is trying to drive home is that this is no reason to condemn life. 
Getting to this point is not easy though. However, like much in life, as we learn more about it, 
the more it becomes familiar, the less frightened we are by it. If all goes well, we will then see 
that we have no reason to condemn it. However, while there are many instances where 
understanding something formerly unknown or misunderstood helps to remove our fear, this is 
not necessarily always the case. We will have to see if Nietzsche has the resources to meet this 
concern, as it could prove to be a serious problem. 
 Regarding human life, we learn that what is valuable for life is defined by the 
perspectives or interests of individuals and groups. A particularly prevalent part of Nietzsche's 
account of life is that many things, e.g., art and science, as well as things we normally take to be 
detrimental to the interests of life, like deception and appearances, or conflict and war, can serve 
the interests of life. Just as there are many different types of human life, e.g., the artist, the 
philosopher, the scholar, the master, the saint, the priest, and the slave, so too are there many 
ways in which each of these types of life can be served. More will be said about what it means to 
“serve life” in the next section; but the key point is that when Nietzsche is talking about serving 
[94] 
 
life, the kind of life he has in mind is human life, and the concern he has is how things can help 
preserve, promote, enhance, and affirm different types of human life.
154
 
*** 
Understanding that one of Nietzsche’s goals is to disabuse us of thinking that life is evil 
and immoral, connects to a seemingly unrelated point about the relation between life and 
valuing. Nietzsche contends that “life itself forces us to posit value”.155 In essence, to live is to 
value, that is, to live is to have certain commitments, to be for certain things and against other 
things. If it is the case that we create value and that life has no intrinsic value, then it would be 
clear that judging life to be bad or good is an error. Thus, if Nietzsche could show that it is 
human beings who infuse life with value by valuing it, he would have demonstrated the mistake 
in believing that life is evil and immoral and should be other than it is.
156
 
Nietzsche claims that “without esteeming the nut of existence would be hollow” (Z I.15). 
That is to say, life would be hollow if there was no valuing; it would not be recognizable as life 
in the way we understand life. In other words, valuing and having commitments is, in a certain 
way, what makes life life for human beings. While Nietzsche’s metaethical views are not entirely 
clear, much evidence suggests that he holds the world and life to have no intrinsic value.
157
 Life 
and everything that makes life what it is gets its value from us. Human beings are the sources of 
value.
158
 Given this fact, we should not be surprised Nietzsche goes on to say that man is “the 
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 While Nietzsche’s writings in the 1880s frequently suggest the kind of human flourishing he has in mind is 
reserved for a select portion of humanity, there are also times, e.g., Schopenhauer As Educator, where he argues that 
all types of human life can become something greater than at present. 
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 “When we talk about values we are under the inspiration, under the optic, of life: life itself forces us to posit 
values, life itself evaluates through us, when we posit values” (TI V.5). Elsewhere Nietzsche asserts that “life could 
not exist except on the basis of perspectival valuations and appearances” (BGE 34). 
156
 Granted, one of the challenges here is convincing people that this notion of value is good enough. This may be a 
daunting task, given that Platonism and Christianity have taught us that values are objective and unchanging. 
157
 A good, comprehensive survey of Nietzsche’s metaethics can be found in Robertson (2009). 
158
 “Whatever has value in the present world has it not in itself, according to its nature—nature is always value-
less—but has rather been given, granted value, and we were the givers and granters! Only we have created the world 
that concerns human beings!” (GS 301). 
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being who measures values, who values and measures” (GM II.8).159 Through human valuing the 
value of the world is created and thereby illuminated. “Only through esteeming is there value” (Z 
I.15). The world and life are not in themselves evil and immoral; rather, through human valuing, 
we have made the world and life evil and immoral.  
To take a good example, let us consider Nietzsche’s claim that, insofar as people have 
decided to judge the world and life to be ugly, they have made the world and life ugly (GS 130). 
Once again, we find him saying that we did not discover the world and life to be ugly because it 
was ugly in itself, we made it ugly through our valuations. If Nietzsche can get us to see this 
point, then he will have made progress in getting us to move beyond judging the world and life 
to be evil and immoral. If he can succeed in doing that, people will be more open to learning 
about all that is strange and questionable in the world. And this can help us overcome holding a 
life negating perspective while laying the foundation for cultivating a love of life. 
Beyond offering a window into his metaethics and his critique of life-devaluing values, 
Nietzsche’s position on life and its connection to the nature of values plays an integral role in his 
diagnosis of those who are sick. As we saw in chapter one, Nietzsche holds that a person’s value 
judgments should be understood as signs and symptoms about a person’s life (BGE 187, TI II.2). 
If valuations are, as Nietzsche claimed, “physiological requirements for the preservation of a 
particular type of life” (BGE 3),160 a pessimistic person who laments that life is no good tells me 
nothing about life itself, but does tell me something about both her life, whether she is healthy or 
sick, and why certain values are necessary for her preservation. This makes sense if values come 
from a person instead of inhering in things themselves. At the same time, Nietzsche’s position 
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 A decade earlier Nietzsche had stated that “the word ‘Mensch’, indeed, means the measurer” (WS 21). 
160
 Nietzsche expands upon this point in a Nachlass fragment 11[73], which states that “the viewpoint of ‘value’ is 
the viewpoint of conditions of preservation and enhancement”. 
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suggests a kind of value standard about what constitutes a good or bad, healthy or sick life for a 
person, a standard deeply connected to a person’s physiology. 
In his later writings Nietzsche links health and what is good for ‘growth’. However, 
Nietzsche never goes into much detail about what constitutes growth in the context of life, 
though he does offer some general ideas.
161
 The basic idea he espouses is that when life is 
functioning properly, it exhibits growth. In contrast, when life is not evincing growth, but rather 
decline, then it is not functioning as it ought. Life, human and otherwise, can thus be assessed as 
either ascending, where life is growing, or as declining, where life is atrophying. This is a fairly 
vague account of growth, and the various related descriptions that growth is associated with 
appropriating and incorporating, or that things grow strong and hard during struggles and pain, 
do not illuminate this important idea as much as we would like.  
Schacht helpfully says that growth, which is “taken to be the primary characteristic of all 
life that is flourishing rather than declining” (1983; 248), includes both the accumulation and 
discharge of force; it “involves a dialectic of assertion and assimilation” (ibid). Or, as we have 
seen Nietzsche often emphasize, growth, like life, involves struggle. Importantly, Schacht 
emphasizes that growth is not to be understood in a merely quantitative way. That is to say, just 
because something has grown quantitatively, that does not necessarily qualify it as good.
162
 For 
example, cancer is a growth, but we do not take it to be good. Nietzsche however typically refers 
to growth as an unqualified good, never considering that some forms of growth are problematic. 
He likewise identifies life with growth, albeit in an unqualified way. Like life, Nietzsche often 
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 Another ideal associated with the vague idea of growth is that life should flourish or prosper. Nietzsche himself 
makes very few explicit references to flourishing in his published writings, the most notable example being in 
section 3 of the preface to the Genealogy, where he asks if good and evil have contributed to human flourishing or 
diminution. Other references can be found in GS 1 and 347, as well as GM II.10, II.12, III.11, and III.19. The 
German gedeihen, at times translated as “to flourish”, is alternately translated as “to thrive” or “to prosper”. 
162
 This is a point repeatedly emphasized to me by William Schroeder, who helped me to see that not all growth is 
good. 
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associates power with growth. This association provides a helpful qualification, for the presence 
of power can offer some insight into the direction growth must take to be considered good. His 
treatment of power helps us see that growth aims not at some static end-goal, but is rather a 
continuous overcoming beyond what something is at present. As we saw Nietzsche remark about 
life in Zarathustra, growth is similarly marked by “purpose and the contradiction of purposes”. 
To take the most evocative image Nietzsche offers, genuine growth is continuous self-
overcoming.
163
 
For Nietzsche, a healthy life is a life marked by self-overcoming. We have already seen 
most of the particulars, viz., the need for resistance and struggle, which act as a stimulus and 
propels this self-overcoming. The process of struggle ideally helps integrate and unify the 
individual, though there is also a risk involved in this experiment that is life. Attaining the goal is 
not an end state however; rather, it is a spur to something new. Thus Nietzsche's frequent appeal 
to the unified relationship between creating and destroying; there cannot be one without the 
other, and a healthy life evinces both.  
This is contrasted with examples of dysfunctional, impoverished life, which, given its 
circumstances, seeks mere preservation. We have already seen what the impoverished individual 
looks like: this type evinces a desire for rest and peace; she evinces a distrust of life and her 
instincts; she chooses what she believes to be good for herself, but which is actually harmful; she 
shows a weakness of will; in effect there is a state of disintegration and a focus on mere self-
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 Self-overcoming is clearly an important notion in Nietzsche’s thought, and for that reason it is an image that 
warrants careful attention. In order for self-overcoming, will to power, and life to receive the attention each 
deserves, and to prevent  running them all together conceptually, I defer saying more about self-overcoming until 
chapter 4, where it is discussed in the context of will to power. Given the associations between these different 
notions, it might seem artificial to pry them apart. However, examining these notions separately will not only help 
clarify the types of sickness Nietzsche diagnoses, it will also provide insight into how these respective sicknesses 
might be treated. 
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preservation within such individuals.
164
 Instead of seeking resistance and struggle, which 
normally acts as a spur to greater development, the impoverished seek to still the waters. 
Creativity and power may be lacking, as well as a unifying will. As we will see below, all of 
these symptoms can be read from the values that the declining types of people esteem.  
*** 
 Having surveyed Nietzsche’s treatment of the nature of life we have moved from what 
was a very poetic-metaphoric description about the life process into something more concrete. 
Distilled to its core, life is defined by struggle, change, self-overcoming, and the continuous 
interplay of creation and destruction. Given the nature of this abstract characterization, we 
should not be surprised that life is described more concretely with language that captures its 
harshness, brutality, and ugliness. Beyond this account of the life process, some of the features of 
distinctly human life have been illuminated, including some of the ways through which people 
cope with what is strange and questionable in life. While our understanding of the various senses 
of life has become clearer, we must now consider what end Nietzsche has been pursuing in his 
investigations. While Nietzsche undoubtedly has several tasks before him, including critiquing 
unhealthy forms of life, and laying out visions of healthy forms of life, we must remember that 
one of the basic goals in his investigations into life is to better understand life as such. Part and 
parcel of that project is to illuminate life as such to his readers. 
Under the framework of GS 334, I have sought to show that Nietzsche’s goal is for us to 
learn about life so that we might understand it better, become better acquainted with it, and 
become open to it, all with the ultimate goal of learning to love life. Such is the path to life 
affirmation. Having worked to illuminate how Nietzsche believes we should understand life, we 
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 Another particularly helpful account comes in Nietzsche's description of the slave types in the first essay of the 
Genealogy. This type is paradigmatically sick, exhausted, distrustful, resentful, life-denying.  
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can turn our attention to the next stage of the movement towards life affirmation; that is, we can 
turn our attention to the kind of attitude necessary for loving life.
165
 
3.3 Patience, Good Will, and Openness to Life 
Having surveyed Nietzsche’s treatment of life, with an aim towards getting a better 
understanding of the nature of the life process as manifest in human lives, we have made our way 
through the first movement of how a person learns to love life. This brings us to the second 
movement, about which Nietzsche says: “one needs effort and good will to stand it despite its 
strangeness; patience with its appearance and expression, and kindheartedness about its oddity” 
(GS 334). Nietzsche emphasizes the need for effort, good will, and patience in learning to love. 
Applying this to life, Nietzsche is asking us to be open and ready to respond to life. We need to 
be at once patient and attentive to its strangeness, but also open to the way life can challenge us.  
Coming to a deeper, richer understanding of life, we have seen Nietzsche describe life in 
ways that might, in light of the unflinching honesty, cause people to deny what Nietzsche says, 
to turn away in horror or disgust. This is a distinct possibility, as even Nietzsche must 
acknowledge; as such, we must evaluate if there is a satisfactory response to this issue. One 
potential response can be seen in Nietzsche’s suggestion about the need to endure life’s travails. 
As he says with respect to a new piece of music, “one needs effort and good will to stand 
[ertragen, endure] it despite its strangeness” (GS 334). On the face of it, with his emphasis on 
‘standing’ or ‘enduring’ something, Nietzsche seems to be suggesting there will there be times 
one must simply endure something questionable or terrible. In light of the ugliness and suffering 
in life, the call to endure it would seem to be a reasonable response. Given what Nietzsche 
intimates, I suspect there may be something important about enduring a thing, even if it is only 
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 Just as there is a cognitive element involved in learning to love, i.e., learning about the warp and woof of life, so 
too is an affective (non-cognitive) element involved. More will be said about this relationship below in IV.C. 
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vaguely hinted at here. This stance works in some contexts, e.g., enduring a piece of atrocious 
music, but that is not to say it will work in all contexts. 
Enduring something suggests a stance that is both passive and defensive; it has greater 
affinity with a focus on self-preservation.
166
 Against this defensiveness Nietzsche advocates that 
something else is needed. The real emphasis lies with a kind of openness, as the possession of 
good will, patience, and kindheartedness suggests. Just as Nietzsche says we need to be open and 
receptive to a new piece of music, so too must we be open and receptive to life.
167
 More than 
openness is needed though; in keeping with his high estimation of activity, Nietzsche implicitly 
suggests that instead of passively undergoing life, a person needs to be actively engaged with 
life, ready to take on its challenges.  
To see out how this might work, let us flesh out the details of Nietzsche’s example of a 
melody in a piece of music. His description that the music is strange and odd (experimental) 
nicely mirrors the way life and the world look to most people. A piece of music can be different 
from what we expected, it can be avant-garde, and thus it can surprise, even startle us.
168
 For 
these reasons the piece of music can initially be difficult to understand, and certainly difficult to 
get into; accordingly, we may find ourselves very much “enduring” it, and the last thing we 
would attribute to it would be any kind of beauty. However, with effort, patience, and good will, 
the music reveals itself to us, at times losing the strange quality that had once kept us at a 
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 Of course, one might be patiently enduring something, withstanding the blows, as one gathers strength and 
determination for some future project. In this case, it stands to reason that Nietzsche would see value in endurance, 
albeit only as a temporary stage.  
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 I owe William Schroeder particular thanks for getting me to see beyond Nietzsche’s reference to standing or 
enduring something. After obstinately clinging to my focus on enduring something, and patiently reading and 
rereading GS 334, the richness of the passage revealed itself, opening the way for a more thoughtful reading. I came 
to see that enduring life was too defensive and withdrawn from life, whereas Nietzsche advocated an openness and 
active engagement with life.  
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 Public reaction to Wagner’s Zukunftsmusik is a good example of music that surprised, startled, and offended, as 
was the reaction to the atonal music of Arthur Schönberg. Even the reaction to pop music, for example The Beach 
Boys’ Pet Sounds, or The Velvet Underground & Nico, can be one of surprise and uncertainty, shock and disgust. 
Underlying this we often see a stylistic shift, where the new music betrays our expectations. Just as Nietzsche 
describes in this passage, our good will and patience usually—though not always—reward us in these situations.  
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distance, but at other times retaining the strangeness, yet losing what made it seem so foreign and 
off-putting.  
Similarly, much in life is often different than expected, such that it often surprises and 
confounds us with its strangeness before we get to know it. More than that, life can be harsh and 
ugly. As we have also seen, for these reasons life can inspire anxiety and dread; people begin to 
wish it were different and ultimately adopt a negative view of life. One might object that the 
attitude towards new, challenging music does not translate to the harsher elements of life. There 
is the worry that, even as one becomes more familiar with the harsh and ugly parts of life, it will 
not get any less frightening or nauseating. It is one thing to be open to life and to engage it with 
good will, working to transfigure what is harsh and ugly, but it is another thing for this kind of 
transfiguration to genuinely occur. Thus we would not be in the wrong to question if Nietzsche’s 
claim is that we can learn to love anything with enough patience and good will.
169
  Nietzsche will 
need to say more if his account of how we learn to love will be truly applicable to what is 
harshest and most terrible in life.  
Nietzsche continues by mentioning the appearance and expression of a piece of music, so 
let us consider the way a piece of music appears and how it is expressed. Music invariably 
unfolds over time, first one movement, then another movement, sometimes repeating itself, but 
only slowly revealing itself to us. More often than not we need repeated listens to really hear 
everything that is going on in a given piece of music. There are parts that are immediately 
appealing, parts that seem to be a bridge to something greater, parts to which we are indifferent, 
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 Nothing in GS 334 suggests that we can learn to love all things, nor does it suggest there are things we cannot 
learn to love. Given this, one might then object that life is not something we can learn to love. This objection will be 
addressed below. Additionally, if there are things that cannot be loved, we need to try and discern what it is that 
distinguishes what we can learn to love from what we cannot learn to love. 
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and parts that are ugly. All of these twists and turns contribute to our overall reception of the 
music, be it positive or negative. 
The appearance and expression of life follows a strikingly similar movement, as life is 
filled with great crescendos and decrescendos, periods of calm and periods of tempest, moments 
of dissonance and moments of harmony. In essence, life is filled with much that is beautiful, 
much to which we are indifferent, and much that is harsh and ugly. Within the many twists and 
turns of life, the point Nietzsche seems to be communicating is that life fully reveals itself to us 
slowly over time. As with music, we need to be attentive to life, we need to be patient with it, 
and we need to face it instead of turning away, lest we get little more than an incomplete view of 
it. Nietzsche still has not offered any reasons to believe that the revelations life gives us as a 
reward for our good will and patience will not make life look increasingly unsettling, harsh, and 
ugly. 
The virtues Nietzsche recommends as essential in learning to love—effort, good will, 
patience, kindheartedness, openness, and receptivity—can certainly reward us in many contexts. 
If he is right, the same virtues that help us come to appreciate a piece of music or fall in love 
with another person can help affect the same change in our orientation towards life. For just as a 
new piece of music surprises us and challenges us, so too does life. However, life presents far 
greater challenges than even the most avant-garde, dissonant piece of music ever could present. 
One need only consider natural disasters, diseases, and wars to see how much uglier life can be. 
How are we to respond to the worst that life has to offer? Furthermore, can we be genuinely 
prepared to respond in the ways Nietzsche describes?
170
 
We must be patient and ready to face life, just as we must honestly face it, and we must 
do so with good will. To this point Nietzsche has said nothing about how a person might 
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realistically generate this good will in the face of what is ugly, harsh, and terrible. Insofar as we 
are open to life and ready to be challenged by it, we create the conditions where we may become 
used to it and where we expect it. But we are right to see that this is not enough, for merely 
becoming used to and enduring life’s travails is not to meet them with good will. Furthermore, 
what does it mean to become used to natural disasters, disease, and war? Is that something we 
want? Beyond that, should we understand Nietzsche as saying that we can learn to love anything 
with enough patience, openness, and good will? Our intuitions suggest that, just as there are 
things we cannot become used to, so too are there are things that cannot be loved. If the goal is to 
love life, to be enchanted by it, Nietzsche is moving far beyond what we find in the second 
movement of how one learns to love. As we have seen, there are significant hurdles to pass over 
to achieve this kind of expansive love. To explain how a person might overcome these hurdles 
and learn to love life, the most difficult movement, we now turn our attention.   
3.4 Loving Life 
Introduction 
Having made our way through the first two movements described in GS 334, we have 
progressed from encountering and learning about something strange, to cultivating good will, 
patience, effort, and openness towards it. This brings us to the final stage of the movement 
Nietzsche describes. He writes: 
Finally comes a moment when we are used to it; when we expect it; when we sense that 
we’d miss it if it were missing; and now it continues relentlessly to compel and enchant 
us until we have become its humble and enraptured lovers, who no longer want anything 
better from the world than it and it again (GS 334). 
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Among the things that immediately stand out is the fact that, while GS 334 does not explicitly 
invoke eternal recurrence, Nietzsche clearly gestures at eternal recurrence when he speaks of “no 
longer want[ing] anything better from the world than it and it again”.171  Additionally, Nietzsche 
concludes that “we are always rewarded in the end … as it gradually casts off its veil and 
presents itself as a new and indescribable beauty”, which ought to give us pause.172  
The implicit reference to eternal recurrence suggests that it might help illuminate our 
understanding of how a person comes to love. This seems reasonable in light of Nietzsche’s 
claim that eternal recurrence is "the highest possible formula of affirmation" (EH, Z.1). Thus we 
may have some guidance or direction about how a person comes to love and affirm life by 
examining the eternal recurrence. Whether or not eternal recurrence is a vehicle to loving life, 
there is clearly a profound transformation between enduring life, accepting life, and finally 
loving life. The central issue then is how a person is transformed; what occurs that precipitates a 
new, joyful, loving engagement with life? Careful attention to GS 334, read in coordination with 
amor fati and eternal recurrence, will give us a better understanding of how a person learns to 
love. 
In this section then, the central task of the chapter looms: offering an account of what life 
affirmation is, and then reconstructing how Nietzsche believed a person might come to love life. 
I begin by examining the final movement of learning to love in GS 334, after which I turn my 
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 Here we come across another substantial difference between Nietzsche’s example of a piece of music and life. It 
is one thing to want to hear a piece of music again and again, but at some point, odds are good that a person will tire 
of even the best music, at least for a spell. Clearly Nietzsche would not want this feeling to arise with respect to life, 
as growing tired of life would signify that something had gone wrong. In this section we will see just what it is that 
distinguishes a person’s desire for life from a desire for all other things. 
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 Applied to life, even as we come to understand it better, as well as get used it, there is no guarantee that it will 
become beautiful, particularly what is terrible. Oftentimes as we learn more about the horrors in life, they look 
worse. What kind of beauty could lie in the ugliest parts of life? There is also the possibility that as what is strange, 
terrible, and questionable becomes better known, it will become increasingly mundane, leaving people indifferent, 
possibly resigned to life. All of this makes Nietzsche’s claim appear increasingly less plausible. Overall, Nietzsche’s 
claim that we are always rewarded seems implausible. Fortunately, nothing seems to ride on the claim we are always 
rewarded. There are more challenging problems to come as we work to clarify how a person might come to love and 
affirm life, problems I will return to in section D below. 
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attention to amor fati and eternal recurrence. Having looked at the final movement of GS 334, 
amor fati, and eternal recurrence, I turn to several pressing questions and potential problems for 
Nietzsche’s view as I have reconstructed it. Among these questions, I examine if a person can 
genuinely become used to life, what it means to love life, how it is that life is said to reward us, 
and finally, and most problematically, I look at the issue of loving [affirming] what is terrible in 
life. 
Learning to Love Life 
Having discussed how a person learns to love a piece of music, Nietzsche concludes GS 
334 by saying that “it is just this way that we have learned to love everything we now love”.173 
While one might contest the idea that this is how we learn to love everything, my contention is 
that with GS 334 Nietzsche offers a model of how a person can learn to love life. This fits with 
one of Nietzsche’s overall themes in GS to help cultivate a new, joyful orientation towards life. 
The first task is to elucidate the “way that we have learned to love”. Nietzsche describes 
the final movement as follows: “finally comes a moment when we are used to it; when we expect 
it; when we sense we’d miss it if it were missing; and now it continues relentlessly to compel and 
enchant us until we have become its humble and enraptured lovers”. Vague though it may be, 
Nietzsche does seem to capture part of the basic phenomenology of falling in love. Opening 
ourselves to someone new, a time comes when we are used to her, which leads to a familiarity 
where we come to expect her, where she becomes the horizon that orients our life. This leads to 
the kind of attachment that creates a sense of loss when she is not present. What is of particular 
interest is the description of being “compelled” [Zwang] and “enchanted” [Zauber], which 
suggests that we are moved involuntarily, as if under a spell. We should not be surprised then 
that Zarathustra says, “There is always some madness in love. But there is also always some 
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 Note that this does not commit Nietzsche to the view that everything can be loved or is worth loving. 
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reason in madness” (Z I.7).174 While it would not be incorrect to say that we play some kind of 
role, it is also the case that, in becoming a humble and enraptured lover, we are pushed and 
pulled by forces beyond our control. 
With this description before us, we must try and make sense of how this would apply to 
life. While it is one thing to describe this process in the context of learning to love a piece of 
music or another person, one might question if a person can learn to love life in this way. In the 
course of this transformation, first we become “used to it”, Nietzsche says. We might 
alternatively think of this as being accustomed to life, even comfortable with life. But how many 
people can say they are used to life, let alone comfortable with it? One might object that a person 
cannot become used to life. The key is not so much that a person becomes accustomed to life, but 
that she begins to see the value in what had initially seemed strange and forbidding. No longer 
fearing it, she welcomes it. I return to this issue below. 
Many people, seeing only a world that often looks purposely cruel, do not open 
themselves up to the world and life and try to get to know it. They may actively work to not get 
used to life. In doing so, they forestall the possibility of learning to love the world, seeing it 
instead as something negative. A person can come to “expect” life, to see life as the horizon that 
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 Given statements like this, one wishes Nietzsche had said more about the nature of love, specifically how he 
understood a good and valuable kind of love (in contrast to something like the neighborly love that he so frequently 
criticized). Han-Pile (2009) makes just this point. Nietzsche may talk about love a lot, e.g., references abound 
throughout The Gay Science and Zarathustra, but he never says anything about the nature of this love. It is one thing 
to say that Zarathustra came down from the mountain out of love for humanity, but that does not say anything about 
the nature of this love. And to say that it is an overflowing love, while an evocative image, is vague and raises more 
questions than answers. Han-Pile offers a compelling argument that the kind of love Nietzsche has in mind is not 
eros, but rather agape. There are reasons for thinking Nietzsche has a different model of love in mind, something 
grounded in his understanding of “the gay science”. Pippin says that we can understand “the gay science” as “a kind 
of poetry, a love poetry meant to call to mind an extremely idealized love” (Pippin, 2010; 41). Following this idea, 
Dreyfus & Kelly helpfully write of the poets of Provence that they “develope[d] a new understanding of love”, 
understood as neither eros nor agape. “This new kind of love involved total devotion to a person who became the 
center of your life. Indeed, in the troubadour tradition your beloved actually gives you your identity. Without her 
you would cease to exist as the person you have become in loving her. You understand who you are entirely in 
relation to her, and therefore you are ready to die for her” (2011; 129). This is a topic well worth further 
investigation, but which would take us beyond the scope of this chapter.    
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orients everything else. While it may seem strange to talk of missing life, we can understand 
what it would mean to miss the horizon that orients a person. Finally, for those who open 
themselves up to the world and life, who courageously look upon the world and life, they learn 
that, while there is much that is terrible in life, they discover that life can compel and enchant, 
transforming us into “enraptured lovers” of life, and revealing “a new and indescribable beauty”. 
With the entire movement before us, one might interject that Nietzsche has not explained 
how a person learns to love life. While this is not an unexpected feeling, expecting an 
explanation is to misunderstand what Nietzsche is offering. Love eludes explanation; as 
Nietzsche’s treatment shows, it is a lived experience. That Nietzsche should have chosen 
learning to love music, something so dear to him, suggests a few things. First, this example 
should make it very clear that learning to love is not something that occurs through careful 
deliberation. Secondly, let us recall that Nietzsche described GS as “the most personal of all my 
books”. Thus we may be entitled to surmise that the account of learning to love that Nietzsche 
offers in GS 334 is his description of how he had learned to love. We should not read this 
meditation as something abstract and impersonal, but rather a personal account of his own 
experiences.
175
  
As a person learns to love, a transformation occurs within the person. What is more, this 
transformation leads to a point where the world and life are thereby transfigured, just as the 
person is transformed. Nietzsche concludes by saying that what is strange, “gradually casts off its 
veil and presents itself as a new and indescribable beauty” (GS 334). We become open to the 
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 Han-Pile makes the same point, albeit in the context of loving fate specifically. “Nietzsche does not offer any 
reasons to try to convince us of the desirability of loving fate, but a reflective description of how things appear to 
someone who is in such a state.” She continues, “Correlatively, what may have looked like arguments or 
requirements for the erotic love of fate are in fact observations about the sort of experiences entailed by the state 
once it is achieved in its agapic form” (234; emphasis mine). 
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world and life, thereby opening ourselves to the possibility of both love and beauty, even in the 
midst of a world and life that is filled with much that is hateful and ugly. 
Toward Affirmation: Amor Fati and Eternal Recurrence 
One of the motivating ideas in this chapter is that Nietzsche’s response to the hatred of 
life he diagnosed lies in his notion of life affirmation, or love of life. Given the primacy 
Nietzsche accords eternal recurrence in EH Z.1, and its role in the project of life affirmation, 
there can be no doubt that the idea of life affirmation [loving life] is fundamental for Nietzsche. 
Granting this, Nietzsche seems to take it as given that learning to love life and affirm it is 
possible. 
As we have seen in proceeding through the movements of how one learns to love, there is 
still much clarificatory work to be done, as questions abound. We must examine in greater detail 
how to understand life affirmation [loving life]. Then we must consider more carefully how a 
person might come to love and affirm life, i.e., what precipitates the transformation where a 
person achieves an attitude of life affirmation. Finally, we must examine whether life affirmation 
can succeed as a response to the problem of life negation Nietzsche diagnosed. To begin to 
address these questions, our attention now turns to an examination of two important ideas in 
Nietzsche’s thought, amor fati and eternal recurrence. 
Amor fati 
Nietzsche’s notion of amor fati seems like it can offer some clarification on the subjects 
of both love and affirmation. However, as with much in Nietzsche, both understanding the idea 
of amor fati and what role it plays are by no means easy. Nietzsche introduced the notion of 
amor fati at the beginning of book IV of GS, writing that his “dearest wish” was “to learn more 
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and more how to see what is necessary in things as what is beautiful in them” (GS 276).176 The 
kind of love Nietzsche wants from this point on is amor fati. One might wonder why this has 
become Nietzsche’s “dearest wish”. While he never explicitly addresses this, if we take into 
account the preface to GS, it is likely that what precipitated this new outlook was his experience 
of sickness and pain, as well as the newfound health he experienced. 
While Nietzsche first mentioned this idea in 1882, he did not return to it until 1888, when 
he described amor fati as his “formula for greatness”. As he characterizes amor fati: “you do not 
want anything to be different, not forwards, not backwards, not for all eternity” (EH II.10). Once 
again, the love he speaks of is a love of necessity. Relevant to the present discussion, Nietzsche 
goes on to dismiss two alternative reactions to necessity. It is insufficient to tolerate necessity, 
just as it is mistaken to conceal it; neither of these standpoints indicates any kind of love. To 
achieve greatness, one must love necessity, one must love everything as it is. 
Later in Ecce Homo Nietzsche says that “Necessity does not hurt me; amor fati is my 
innermost nature” (EH CW.4).177 What is of interest is that in 1882 Nietzsche described amor 
fati as his “dearest wish”, he now describes amor fati as something he has achieved.178 If 
Nietzsche has genuinely achieved this state (even if believed he was on the path to achieving it), 
he could presumably offer some guidance on how one might similarly achieve amor fati. 
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 Nietzsche concludes the passage by saying: “Let looking away be my only negation!  And, all in all and on the 
whole: some day I want only to be a Yes-sayer!” Given the frequency of Nietzsche’s no-saying between 1882-1888, 
one might reasonably conclude Nietzsche that he failed to become a Yes-sayer. One might then also conclude that 
Nietzsche, despite his wishes, did not succeed in becoming the life-affirming person. I will return to this issue below 
in the conclusion. 
177
 Nietzsche would essentially repeat this: “What my innermost nature tells me is that everything necessary, seen 
from above and in the sense of a great economy, is also useful in itself,—it should not just be tolerated, it should be 
loved … Amor fati: that is my innermost nature” (NCW Epi. 1). 
178
 Beatrice Han-Pile brought this to my attention: “Amor fati is now presented in the first person, and not as an ideal 
but as a realised state (‘my inmost nature’, ‘the bottom of my nature’). Nietzsche does not offer any reasons to try to 
convince us of the desirability of loving fate, but a reflective description of how things appear to someone who is in 
such a state” (Han-Pile, 2009; 234). 
 
[110] 
 
As with much in Nietzsche, it is one thing to state a point, it is another to explain; and 
Nietzsche does little to explain how it is he might have achieved amor fati. How does a person 
come to love everything as it is, backwards and forwards? There is no answer to this question. 
Han-Pile comments on how Nietzsche is not offering a prescriptive account of how one can 
achieve amor fati, rather, Nietzsche is offering a descriptive account of his own achievement. In 
light of this, is there anything we can conclusively draw about amor fati from his example? To 
answer this, we must try to answer several other questions first. 
To begin, we must try to make sense of how amor fati is a “formula for greatness”. 
Nietzsche says it is “not want[ing] anything to be different, not forwards, not backwards, not for 
all eternity” (EH II.10). If the suggestion was that we accept a state of affairs, this much seems 
within a person’s control. But Nietzsche makes it clear the formula is asking something more, for 
he goes on to add, revealingly, that neither tolerating [ertragen, enduring] necessity nor 
concealing it will do; one must love it. What would it mean to [choose to] love necessity and 
fate? Putting the question in this way effectively brings us back to how one learns to love. It is 
not the case that one simply decides by rational deliberation to love, or through sheer force of 
will, wills love. Rather, one learns to love; it is something we play a role in, but simultaneously 
undergo.  
What Nietzsche describes is clearly a goal and an ideal. Thus, while amor fati is an 
intriguing ideal, it is just that, an ideal. And while it does seem to help fill in the account about 
how a person might love life as a whole (despite all that is strange and terrible), amor fati does 
not provide a “formula of greatness”, but rather highlights the end goal. As we have seen, love 
must be learned; so too must love of fate be learned. The question then is: how does one learn to 
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love fate? And this brings us back to one of the primary challenges with Nietzsche’s position: 
how does one learn to love a life filled with so much that is strange and terrible? 
Eternal Recurrence 
 One of the pressing challenges for Nietzsche is to articulate how a person might move 
beyond a life negating standpoint to a life affirming standpoint. For that matter, there is also the 
issue of how a person might go beyond enduring, accepting, or resigning herself to life. Several 
variations focusing on the eternal recurrence ‘test’ have been proposed as to how this might be 
accomplished.
179
 No doubt spurred by Nietzsche’s claim that the eternal recurrence is “the 
highest possible formula of affirmation”, this is an understandable interpretation. However, it 
does not seem to explain how one would come to achieve an attitude of life affirmation; rather, it 
merely helps a person diagnose their individual standpoint towards life at a particular time. 
Consider the question the demon asks regarding how one would react to the idea of the eternal 
recurrence: “would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who 
spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have 
answered him: ‘you are a god, and never have I heard anything more divine’” (GS 341; emphasis 
mine).  
Nietzsche here suggests that one need only have “a tremendous moment” in one’s life to 
affirm one’s whole life. But as the passage continues, Nietzsche then suggests an alternative: “Or 
how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to long for nothing more 
fervently …?” As the passage concludes, Nietzsche seems to place the emphasis on one’s life and 
life more generally, which is quite different from a great moment. Nietzsche seems to overlook 
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 For significantly more detailed discussions of the eternal recurrence, see Soll (1973), Magnus (1978), Nehamas 
(1985), Clark (1990), Anderson (2005), and Reginster (2006), all of which present thoughtful and nuanced 
treatments. Chapter 5 of Reginster gives a good, critical overview of the various readings offered by the 
aforementioned interpreters.  
[112] 
 
the obvious possibility that a person could react to the thought of eternal recurrence with 
indifference and apathy. Similarly, he seems to overlook the fact that the vast majority of people 
would, knowing what they had done in their lives, desire something radically different. 
What we can take from this is that how a person reacts is primarily a sign about whether 
or not that the person has achieved an attitude of life affirmation.
180
 How a person reacts says 
nothing about what it is that gets them to a point where they can react with joy to the idea of the 
eternal recurrence. Nietzsche, as if aware of this, does add that, if the idea of the eternal 
recurrence “gained power over you”, then it would transform you. This directs our attention 
towards an important question that needs to be answered: how might the thought of the eternal 
recurrence gain power over a person? Nietzsche does not offer an explanation why or how 
thought of the eternal recurrence would gain power over a person. All we learn is that if it did 
gain power over a person, it would transform her. Thus, while “The Greatest Weight” is a 
deservedly famous passage in Nietzsche’s corpus, it leaves much to be explained both with 
respect to the eternal recurrence and achieving an attitude of life affirmation.  
Fortunately, Nietzsche makes some intriguing suggestions about how we might address 
these questions. First of all, we can also read GS 341 as a confrontation, in that most people are 
probably going to react negatively to Nietzsche’s question about wanting this again—if they 
react at all. This confrontation can act as an impetus to the project of self-cultivation required to 
answer the question affirmatively. If this is the case, there is certainly great value in “the greatest 
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 A representative example of this can be found in Reginster, who writes: “You affirm [your] life if you react with 
joy to the prospect of its eternal recurrence” (Reginster, 2006; 202). He continues, adding a little more substance to 
the idea when he says that “to advocate the affirmation of life, then, is to exhort compliance with a distinctive ethical 
imperative: live your life so as to become able to welcome its eternal recurrence” (ibid). What such a life is like is 
not something Nietzsche could say, but more can assuredly be said about just how one ought to live. Leiter says that, 
“a person affirms his life in Nietzsche’s sense only insofar as he would gladly will its eternal return” (Leiter, 2002; 
119-120). Clark, says that “a joyful reaction [to eternal recurrence] would indicate a fully affirmative attitude 
towards one’s … life”, which is an attitude “Nietzsche wants to promote” (Clark, 1990; 251). 
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weight”, but primarily in the way it works as a confrontation and an impetus to do something 
with one’s life.  
Nietzsche also suggests in the passage that one is not reacting to the thought experiment; 
rather, when he asks “have you once experienced a tremendous moment”, what is at stake is 
whether or not one has achieved something special, a defining moment in one’s life. The 
suggestion is that it is this rare, defining moment that makes one’s life something worth 
affirming. Connecting this second suggestion to the first, one might find that one’s life contains 
no tremendous moments, which could be an impetus to new projects and that one defining 
achievement. At the same time, as Nietzsche was aware, there is the possibility that a person 
may, upon recognizing the absence of any defining moment, be crushed. 
In the end we find that, while the presentation of eternal recurrence in GS 341 
promisingly offers a few suggestive ideas on the question of life affirmation and how one might 
learn to love life, it generates more questions than it provides answers. It is to these, and other 
questions, that we now turn. 
Can We Become Used to Life? Can We Affirm Life? 
 Having worked to elucidate the different movements about how one learns to love life, 
there are several questions and potential problems identified above that now need to be 
addressed. (1) How could a person become used to life, particularly the preponderance of the 
questionable and terrible? For most people, this seems to be asking for too much, and oftentimes 
when a person does become used to the travails and sorrows of life, the resulting attitude is one 
of resignation or indifference, which is surely not what Nietzsche hopes to cultivate.  
This leads us to the difficult question we have been building toward: (2) how could a 
person come to affirm life, particularly what is questionable and terrible, which seems required 
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by the “the greatest weight” test? There are many things in life that are, on the most charitable 
reading, nearly impossible to accept; more than that, the thought of ever becoming accustomed to 
such things should strike us as deeply disconcerting. Given these difficulties, it seems the height 
of folly to ask that a person love what is questionable and terrible, let alone desire such things 
again and again. These are not easy tasks, as Nietzsche knew very well. And they seem to cast 
doubt on whether a person could come to truly love life in the way Nietzsche suggests. 
Can We Become Used to Life? 
Nietzsche writes that “finally comes a moment when we are used [gewohnt, accustomed] 
to it”. While we can understand what it means to become used to a new piece of music, it would 
be something altogether different to become used to life. Nietzsche offers a general idea of what 
it means to get used to something, explaining that “what we are used to” is what is familiar, what 
“we no longer marvel at it”; it is what “makes us feel at home” (GS 355).181 Taking this as a 
starting point, the concern is that, given that life is full of what is questionable and terrible, it is 
not clear why anyone would want to “feel at home” in this world.182 Additionally, it is doubtful 
that we want to get used to evil such that we longer marvel at it as something extra-ordinary. In 
light of these issues, Nietzsche’s position needs to be carefully examined, to see what it means to 
become used to life and how one achieves this, and to see if the aforementioned problems can be 
circumvented.   
We can begin to address these questions and get a clearer picture of the stance a person 
must come to by considering another stance about which Nietzsche spoke. One of the things that 
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 “The familiar means what we are used to, so that we no longer marvel at it; the commonplace; some rule in 
which we are stuck; each and every thing that makes us feel at home” (GS 355). 
182
 And history is filled with those who have argued we are not at home with this world. One need only look at the 
writings of Pythagoras, Plato, and St. Paul to see that this standpoint is not at all uncommon. 
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Nietzsche observed is that people work to simply endure life.
183
 In virtue of the fact life is beset 
by pain and suffering, many people take life to be evil, and thus desire that it be other than it is. 
In spite of this, many people do begrudgingly accept the world before them, to the degree they 
endure it. This seems to signify something of an achievement to Nietzsche, at least in 
comparison to those who would turn away from life in despair and resignation. On the other 
hand, he does not look at the ability to endure suffering as much of an achievement.
184
 Thus we 
can conclude that facing the world, and enduring it as it is, is not something Nietzsche holds with 
much esteem (even if it might have some limited value). Many people do simply put their heads 
down, endure life’s hardships, and get on with their lives.185 But this does not seem to be what 
Nietzsche has in mind by “becoming used to life”. 
To get a clearer understanding of how a person becomes used to something, we can 
consider an example when a person is not used to something, e.g., a sibling’s dog. There is a 
kind of tentativeness around the dog, which is understandable given that the dog is unknown and 
unfamiliar to the person. This becomes more understandable when we learn the person has had a 
fear of dogs that dates back to a childhood incident. The person does not “feel at home” around 
dogs, certainly not around a large dog like a Rottweiler or a Doberman. There might be feelings 
of defensiveness and dislike, perhaps something as strong as disdain. In the presence of one of 
these dogs, the person responds by doing his best to avoid the dog, and when in contact with the 
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 Horstmann goes so far as to say that the “starting point for almost everything Nietzsche was interested in … can 
be nicely summarized in the form of the question … ‘how are we to endure life?’” While it may be fair to describe 
this question as a starting point, it is not the primary goal in Nietzsche’s thought. Horstmann makes this point in his 
thoughtful and illuminating introduction to Beyond Good and Evil (xvi).  
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 Interestingly, Nietzsche notes that life is not that hard to endure (GS 325). He also thinks, somewhat surprisingly, 
that “the great majority endure life without complaining overmuch” (HH 33). Perhaps more surprisingly, he notes 
that “we are able to endure a fairly large amount of unpleasure” (D 354). 
185
 This attitude, if it can be called as such, presents an intriguing case, about which there are many questions. To 
genuinely answer these questions, we would need to know more about such types. For example, is the person who 
endures life simply indifferent to it? How does this differ from being resigned to life? Nietzsche did not view the 
attitude of resignation as positive, but rather something to be overcome. On the other hand, we should consider if 
there is something of merit we should laud in the person who endures life, determinedly going about her business, 
come what may. Does this not show a change in her stance that has some value? 
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dog, to simply bear the interaction and extricate himself as quickly as possible, while constantly 
wishing no dogs were present. We can see that this person is closed off to the dogs. 
Over time, as the person gets to know the dogs, as they become more familiar, he 
becomes more open to them, his anxiety and cautiousness begin to slowly recede, he may 
actively seek them out, and the possibility of positive feelings arise as he comes to know the 
dogs better.
186
 At the core, he learns to respond to the dogs in a better way, no longer closing 
himself off. He neither withdraws from their presence, nor does he resign himself to their 
presence, nor does he wish the situation were otherwise. Through increased familiarity, 
something questionable and strange “loses” the negative qualities because his stance towards the 
dogs has changed. That is to say, by cultivating the openness Nietzsche talks about in GS 334, 
putting forth effort and good will, patience and kindheartedness, the person learns to respond 
better. 
To talk of getting used to a dog, despite a fear of dogs is one thing. Similarly, talking 
about life in the abstract may make the process seem straightforward, but will this apply to more 
difficult cases? Can we become used to the seemingly endless string of terrorist attacks across 
the globe, or to the preponderance of natural disasters? Perhaps more importantly, would we 
want to become used to such events? There is an important difference between the examples 
offered: with respect to music and a sibling’s dog, in each of these cases there is a good to be 
gained from becoming used to them. This contrasts with vicious terrorist activity and devastating 
natural disasters, things which often do not even directly have anything to do with us. In these 
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 Of course, there is the concern that certain conditions prevent this, e.g., the person’s childhood fear of dogs is too 
strong, such that any interactions with dogs simply exacerbate her fear. In the end, the dog may always appear 
menacing. This is the persistent worry we have seen several times above, a worry that extends to life: it may simply 
appear too menacing, too ugly, too difficult to be loved. 
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cases, we would find something awry if a person got used to such events; we take it that it is 
good to be angered by such things. 
Terrorism provides a helpful example which may allow us to capture the attitude 
Nietzsche seems to be working to articulate. For decades, the people of Israel have grown 
accustomed to terrorism, to the point where schoolchildren are taught to avoid suspicious 
packages, where people comport themselves as if such attacks could happen at any time, all 
leading to terrorism has become part and parcel of their lives. What is revealing about this 
example is something that is not ordinary has, in one sense, become commonplace, part of the 
background in life in Israel. Yet, at the same time such actions retain both what makes them 
extra-ordinary and bad. And this is how we want things to be, for we would find something 
wrong if people became used to such events such that we perceived them as ordinary and part of 
daily life. 
In each case, be it a piece of music, a dog, or terrorism, the key is that we need to listen to 
what is before us. We need to be open to it, acknowledge the ways it can challenge us, rise to the 
challenge, and meet it on its own terms. Putting forth this effort will help remove certain barriers 
to life, helping us learn how to respond appropriately, astutely, and in a timely manner; perhaps 
we may come to feel at home with it. We can see in each of these examples that a different kind 
of responsiveness is needed if we are to become used to these things in the proper way. What I 
expect from a piece of music will differ from what I can expect from a dog. We take it that a 
piece of music or a dog is a good thing (though it need not be), while terrorism is a bad thing. 
Having the right stance is integral, as the stance one enters a situation with will dictate how we 
respond to it, particularly if we respond in a good way or a bad way. For example, responding to 
terrorism in the same way one responds to a dog would be responding in the wrong way. 
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Taking all of this and generalizing to life, to become used to life in the right way requires 
learning about life, just as it requires being open to life. Being open to life will be particularly 
important, as we need to be able to bear it, while simultaneously responding to it in the right 
way. The right kind of stance, as Nietzsche says, is one in which the person comes with effort 
and good will, patience and intelligence. With this stance we are in position to listen to life, 
acknowledge what is good about it, but also acknowledge the ways in can both challenge us and 
terrify us. In the latter case, we need to learn to bear it better, while at the same time 
acknowledging that we do not want to get used to it in such a way that it loses what makes it 
extra-ordinary. Putting forth this effort will help remove some, but not all barriers to life, helping 
it become something with which we feel at home, while also acknowledging that there is 
something extra-ordinary about life. 
Can We Affirm the Terrible in Life? 
The biggest challenge that arises from Nietzsche’s view has to do with what “The 
Greatest Weight” demands of us, as it seems to require that a person affirm things she would find 
nearly impossible to affirm, if not impossible. How, the objection goes, could one possibly 
affirm something as horrific as the bubonic plague that devastated Europe in the fourteenth-
century, killing an estimated one-third of the population, or the Terror Famine of the Ukraine in 
1932-1933, in which Stalin systematically starved to death 3-5 million people, and possibly as 
many as 6-8 million? Our intuitions are that such events cannot be affirmed, that we should not 
want to affirm such events, and that Nietzsche is deeply misguided if he thought otherwise.  
This issue is more complicated than it initially appears, for it is not clear if Nietzsche 
would have us love and affirm one’s own life, as the question of the greatest weight suggests, or 
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if, as he suggests at times, we are to love and affirm existence as a whole.
187
 The former is 
difficult enough, while the latter poses an even greater challenge. For example, Nietzsche spoke 
of “saying yes to life, even in its strangest and harshest problems,” (TI X.5).188 Thus he might 
very well be asking us to affirm life as a whole. Alternatively, one could read Nietzsche as 
presenting the idea of affirmation with respect to the events of one’s own life, viz., that one 
affirm all of the events in one’s life.189 This too is hard. Even this minimal version leads to the 
same basic objection: one cannot possibly affirm the terrible events in one’s own life. If this is 
the case, then Nietzsche’s notion of life affirmation has a serious problem.190  
Nietzsche was aware of this issue and the general difficulty of affirmation in a world rife 
with pain and suffering. We see him grappling with this problem as early as The Birth of 
Tragedy, where he claims that “only as an aesthetic phenomenon is existence and the world 
eternally justified” (BT 5); we see the issue as the dramatic centerpiece of Book III of 
Zarathustra, as Zarathustra wrestles with the difficulty of affirming his “most abysmal 
thought”;191 and we see it in Nietzsche’s discussions of amor fati and Yes-saying in the 1888 
writings. Given his awareness of the issue and his various attempts to address the issue, it is 
reasonable to infer that he felt this challenge could be successfully met. The challenge is to see 
just how this might be addressed consistent with the goal of affirming life. 
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 A statement from the Nachlass makes the most explicit statement of this idea: “If we say Yes to a single moment, 
this means we have said Yes not only to ourselves, but to all existence” (WLN 7[38]). 
188
 Nietzsche repeats this statement in EH BT.3. The enormity of what he is asking can be clearly seen in his call for 
“an unreserved yea-saying even to suffering, even to guilt, even to everything questionable and strange about 
existence” (EH BT.2). See also EH Z.6. 
189
 Anderson, in “Nietzsche on Truth, Illusion, and Redemption” (2005) reads Nietzsche as advocating this “minimal 
version” (197). Anderson acknowledges however that one could read Nietzsche as suggesting the stronger version 
about the world as a whole. 
190
 And yet Nietzsche speaks of a type who he claims does just that! “The tragic artist is not a pessimist,— he says 
yes to the very things that are questionable and terrible, he is Dionysian …” (TI III.6). 
191
 I will return to the dramatic confrontation of “On the Vision and the Riddle” in the conclusion, as Nietzsche here 
offers a rich portrait of Zarathustra’s struggle and redemption. 
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There is nothing in GS 334 that directly addresses how one might learn to love what is 
“heaviest, blackest”. As we have seen, GS 334 advocates putting forth the effort and good will to 
endure what is strange, after which we become used to it, and in the end we are enchanted by it, 
to the point where it “casts off its veil and presents itself as a new and indescribable beauty”. If 
Nietzsche is suggesting that everything strange and terrible in life somehow reveals itself as 
beautiful, then surely he is mistaken. It is one thing for an atonal composition by Schönberg to be 
unveiled as a thing of beauty, but quite another for the bombing of civilians to be seen in this 
way. The fact of the matter is that much that is strange, questionable, and terrible, cannot be 
unveiled as something beautiful. Furthermore, in light of the way Nietzsche describes the world 
and life, if the veil was lifted, it is a distinct possibility life would look even more terrible, not 
beautiful. 
Evidence suggests Nietzsche was aware that not all things are loveable, as he speaks of 
“everything we now love” as what “we have learned to love”. While the statement is ambiguous, 
there is no reason to think that he is claiming all things are lovable. This returns us to the main 
issue: how can a person come to love life, given that life is filled with so much suffering, so 
much that is questionable, so much that is terrible?  
One way we might be able to navigate this problem is by turning our attention back to 
Nietzsche’s notion of amor fati. With Nietzsche’s first remark about amor fati, he writes about 
wanting to attain a deeper understanding between “what is necessary in things” and “what is 
beautiful in them”.192 Importantly, Nietzsche sees in this a way to help make things beautiful. He 
later elaborates on what amor fati means, saying it is not wanting anything to be different, not 
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 “I want to learn more and more how to see what is necessary in things as what is beautiful in them—thus I will be 
one of those who makes things beautiful. Amor fati: let that be my love from now on!” (GS 276). 
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even the tiniest grain of sand.
193
 In focusing on the importance of each event in one’s life, that 
they all contribute to who and what one becomes, one comes to understand that “nothing is 
dispensable”. Nietzsche intriguingly characterizes this idea as “a formula of the highest 
affirmation”.194 The basic idea is that a person’s life, and everything in it, can be affirmed by 
being taken as a whole.
195
 One might object here that, if this is what Nietzsche is asking of us, he 
seems to have a weaker position, as a person does not affirm certain things for what they are, but 
only as a part of a greater whole. Alternatively, in the discussion of eternal recurrence, we saw 
the idea that one tremendous achievement in a person’s life is what redeems her life. In light of 
these concerns, we must evaluate if the significance of particular acts would be diminished when 
taken as part of a whole. 
Nietzsche’s belief in the interconnectedness of events offers a response showing that it is 
misguided to be concerned about the significance of particular acts being diminished when taken 
as part of the whole. For example, in Zarathustra, Nietzsche asks if “you ever said Yes to one 
joy?” If so, he replies, “then you also said Yes to all pain.” This is because “all things are 
enchained, entwined”.196  The implication is that to change one particular detail would have 
repercussions on other details in a person’s life. Nietzsche saw this with respect to his own life, 
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 “My formula for greatness is amor fati: that you do not want anything to be different, not forwards, not 
backwards, not for all eternity. Not just to tolerate necessity, still less to conceal it—all idealism is hypocrisy 
towards necessity—, but to love it …” (EH II.10). See also BGE 56. 
194
 “[A] formula of the highest affirmation born out of fullness, out of overfullness, an unreserved yea-saying even to 
suffering, even to guilt, even to everything questionable and strange about existence . . . This final, most joyful, 
effusive, high-spirited yes to life is not only the highest insight, it is also the most profound … Nothing in existence 
should be excluded, nothing is dispensable” (EH BT.2). 
195
 Anderson (2005) and May (2011) both read Nietzsche as advocating affirming a person’s life as a whole. 
Anderson writes that “a person’s life … can be redeemed by being brought into a whole that the person can affirm”, 
which is achieved “in virtue of [each event’s] essential contribution to the meaning of the whole story” (Anderson, 
2005; 200). May notes that “the proper object of affirmation is not the particular event as such but rather my whole 
life of which the particular event is an inextricable part” (May, 2011; 95). 
196
 “Have you ever said Yes to one joy? Oh my friends, then you also said Yes to all pain. All things are enchained, 
entwined, enamored –“ He continues, stating that “if you ever wanted one time two times … then you wanted 
everything back!” (Z IV.19.10). Likewise, GS 341 implies that all things are interconnected. 
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as he emphasized throughout EH; he expressed thankfulness for the travails and sicknesses in his 
life, as they helped him see his task. The idea is that even those events in a person’s life which 
she detests play a role in the overall whole of her life: to weed out an event she laments and 
wishes was otherwise would be to change her life into a different life, which is not at all 
consistent with the idea of life affirmation.
197
  
Nietzsche’s position suggests that to affirm the whole of one’s life is to redeem even 
what she detests and laments.
198
 This strongly suggests a person can affirm her life, while 
detesting certain lamentable moments within her life. At the same time, insofar as affirming the 
whole affirms all that is necessary to the whole, the lamentable moments are themselves 
affirmed, and this is done without wishing them to be otherwise. 
At this point we must consider whether a person can affirm life and yet say no to certain 
experiences, as the evidence offered above seems to suggest. There is much in Nietzsche that 
suggests, while his dearest wish was become only a Yes-sayer, he knew life necessitated No-
saying. Thus, while his rhetoric at times says that the person who had achieved a point of 
affirming life says only Yes, Nietzsche actually knew better.
199
 Given the basic challenge about 
the implausibility of having to affirm all events in one’s life, seeing that Nietzsche acknowledges 
the need for No-saying is what we would hope his position entails.  
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 As an example Anderson appeals to Jimmy Carter, who suffered a resounding defeat in the 1980 presidential 
election, only to reemerge as a great moral force with his work to eliminate disease, reduce poverty, and advance 
civil rights. Had Carter not suffered a crushing defeat in the election, all that he would go on to accomplish would 
likely not have occurred. The suggestion Anderson takes from Nietzsche is that even such terrible moments in a 
person’s life “can be redeemed by being brought into a whole that the person can affirm” (Anderson, 2005; 200). 
Integrated into the whole of one’s life, those events which, taken in isolation, could not be affirmed, may be 
affirmed. More than that, without his defeat in the election, the Carter we know today would not be.  As Nietzsche 
claimed, all things in a person’s life are indispensable. 
198
 See Z II.20, “On Redemption”. Elsewhere Nietzsche writes that “everything is redeemed and affirmed in the 
whole” (TI IX.49). 
199
 “I know the joy of destruction to a degree proportionate to my strength for destruction,— In both cases I obey my 
Dionysian nature, which does not know how to separate doing no from saying yes” (EH IV.2). 
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While Nietzsche spoke of Daybreak and The Gay Science as affirmative books, there was 
much in them that was critical. He also explains that even with all of his No-saying, Zarathustra 
is “the opposite of a no-saying spirit”. Likewise, Nietzsche adds how he “contradict[s] as nobody 
has ever contradicted before”, but is nonetheless “the opposite of a nay-saying spirit” (EH 
IV.1).Nietzsche routinely emphasized that his work included a No-saying part. Having said this, 
Nietzsche proceeds to restate the basic problem: “how someone with the hardest, most terrible 
insight into reality … can nonetheless see it not as an objection to existence … but instead find 
one more reason in it for himself to be the eternal yes to all things” (EH Z.6).  
We find clarity in a particularly revealing statement found in Zarathustra, a statement 
which captures what we would expect from him with respect to Yes-saying and No-saying. 
Zarathustra states how an indiscriminate taste is “not the best taste”. Rather, he esteems “the 
obstinate, choosy tongues and stomachs, which have learned to say ‘I’ and ‘Yes’ and ‘No’” (Z 
III.11).
200
 This should not surprise us, as it not only fits with the many things Nietzsche said ‘no’ 
to as part of his critical project, but it also fits with his basic sense of taste. Overall then, 
evidence strongly indicates that a person who loved and affirmed life could nonetheless say No 
to at least some of what was terrible in life.  
One last issue is that this might seem to be in tension with the earlier claim that even the 
terrible, detestable events in one’s life are essential in making a person’s life hers. How can one 
detest what is essential, and yet ultimately affirmed in the whole? We have seen that affirming 
life does not entail that we see everything in life as good. To take an example, there seems to be 
no inconsistency in detesting the endless revisions that go into writing a dissertation, while at the 
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 Nietzsche concludes by saying that “chewing and digesting everything – that is truly the swine’s style! To always 
say hee-yaw – only the ass learned that, and whoever is of its spirit!” (Z III.11). 
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same time acknowledging that careful, continued revising is essential to a good dissertation. I 
can love the dissertation without loving the revision process. 
3.5 Conclusion: A New Love of Life 
Nietzsche discusses love throughout his writings, though precisely how he understands 
love is by no means clear. However Nietzsche might be conceiving love, it is a new love that he 
is after with the love of life.
201
 This new love is, as he emphasizes, a different kind of love. What 
makes this love different? As Nietzsche recognized, life is filled with much that is strange, 
questionable, and terrible, a fact which does little to inspire feelings of love or trust. As 
Nietzsche goes on to say, “life itself has become a problem”. This should not make us gloomy 
though, for “love of life is still possible—only one loves differently. It is like the love for a 
woman who gives us doubts” (GS P.3). In the same way that loving such a woman is risky, 
loving life is similarly risky.  
This is one of those evocative and enigmatic passages that make Nietzsche a joy to read 
and meditate upon. We would not expect “the love for a woman who gives us doubts” to inspire 
much confidence. And it is true, life can be frightening and dangerous, but that does not mean 
love of life is impossible. Nietzsche immediately adds that this does not make us sullen; in fact, 
“the attraction of everything problematic” (GS P.3) captures the eye of the type Nietzsche has in 
mind. This may be putting the cart before the horse though, for an attraction to what is 
problematic seems to presuppose a person has already achieved the kind of life-affirming 
standpoint Nietzsche has in mind.  
Having explained the various stages that culminate with a person learning to love life, the 
goal in this conclusion is to tie together the various threads and see what the life-affirming 
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 Pippin helpfully writes that “the gay science is, then, a knowledge of erotics; not so much a knowledge of what 
love is as how to love and so live well” (Pippin, 2010; 35). 
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person looks like. The person who has achieved a genuine love of life is transformed. The 
transformation encompasses a fundamental change in a person’s attitude and orientation towards 
life; it is a way of living, a celebration of life.   
While the idea of life affirmation is something of an elusive notion, Nietzsche talks about 
“the ideal of the most high-spirited, vital, world-affirming individual” (BGE 56), who is 
enamored by the idea of eternal recurrence. Reflecting on the idea of the high-spirited 
[übermüthigsten; carefree, exuberant] person, we find a person who is able to triumph over 
challenging experiences, and does so in a high-spirited manner. Nietzsche uses 
übermüthigsten in GS P.1 to refer to his triumph over the winter and the return of health, 
gratitude, and joy that brought, all the while being aware of the winter that he patiently resisted. 
This experience Nietzsche recalls captures the kind of equilibrium and fortitude of the high-
spirited person. An additional feature of affirmation, related to this high-spiritedness, can be seen 
in EH BT.2, where Nietzsche writes of “this final, most joyful, effusive, high-spirited 
[übermüthigste] yes to life”. Here Nietzsche refers to another notion common in his mature 
works, fullness and overfullness. This overfullness gives a person the ability to withstand what 
would harm other people. As such, it gives a person a well-spring to draw from (as well as an 
overflow to give). At the same time, it signifies a confidence and joy in the person’s activity. 
Taking these remarks into account, as well as what we learn from Nietzsche’s account of 
learning to love, we can supplement the portrait of the life-affirming person. This person comes 
to understand life, seeing everything in it with an honest eye, seeing the basic connectedness of it 
all; this person does not reject life as a whole (even if certain particulars in life are detested), but 
rather desires the world as it is; hardened by the struggles and resistances that are part and parcel 
of life, she cultivates personal strength (as opposed to an attitude of resignation); this person 
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exhibits cheerfulness, carrying the self-knowledge that she is capable of overcoming problems 
and challenges, that she has risen to hard tasks before and is prepared to do so again; 
accordingly, she is open to life and its challenges, engaging life through risk-taking (as opposed 
to adopting a defensive and withdrawn orientation towards life); she knows she must be ready 
and strong enough to rise to the challenges life brings, while maintaining her equilibrium; and 
finally, this person not only comes to see the beauty in the totality of life, but also helps to 
redeem what is questionable and terrible in the world through her defining achievement(s).
202
  
Life affirmation is for Nietzsche at once both a radical transformation in the individual, 
and simultaneously a transformation of life and the world. We can get a clearer picture of this 
twofold transformation by examining a crucial passage from Zarathustra, “On the Vision and the 
Riddle”. 
*** 
As Nietzsche depicts the mysterious vision of a snake that had climbed down the 
shepherd’s throat, Zarathustra tells him to bite the head off. The shepherd does so and overcomes 
what is “heaviest, blackest” and becomes “a transformed, illuminated, laughing being” (Z III.2). 
We see here Zarathustra’s [Nietzsche’s] horror at what willing the eternal recurrence entails, i.e., 
the smallest in life, the most terrible in life. Nietzsche expressed disgust at the thought of 
affirming what seemingly cannot be affirmed. Like the shepherd in his vision, Zarathustra will 
later overcome his nausea at the idea of eternal recurrence and the repetition of everything 
small.
203
 Both the shepherd and Zarathustra were able to come to terms with what they found 
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 As we saw above, this beauty can have different sources. Nietzsche explains how the person who has “an 
overflow in procreating, fertilizing forces capable of turning any desert into bountiful farmland” (GS 370). With this 
description Nietzsche illustrates the transformative capabilities of one who has achieved an attitude of life 
affirmation. This is undoubtedly rarified air of which Nietzsche speaks. 
203
 While it takes the entirety of Book III to capture Zarathustra’s struggles with these issues and how everything 
unfolds, see “On the Vision and the Riddle” and “The Convalescent” for crucial moments. Part III of Lampert 
(1986) gives a thoughtful, illuminating reading of the meaning of what Zarathustra undergoes and how these 
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most nauseating. Despite the examples of the shepherd and Zarathustra, it is not clear how such 
events are to be affirmed, or whether everyone will be up to the challenge to affirm what is 
terrible in their respective lives.  
If we stop and reflect on how Nietzsche describes the shepherd, we can get a little closer 
to understanding how Nietzsche believes he can address the problem of affirming what is terrible 
in life. At the same time, we get more insight into the nature of a life-affirming person. Setting 
aside the question of how the shepherd is transformed,
204
 his transformation is characterized in 
such a way that he is “no longer human”, evincing “a laughter that was no human laughter”. 
These are strong words, and could easily be misinterpreted.
205
 At the core, the idea Nietzsche is 
trying to convey is that this person would, from our perspective, appear “no longer human”. 
After all, to be able to laugh at what is “heaviest, blackest” in life not only appears inhuman, but 
strikes us as undesirable.
206
  
While the quality Nietzsche is after can be elusive, we do find him give expression to the 
basic idea at other times in his writings. That is to say, he envisions a type who has attained a 
point where what is strange, questionable, and terrible simply does not impact him. That is, 
“what is evil ... and ugly almost seems acceptable because of an overflow in procreating, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
chapters fit together, a reading with which I am generally in agreement. Lampert compares willing eternal 
recurrence and affirming life with theodicy. “In justifying the ways of life to man, Zarathustra too faces the problem 
of evil as the fundamental puzzle, whose solution calls for an act of willful courage” (171). 
204
 Pippin makes just this point in his illuminating introduction to the Cambridge translation of Zarathustra. See 
page xxxii. This brings us back to the primary issue: how is it that a person is transformed?  
As it is chronicled in Book III, Zarathustra spends much time working towards this moment. 
205
 For example, one might read this as an indication that the shepherd, being “no longer human”, has become an 
Übermensch. Lampert (1986) and Gooding-Williams (2001) both offer solid arguments against the idea the 
shepherd has become an Übermensch. 
206
 Lampert describes the laughter as “so sovereign and so singular that [Zarathustra] is haunted by the need to laugh 
that laughter himself” (169). For this to happen, Lampert says Zarathustra must “enact the chilling scene that made 
that laughter possible” (170). This occurs in “The Convalescent”, near the end of Book III, when Zarathustra 
summons his most abysmal thought “and how that monster crawled into my throat and choked me! But I bit off its 
head and spat it away from me” (Z III.13). 
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fertilizing forces”.207 The life-affirming person simply is not shaken and thrown off balance in 
the way most people are shaken at the sight of what is terrible. For some, this may come across 
as a deeply undesirable trait, and laughter might not seem to adequately convey what Nietzsche 
has in mind, but in laughter there is something that captures the joyfulness and cheerfulness he 
esteemed. At the same time it indicates the achievement of a person who has, through his 
transformation, rendered what is strange and terrible something she can face, something she sees 
herself as equal to its challenges, and in doing so remains undaunted by it. Thus we see that, one 
possible way Nietzsche responds to the problem of affirming what is terrible, is to attain a 
radically new standpoint where what is terrible is no longer daunting. In effect, the person is 
transformed and stands energized and ready to rise to the occasion.  
There is another issue that arises in light of what Nietzsche says in “On the Vision and 
the Riddle”. How does the kind of transformation and standpoint of the shepherd cohere with the 
account of learning to love? Additionally, how does a standpoint where what is “heaviest, 
blackest” is beneath a person fit alongside the idea that a life-affirming person can detest what is 
strange and terrible? It seems like Nietzsche is offering two substantially different ideals in these 
two accounts. Given that, one might think that the account I have offered grounded in GS 334 
has erred in conceiving how a person learns to love and affirm life. 
The apparent inconsistency between these two ways of conceiving life affirmation vexed 
me until a distinction that Ken Gemes made came to mind. In his review of Reginster, Gemes 
makes a distinction between what he calls “naïve affirmation” and “reflective affirmation”. 
Naïve affirmation is what we find in Nietzsche’s description of the noble types in essay one of 
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 “He who is richest in fullness of life, the Dionysian god and man, can allow himself not only the sight of what is 
terrible and questionable but also the terrible deed and every luxury of destruction, decomposition, negation; in his 
case, what is evil, nonsensical, and ugly almost seems acceptable because of an overflow in procreating, fertilizing 
forces capable of turning any desert into bountiful farmland” (GS 370). 
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the Genealogy.
208
 In contrast, reflective affirmation, which he associates with “The Greatest 
Weight” passage, is what is available to humanity in light of our Judeo-Christian history. 
The account of how we learn to love that I have presented would clearly be a case of 
reflective affirmation. I see no reason why we cannot read the shepherd’s transformation as an 
example of naïve affirmation. This distinction helps explain the incongruity between the two 
accounts. Interestingly, Gemes goes on to speculate that “naïve affirmation is no longer possible 
and the best we can aim for is reflective affirmation, with the idea that one day, a long time in the 
future, we may again be capable of naïve affirmation” (Gemes, 2008; 462-463). Given the ways 
of the noble type and the shepherd, it is a peculiar suggestion that Gemes makes: do we have a 
desire to be like them? Is it even a live possibility? By all accounts, reflective affirmation seems 
to be a more desirable model. Is our ideal a barbarian or a Goethe?
209
 
*** 
To look again at the kind of affirmation Gemes calls reflective, we can turn to what 
Nietzsche said about Goethe, as an example of someone who may have successfully learned to 
love life and achieved a standpoint of life affirmation. I believe the description will be a fairly 
convincing endorsement for reflective affirmation. While Nietzsche spoke of Goethe regularly 
and with high regard
210
, the passage which best captures the ideal of life affirmation can be 
found in TI IX.49: 
A spirit like this who has become free stands in the middle of the world with a cheerful 
and trusting fatalism in the belief that only the individual is reprehensible, that everything 
is redeemed and affirmed in the whole—he does not negate anymore (TI IX.49). 
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 See BGE 260 and GM I.10. 
209
 In fairness to Gemes, he also considers the possibility that in the distant future we could have a kind of hybrid 
naïve-reflection affirmation. 
210
 Brobjer (1995) documents that Goethe is the most frequently mentioned figure in Nietzsche’s writings. See 
Appendix 2. 
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Given this description, we should not be surprised to see many of the ideas that have come up in 
this examination of affirmation and love. There is cheerfulness and a trust in fate, which is 
essentially Nietzsche’s notion of amor fati. We see Goethe “does not negate anymore”, though 
we have already seen that Nietzsche did not hold negation and life-affirmation to be opposed. 
After all, he expresses the idea that the whole can redeem specific things that are repugnant. 
Earlier in this passage, Nietzsche offers great praise of Goethe, saying “he put himself squarely 
in the middle of [life]”, “he did not despair”, and that he “was a convinced realist: he said yes to 
everything related to him”. With this brief description of Goethe we see many of the key 
elements of life affirmation detailed above.  
*** 
What then has Nietzsche taught us in his investigations of life?  I hope to have illustrated 
how his work is marked by a concerted attempt to show how one might come to love and affirm 
life. I have reconstructed one account of how Nietzsche addressed the sickness of life negation 
with his account of life affirmation, noted potential problems, and worked to show how he could 
respond to these problems.  This brings us to our final concern, which is an important question: 
can Nietzsche’s vision of loving life—life affirmation—genuinely help a person overcome a life-
negating standpoint towards the world and life? 
Nietzsche undoubtedly thought that his notion of life affirmation could bring a person to 
a point where she loved and affirmed life, even as Nietzsche acknowledged that it was not an 
easy transformation. He was very clear that loving and affirming life was a significant challenge, 
with many obstacles to overcome, most notably all that is questionable and terrible in life. The 
question is not one that can be easily answered.   
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How might we evaluate Nietzsche’s notion of life affirmation then?  Does it show that 
love of life is genuinely possible in the face of so much that is terrible in life? The only way to 
answer these questions is to look at a person’s life. We must set aside arguments and look at a 
person’s lived experience to see if this person genuinely loved life. But even that carries with it a 
challenge, as we cannot see into a person’s heart. However, in looking at a person’s actions and 
how she comports herself, we can draw informed conclusions.  
*** 
At times Nietzsche seems to offer himself as an example of someone who sought to 
affirm life.
211
 The evidence however is not at all clear, as Nietzsche also intimates that he had not 
succeeded in achieving life-affirmation. We need only look to his resentment to see a man who 
struggled. Whether or not Nietzsche achieved the affirmative, loving standpoint he sought, even 
if he was unsuccessful in this, his writings can nonetheless offer insight into the nature of life 
affirmation. Thus, it is academic whether or not Nietzsche’s characterization is an honest and 
accurate portrait of himself, for it still speaks to the characteristics of the life-affirming person 
(even if it does not genuinely speak of Nietzsche). As he says, “my writings speak only of my 
overcomings” (HH II P.1) 
There is no doubt that Nietzsche had been seduced by Schopenhauer’s pessimism, which 
he was cured of through his sickness (HH P.5). Likewise, he acknowledges that he fell under the 
spell of nihilism, though he notes that he outgrew it (WP P.3). Nietzsche also recognized that 
having experienced pessimism and nihilism were important for his self-development; “nothing is 
indispensable”. The tremendous sicknesses he suffered made him question both his convictions 
and life itself, and yet he found a wealth of invaluable insights from having wrestled with such 
sicknesses (GS P.3, EH I). Similarly, his sickness and subsequent recovery, characterized by 
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 Leiter (2002) holds that by Nietzsche’s own standards, he affirmed life (120). 
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feelings of high-spiritedness (GS P.1), precipitated a new joy (GS P.4). More than that, as he also 
says his sickness showed him the way both to himself and to his task (HH II P.4). 
Despite all that he had suffered, through his strength of will, Nietzsche reveled in the 
challenges life threw at him, forcing him to rise above what he thought capable, even as life 
brought him one disappointment after another. He wrenched insights from what would have 
felled stronger men. In both the prefaces of 1886 and Ecce Homo we find a man who had 
suffered much and, to his apparent surprise, not only endured his torments, but resiliently 
emerged a stronger, transformed man, grateful for the purpose that propelled him forward and 
the defining achievements he had accomplished.  
We would be mistaken to think that Nietzsche has given us a prescriptive account of how 
one can achieve life-affirmation—that idea would be anathema to him. However, through his 
writings and his example, he has given us a descriptive account of his personal experiences—and 
possibly others’ experiences (HH II P.6). Nietzsche has not only given us a helpful model on 
how we learn to love, but we also have a powerful example of a man who sought to live 
according to his ideal. As he asks in the preface to EH, “how could I not be grateful to my whole 
life?”212 
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 Solomon (2003) quotes this statement by Nietzsche and says, “that is all of the life-affirmation one really ever 
needs” (206). 
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CHAPTER 4: THE WILL TO POWER, OVERCOMING RESISTANCES, AND THE 
VALUE OF SUFFERING 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter one I claimed that enervation is perhaps the most insidious form of sickness. It 
is marked by a weak will, where pleasure, ease, and comfort are among humanity’s highest 
values. In virtue of these features, the sickness is such that it leads to the belief there is no 
problem. Nietzsche does not explicitly propose a treatment for this form of sickness, only 
offering various hints and suggestions about what might be done to address this sickness, e.g., 
strengthening one’s drives and making them consistent with one another. He does not appear to 
offer a comprehensive strategy. In critiquing modernity, its highest values, and its underlying 
ideal, Nietzsche makes it clear that a new ideal is needed, an ideal he associates with 
Zarathustra.
213
  
Beyond Zarathustra, Nietzsche indicates we might look to conceive this new ideal in the 
will to power, which is regularly juxtaposed to the ideals of modernity.
214
 Bernard Reginster’s 
recent interpretation of the will to power as “the will to overcoming resistance” (Reginster, 2006; 
126) provides a new understanding of the will to power, and with that, an improved framework 
for both understanding and addressing the sickness of enervation. I argue that Reginster’s 
interpretation helps illuminate the sickness of enervation in a new way, thereby putting us on the 
path to addressing the problem. If the will to power is the will to overcome resistance, we can 
now recognize that modernity lacks a strong will, i.e., a will which aims to overcome resistance 
and challenges.  
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 See GM II.24, GS 382, and EH GM. 
214
 Elsewhere, and with greater emphasis, Nietzsche identifies the eternal recurrence as the locus of the counter-ideal 
he seeks. Evidence suggests that both the will to power and eternal recurrence are important parts of Nietzsche’s 
overall attempt to address the different forms of sickness he diagnoses. 
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With a new understanding of the nature of the sickness of enervation, we can identify a 
distinct, if not fully developed, response to this sickness. At the heart of the matter, what 
Nietzsche identifies as the highest values of modernity—most notably the elimination of 
suffering, but also the emphasis on compassion, equality, and democracy—are such that they 
have undermined the spirit [will] of modern [bourgeois] humanity, enervating the will through 
the removal of resistance [suffering], leading people to be satisfied with a misguided notion of 
happiness. Nietzsche’s response then is to inculcate a strong will, disciplined by suffering and 
continued engagement with resistance and challenges, whereby people find happiness in the very 
process of overcoming challenges. 
*** 
With these issues in mind I turn to laying out a case that the will to power is the basis of 
Nietzsche’s response to the sickness of enervation. In section II I begin by offering a brief survey 
of the will to power in Nietzsche’s published writings in order to provide an orientation of how 
he presents and understands the notion.
215
 Important features of the will to power are: its relation 
to overcoming, that it connects what is difficult with what is praiseworthy, and that it seeks out 
resistances to overcome. Having surveyed Nietzsche’s treatment of the will to power, in section 
III I turn to Bernard Reginster’s effort to substantiate the idea that the will to power can be 
understood as “the will to overcoming resistance”. Focusing on the idea that the will to power is 
the will to overcoming resistance, section IV elucidates the new insights into the sickness of 
enervation, specifically that it can now be understood as evincing a will to avoid resistance and 
suffering. With this insight about weak, enervated wills, I propose in section V that the way to 
                                                     
215
 I make no claim to investigate the will to power as a metaphysical doctrine, as this falls outside the purview of 
the problem I am working to resolve. There are several thoughtful, philosophically rigorous treatments of this topic, 
most notably Schacht (1983, 2000), Clark (1983, 1990, 2000), Richardson (1996, 2000), and the more recent work 
by Clark & Dudrick (2012) and Katsafanas (2013). 
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address the problem would be to direct a person toward resistance and suffering, under the 
assumption that this will inculcate a strong will. This is in accord not only with Nietzsche’s 
diagnosis of the sickness of enervation, its cause embedded in the values of modernity that 
emphasize reducing [eliminating] resistances [suffering], but also his claim that what has helped 
to enhance humanity has been “the discipline of suffering”. In virtue of this seemingly counter-
intuitive claim about the value of suffering, I conclude by highlighting and addressing several 
criticisms against the view of Nietzsche’s position that I have reconstructed.  
4.2 The Will to Power in Nietzsche’s Published Works 
Nietzsche’s first published reference to the will to power came in 1983 in part one of 
Zarathustra, with two subsequent references in the second part of Zarathustra.
216
 After 
Zarathustra’s metaphorical description of the will to power in “On Self-Overcoming”, the locus 
of Nietzsche's pronouncements about the will to power occur in BGE.
217
 In the works that 
followed, from the Genealogy, to the newly composed fifth book of GS, to the works of 1888, 
Nietzsche continued to refer to the will to power with regularity, albeit never with the level of 
detail found in BGE.
218
 Sometimes the post-BGE references are informative and revealing, e.g., 
TI X.3, where Nietzsche intimates there are drives other than the will to power; sometimes the 
statements are provocative, e.g., in GM II where Nietzsche reiterates the notion of domination of 
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 See “On the Thousand and One Goals”, “On Self-Overcoming”, and “On Redemption”. I survey Nietzsche’s 
remarks on the will to power in these passages briefly below. In what can be read as a cautionary remark, Clark 
notes that, “because Zarathustra’s conception of life as will to power is too metaphorical and anthropomorphic to 
take seriously as a literal account of the essence of life and gives us no reason to assume that Nietzsche accepts it, 
we would naturally look for Nietzsche’s own doctrine of the will to power in Beyond Good and Evil, the first book 
published after Zarathustra” (Clark, 1990; 212). While Clark makes a reasonable point about the will to power in 
Zarathustra when juxtaposed with BGE, one can proceed carefully and work to draw some lessons from the 
metaphorical pronouncements in Zarathustra, particularly when they are reinforced by things Nietzsche would go 
on to say in later works. 
217
 Nietzsche refers to the will to power in fifteen sections of BGE, sections 9, 13, 19, 22, 23, 36, 44, 51, 186, 198, 
211, 227, 230, 257, and 259 of BGE. 
218
 Nietzsche refers to the will to power in seven sections of GM, sections II.11, 12, 18, III. 7, 11, 15, and 18; in 
book five of GS he makes one reference, section 349; in TI there are six references, sections IX. 9, 11, 14, 20, 38, 
and X.3; in A he makes seven references, sections 2, 6, 9, 16, 17, 24, and 52; there is one reference in the Epilogue 
to CW; and in EH he makes five references, sections P.4, BT.4, CW.1, IV.4, and IV.7. 
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others; sometimes the passages adumbrate earlier ideas, e.g., that life is will to power; and other 
passages only casually refer to the will to power in the context of other discussions.  
Throughout, Nietzsche paints a picture that is alternately provocative, metaphorical, 
frustrating, and fascinating. However, if we are patient readers, we are regularly rewarded for our 
efforts. When we take stock of the common ground between the many claims he makes about the 
will to power, we find a rich body of ideas. In what follows I do not claim to offer anything close 
to an exhaustive examination of the will to power, but rather a broad survey that seeks to get a 
clearer view of dense terrain. I begin by briefly surveying the metaphorical accounts Nietzsche 
offers about the will to power in Zarathustra, before turning to the more straightforward 
treatment Nietzsche offers in BGE, GM, and the works of 1888.  
Nietzsche’s first presentation of the will to power in “On the Thousand and One Goals” 
comes in the context of a discussion about valuing. Nietzsche writes that “[a] tablet of the good 
hangs over every people. Observe, it is the tablet of their overcomings; observe, it is the voice of 
their will to power” (Z I.15). Interestingly, the will to power is described as a kind of 
overcoming, though we should be careful to note that Nietzsche is speaking here of a collective 
will to power, indicating not just a people’s strengths but also its aspirations.219 It should not go 
unnoticed what Nietzsche says next, for he describes whatever is difficult for a people as 
“praiseworthy”, “good”, and “holy”. Admittedly, Nietzsche’s remarks in Z I.15 do not say all 
that much about the will to power, but we do learn that some kind of overcoming is significant, 
just as we learn that what is good is connected to what is difficult.  
In book two of Zarathustra, Nietzsche gives us two more pronouncements on the will to 
power, pronouncements which are frequently presented metaphorically. At the beginning of “On 
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 Kaufmann, already tipping his interpretive hand, goes so far as to say that “the will to power is thus introduced as 
the will to overcome oneself” (200). 
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Self-Overcoming” Nietzsche writes of the “wisest ones” that their ‘will to truth”, which he calls 
a “will to thinkability of all being”, is in fact a will to power.220 Then we learn that a people’s 
good and evil are intimately connected to the will to power.
221
 As he continues, Nietzsche refers 
to the will to power as “the unexhausted begetting will of life”. On the connection between living 
and valuing, he notes that “wherever I found the living, there I found the will to power”. And 
finally, Nietzsche has ‘Life’ conclude her speech by stating that “only where life is, is there also 
will; but not will to life, instead—thus I teach you—the will to power!”222  
There is undoubtedly a lot going on in this section, much of it rather elusive, which is not 
surprising, given that Zarathustra describes what Life says as a secret. While it is difficult to 
draw clear conclusions from each of these claims, there are several conclusions which can be 
justifiably drawn. For example, the title of the section suggests some connection between the will 
to power and self-overcoming, even if the nature of the connection is not yet clear.
223
 While it is 
far from clear what it means, Nietzsche tells us that life is will to power, a claim he asserts time 
and time again in subsequent works. Perhaps most importantly, we learn of a connection between 
living, valuing, and the will to power, though the nature of this connection is not yet clear. 
These elliptical claims are followed by one final treatment of the will to power in “On 
Redemption”. Nietzsche begins by writing of the fragments of human beings that he sees, finding 
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 As Nietzsche goes on to say of “the wisest ones”: “you still want to create the world before which you could 
kneel” (Z II.15). 
221
 “Your will and your values you set upon the river of becoming; what people believe to be good and evil reveals 
to me an ancient will to power” (ibid). 
222
 Life concludes by reiterating Zarathustra’s claim about the connection between valuing (esteeming) and the will 
to power. “Much is esteemed more highly by life than life itself; yet out of esteeming itself speaks—the will to 
power! 
223
 Lampert goes so far as to say that “this most extensive speech on will to power in Zarathustra serves the purpose 
of the narrative or of Zarathustra’s education; it does not serve the purpose of explaining will to power” (Lampert, 
1986; 119). Lampert reads “On Self-Overcoming” as pointing towards “On Redemption”, which is concerned with 
the teaching of the eternal recurrence. He continues, asserting that “the title of this chapter that unriddles philosophy 
as will to power might seem to encourage a limited interpretation of will to power as simply an injunction to human 
beings to overcome themselves, to practice honorable self-mastery or independence” (Lampert, 1986; 120). Thus he 
concludes that “’On Redemption’ shows that the teaching of the eternal return is subsequent to, and dependent on, 
the discovery of will to power, Nietzsche’s fundamental discovery” (Lampert, 1986; 149). 
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“mankind in ruins”, before Zarathustra claims that “the now and the past … is what is most 
unbearable to me”. The redemption of which Nietzsche writes is humanity’s redemption from the 
spirit of revenge,
224
 particularly “the will’s unwillingness towards time and time’s ‘it was’”. As 
Nietzsche writes, the way to do this is to transform “it was” into “thus I willed it”. Late in the 
passage Zarathustra states “that will which is the will to power must will something higher than 
any reconciliation [with time]”, before he abruptly cuts himself off.225  
In light of the elusive, metaphorical discussions of the will to power in Zarathustra, there 
is some reason to agree with Clark about the need to look to BGE for Nietzsche’s treatment of 
the will to power, for it assumes a newfound importance that it does not appear to have in 
Zarathustra, to say nothing about the greater clarity in BGE. Overall, there are several questions 
we desire answers for in BGE, hoping Nietzsche expands on the elliptical remarks of 
Zarathustra. What does it mean to say that life is the will to power? What is the nature of the 
connection between valuing and the will to power? What is self-overcoming and what does it 
have to do with the will to power? 
Within the first part of BGE we read what might appear to be disconnected ideas about 
the will to power, ideas which may lead to greater confusion instead of greater clarity. However, 
when examined more carefully, Nietzsche’s treatment in the first part of BGE reveals a 
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 “For that mankind be redeemed from revenge: that to me is the bridge to the highest hope” (Z II.7). 
225
 “The conclusion implied, but not named, in Zarathustra’s formulation of the problem of redemption is that the 
will to power that wills the past, and hence wills what is higher than all reconciliation, wills eternal return” 
(Lampert, 1986; 147). Lampert argues in much greater detail for his reading of “On Redemption” as a pivotal 
chapter of Zarathustra on pp. 140-151. If Lampert is correct in his reading, then Nietzsche’s final reference to the 
will to power is here primarily a stepping stone to the central teaching of Zarathustra, the eternal recurrence. I do 
not agree with Lampert that the treatment of the will to power in “On Self-Overcoming” merely points toward the 
eternal recurrence. Rather, as evidence strongly suggests, both the will to power and eternal recurrence are integral 
to Nietzsche’s overall attempt to address the different problems he diagnoses. Accordingly, they are important 
elements of how a person might overcome the different forms of sickness and achieve health. 
[139] 
 
progression of ways the will to power may be put to use explaining various phenomena.
226
 
Among Nietzsche’s many characterizations of the will to power in Part One of BGE, we learn 
that philosophy is "the most spiritual will to power (9)
227
; "life itself is will to power" (13)
228
; 
morality can be understood as "a doctrine of power relations" (19); nature can be interpreted as 
will to power (22); and finally, in the concluding section of Part One, that psychology is to be 
understood “as morphology and the doctrine of the development of the will to power" (23). The 
next reference to the will to power occurs in section 36, which gives a detailed account regarding 
how the will to power might be a general explanatory principle of the world.
229
 Given all that 
Nietzsche surveys in Part One, we might conclude that it is just a hodgepodge of ideas, without 
any discernable order or purpose.
230
 On the other hand, we should not forget that all of these 
pronouncements occur in the first part of BGE, “on the prejudices of philosophers”, which 
suggests the tentative nature of these claims.
231
 In the end, Nietzsche suggests that we might get 
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 For a much thorough treatment of part one of BGE, see Clark & Dudrick’s The Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good 
and Evil (2012), which offers a rich, albeit idiosyncratic reading of BGE, with an emphasis on Nietzsche’s supposed 
“esoteric” philosophy. For a thoughtful critique of Clark & Dudrick’s “esoteric Nietzsche”, see Schacht (2014). 
227
 Nietzsche reiterates that “the most spiritual will to power” is philosophy (227). True philosophy, as opposed to 
“philosophical labor” is creative, it legislates, and it is driven by the will to truth which is will to power (211). 
228
 Nietzsche also reiterates the idea that the essence of the world is will to power (BGE 186, 259, GM II.12). 
229
 See Clark, 1983 (reprinted in Leiter/Richardson eds., 2001) and 1990, chapter seven for her treatment of the 
various manifestations of the will to power in BGE, as well as a full argument against attributing the argument in 
BGE 36 to Nietzsche. Clark argues that Nietzsche cannot have held this argument to be true, given the hypothetical 
nature of the argument, as well as reliance on premises that he demonstrated as untenable elsewhere, e.g. 
“immediate certainties” and the causality of the will. She would later revise her argument, noting that she does not 
accept all of the claims she made in 1990, e.g., that Nietzsche rejects the causality of the will. See Clark & Dudrick 
(2012), pp. 229-243. Clark & Dudrick go on to argue that BGE 36 can be read esoterically, illuminating “the will to 
power as a theory of the soul” (231). Schacht, Owen, and Richardson provide insightful critical responses to Clark 
on the will to power, as well as offering an illuminating discussion of the status of the will to power and how to read 
BGE 36, in International Studies in Philosophy 32:3, 2000. 
230
 Lampert (2001) argues that there is in fact a distinct order to what Nietzsche has to say, an order which 
culminates in section 36, where Nietzsche attempts to prove the veracity of the doctrine of the will to power. This 
interpretation seems reasonable, but as we will see, it is not at all clear if Nietzsche "proves" the doctrine of the will 
to power. It strikes me as more likely that, following Clark, Nietzsche does not at all prove the doctrine of the will to 
power.  
231
 On the one hand, we could read this entire chapter as Nietzsche critically pointing to the prejudices that have kept 
philosophers from understanding psychology, morality, and nature how they ought to be understood. On the other 
hand, Clark and Dudrick (2012) argue that this is only a surface reading, and that what Nietzsche expects his “best 
readers to grasp eventually” (156), is that the chapter deals with the “pre-judgments” or values that are essential to 
philosophy. See pp. 32, 42, and 156.  
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a better understanding of psychology under the guiding light of the will to power, just as it might 
illuminate morality, which I will try to show below. 
Nietzsche further characterizes the will to power throughout BGE in his explorations of 
religion, morality, and psychology. Several passages reveal new elements of the will to power 
Nietzsche did not present in either Zarathustra or Part One of BGE. One of the more intriguing 
discussions about the will to power occurs in section 51, where Nietzsche speaks about the will 
to power present in the saint. Here we find “a force that wants to test itself through this sort of 
conquest”. That is, the saint’s self-conquest, with power turned inwards, is recognized as 
“strength of will”. From the perspective of the strong noble type, accustomed to external 
manifestations of power, they see something of a wholly new kind, but recognize it as power all 
the same.
232
 This is surely an evocative example, one that forces us to ask some questions. We 
can understand why the saint’s asceticism would capture the attention of the powerful nobles, 
unaccustomed as they were to sublimated forms of power; but what is it that motivated the saint 
to engage in such self-conquest in the first place?  
We could understand the saint as wanting to test himself. Likewise, we could understand 
him as needing to dominate something, and without anything external to dominate, the saint 
turned against himself. These are plausible answers, supported by other claims Nietzsche makes, 
e.g., the internalization of man presented in GM II. One can also surmise that the saint felt some 
form of inner dissatisfaction, perhaps the powerful pull of a drive that the saint had repudiated, 
but nonetheless felt, which warranted some kind of action to address it. Nietzsche identifies this 
internal dissatisfaction, self-contempt, or tension as something that is missing in modernity.  
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 This key stipulation about internalized power is perhaps best summarized in TI IX.9, where Nietzsche says that 
"the highest feelings of power and self-assurance achieve expression in a grand style".  Cf., GS 290. 
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The idea of self-conquest can be seen later in BGE, where Nietzsche characterizes “the 
commanding element (whatever it is) that is generally called ‘spirit’” as something that "wants to 
dominate itself and its surroundings, and to feel its domination" (BGE 230). Nietzsche continues 
by describing this “truly masterful will” as a binding, subduing, and domineering will. Here we 
get a glimpse of the language of domination that arises several times in BGE and GM, language 
which has suggested the more unpalatable readings of the will to power as power over others 
(even as it is introduced in the context of self-control). Elsewhere, Nietzsche talks of 
transforming a life-will into a power-will, before claiming that harshness, danger, 
experimentation, “everything evil, terrible, tyrannical, predatory, and snakelike in humanity” 
(BGE 44) have helped humanity grow the strongest. The association of the will to power with 
domination is not uncommon in Nietzsche’s writing, which makes it imperative that we do not 
unfairly whitewash what he says, but rather work to understand the significance of such 
pronouncements. 
Nietzsche elaborates on the motif of domination in BGE 259, speaking at his most 
provocative when he talks about life more generally. He begins by describing life, which “is 
precisely will to power”, as "appropriating, injuring, overpowering . . . oppressing, being harsh, 
imposing your own form, incorporating . . . exploiting" (259).
233
 This particular description is 
frequently cited when discussing will to power, pointing to the ugliness with which Nietzsche’s 
notion is easily associated.
234
 Before rushing to judgment on one of the uglier claims Nietzsche 
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 “‘Exploitation’”, Nietzsche goes on to say, “does not belong to a corrupted or imperfect, primitive society: it 
belongs to the essence of being alive as a fundamental organic function; it is a result of genuine will to power, which 
is just the will of life.” See sections 9, 13, 22, 23, and 44 in BGE for similar, albeit brief statements.  Nietzsche 
similarly characterizes life this way in GM, e.g., II.11, where he describes life as essentially functioning violently, 
injuriously, exploitatively. As he writes in GM II.12, “everything that occurs in the organic world consists of 
overpowering, dominating, and in their turn, overpowering and dominating consist of re-interpretation, adjustment”. 
TI IX.14 adds the idea that life is, among other things, abundance and struggle. 
234
 Some, like Katsafanas, try to dismiss Nietzsche’s rhetorical choices. “It is important not to be misled by the 
surface connotations of the term ‘power’. In ordinary discourse, the claim that people will power would suggest that 
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makes, let us consider the significance of why he characterizes the will to power and life in this 
manner. As he asks, “what is the point of always using words that have been stamped with 
slanderous intentions”? Once we understand why he uses such language, we should garner 
further insight into the will to power.  
In general, Nietzsche contends that life, as an embodiment of the will to power, naturally 
grows, spreads, and dominates. To be harsh and overpowering is precisely what we would expect 
if someone were engaged in most kinds of contest. Consider Muhammad Ali in his prime: to say 
that he dominated and overpowered his opponents would be an understatement.
235
 Ali clearly 
evinced great power in the many challenges he overcame. However, as Reginster points out, 
while it is tempting to define power in terms of domination or control, it is a mistake to do so. 
“Increased control or domination, or developed abilities or capacities, are natural and frequent 
consequences of the pursuit of power” (Reginster, 2006; 138).236 To consider a more innocuous 
example, Nietzsche also uses this language to talk about one animal “appropriating” or 
“exploiting” another animal. It is part and parcel of being alive; a living creature seeks 
sustenance.
237
 At the heart of the matter, life exists at the expense of other life; that is simply a 
consequence of living, not its defining feature.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
they strive to dominate, tyrannize, and subjugate others. This is not what Nietzsche has in mind. Power is a term of 
art, for Nietzsche; he gives it a special sense” (Katsafanas, 2013; 156). On the one hand, Katsafanas is correct in 
saying that Nietzsche gives ‘power’ a special meaning. But at the same time, Nietzsche explicitly speaks of 
domination, exploitation, and subjugation, in the context of the will to power, and he does this more than once. That 
he uses such terms is assuredly no accident. The question then is what Nietzsche’s purpose is in using such terms in 
the context of the will to power. I attempt to address this question below. 
235
 An exception would be Ali’s use of the rope-a-dope strategy against George Foreman in 1974. But even in that 
fight, Ali’s ultimate aim was to overcome Foreman. Instead of using brute force—where Foreman exceeded him—
Ali cleverly used Foreman’s overpowering force against him. 
236
 Reginster continues, stating that, “to be successful, the effort to overcome resistance will indeed require ever 
greater abilities and capacities, and when successful, it will result in some sort of increased control and domination. 
But, as I have argued, it would be a mistake to see in those common and perhaps necessary consequences of the 
pursuit of power its very essence” (Reginster, 2006; 138-139). 
237
 “Is it virtuous when a cell transforms itself into a function of a stronger cell? It has to. And is it evil when the 
stronger cell assimilates the weaker? It also has to; this is necessary for it, since it strives for superabundant 
replenishment and wants to regenerate itself” (GS 118). 
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At the same time, there can be no doubt Nietzsche intentionally chose the rhetoric of 
power, domination, and overpowering to confront his readers by being as provocative as 
possible. Nietzsche repeatedly called on his audience to be careful readers, and his drafts show a 
writer who carefully chose his words, so we must take his rhetorical choices seriously. With that 
in mind, there can be no doubt that his provocative rhetoric about domination, overpowering, and 
exploitation—rhetoric emblematic of the strong, noble type—is purposely juxtaposed again the 
“tame”, weakened, “improved” humanity he sees today.  
Given the regularity of this juxtaposition, we must ask ourselves why he is doing so, and 
what he intends to show. On the one hand, Nietzsche seems to be playing the part of the gadfly, 
trying to wake us up, to get us to see that things are not as good as they are believed to be. It is 
not coincidental that so much of the rhetoric about domination, overpowering, and exploitation 
comes in the context of Nietzsche’s critique of modernity. His rhetoric is part of this very 
critique of modernity; it aims to shock the reader, while also shaming her; and ideally, it will get 
her to reflect on her values and the values of modernity more generally.
238
 
On the other hand, while we are likely to cringe when Nietzsche extols harshness, 
overpowering, and domination—which he undoubtedly expects—there is an additional point to 
this rhetoric. When it is put into the proper context, Nietzsche’s point is clear: there can be value 
to harshness and domination, arguably for what they bring to the table: resistance.
239
 Not 
surprisingly, many passages concerned with the will to power emphasize the idea of resistance. 
For example, Nietzsche identifies strength with “a desire to overwhelm, a desire to cast down, a 
desire to become lord, a thirst for enemies and resistances and triumphs” (GM I.13). Thus, 
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 As Nietzsche puts it in Zarathustra, his rhetoric carries a mix of love and contempt. “Oh my soul, I taught you 
contempt that does not come like a gnawing worm, the great, loving contempt that loves most where it has the most 
contempt” (Z III.14). 
239
 We can understand the value of resistance in the context of Nietzsche’s concern: to see where “the ‘plant’ man 
has grown the strongest” (BGE 44).  
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“strong natures need resistance, that is why they look for resistance” (EH I.7). In contrast, 
Nietzsche identifies “an incapacity for resistances” with weakness and the morality of the 
evangel (A 29). Values opposing conflict and resistance, he says, would be “hostile to life, an 
attempt to assassinate the future of man” (GM II.11).  
Freedom, another word for the will to power, “is measured by the resistance that needs to 
be overcome” (TI IX.38).240 Good is identified with what enhances feelings of power, while 
genuine happiness—to be contrasted with the “wretched contentment” Nietzsche routinely 
criticizes—is “the feeling that power is growing, that resistance has been overcome” (A 2).241 
Similar remarks can be found in Nietzsche’s notebooks, all of which attest to the value of what is 
harsh, as well as the need for resistance, which are integral to self-overcoming and the 
development of higher humanity.
242
 
Having surveyed Nietzsche’s various treatments of the will to power from Zarathustra to 
the 1888 writings, we find much that is metaphorical and elusive, just as we find much that is 
provocative and allusive. Nonetheless, there are many important ideas to be drawn from this 
brief survey: the will to power is related to overcoming; will to power connects what is difficult 
with what is praiseworthy; will to power is related to a people’s good and evil; will to power is 
equated with life; self-conquest is one instantiation of will to power; will to power involves 
domination; and will to power seeks out resistances to overcome. Overall, Nietzsche says a great 
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 In full Nietzsche writes, “How is freedom measured in individuals and in peoples? It is measured by the 
resistance that needs to be overcome, by the effort that it costs to stay on top. Look for the highest type of free 
human beings where the highest resistance is constantly being overcome” (TI IX.38). Elsewhere, speaking of the 
“freedom of the will”, Nietzsche writes that it “is the word for the multi-faceted state of pleasure of one who 
commands, and, at the same time, identifies himself with the accomplished act of willing. As such, he enjoys the 
triumph over resistances” (BGE 19). 
241
 In full Nietzsche writes, “What is good?—Everything that enhances people’s feeling of power, will to power, 
power itself. … What is happiness?—The feeling that power is growing, that resistance has been overcome” (A 2). 
242
 Nietzsche writes that “the will to power can only express itself against resistances; it seeks what will resist it” 
(WLN 9[151]). Elsewhere Nietzsche writes that “the will wants to move forwards, and again and again become 
master of what stands in the way … it is not yet satiated unless it has boundaries and resistances …” (WLN 11[75]). 
See also WLN 14[174], 11[111], and 10[103].  
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deal about the will to power during 1883-1888. Before concluding this survey of the will to 
power, it should prove fruitful to reiterate a point intimated several times so far. 
There are good reasons for thinking that Nietzsche’s continuous effort to oppose 
modernity to the will to power is not coincidental, but rather intentional.
243
 The failure of 
modernity’s values stands in relief when juxtaposed against the will to power and the ideal 
Nietzsche associates with it. In EH Nietzsche explicitly characterizes BGE as “a critique of 
modernity” that sought to present an “opposite type” to what was hitherto perceived as the good 
person, e.g., the person who exhibited selflessness.
244
 The will to power—along with the two 
other central ideas from Zarathustra, the eternal recurrence and the Übermensch—is emblematic 
of this opposite type. 
To take one final example contrasting the ideal associated with modernity and the ideal 
Nietzsche associates with the will to power, we can look at a passage from 1888, A 6: 
“I consider life itself to be an instinct for growth, for endurance, for the accumulation of 
force, for power: when there is no will to power, there is decline. My claim is that none 
of humanity’s higher values have had this will,—that nihilistic values, values of decline, 
have taken control under the aegis of the holiest names.”245 
 
The contrast is made strikingly clear, even if Nietzsche is speaking with excessive hyperbole 
here: modernity’s higher values have been detrimental to humanity.  
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 See BGE 22, 44, GM II.12. 
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 EH BGE 2. Similar references are common in BGE and GM. See BGE 44, 203, 260, and GM I.12. See also TI 
IX.38 and EH CW.1. 
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 Nietzsche seems to have gotten lost in his rhetoric here; in more calm, collected moments it is unlikely he would 
say that “none of humanity’s higher values have had this will”. To take an obvious example, it seems unlikely that 
he believes the Presocratic Greeks fall under this criticism. Nietzsche seems to be talking about “none of [modern] 
humanity’s higher values” in A 6. 
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Much of the strong rhetoric of the will to power should be read just as Nietzsche says in 
BGE 22, as an opposite mode of interpretation contra the modern spirit. What is more, Nietzsche 
clearly alludes to the opposite intentions behind this interpretation in BGE 22. That he describes 
this as only “interpretation” might be cause for skepticism, but that it is only his interpretation 
need not undermine the force of his claims. After all, depending on the goal at hand, different 
values would achieve different ends, a point Nietzsche noted on several occasions.
246
  
What then are Nietzsche’s opposite intentions in interpreting the world and life as will to 
power? I have already answered this: to help humanity overcome the sickness of enervation and 
the spirit of modernity with all of its associated problems—a weakened will; small goals like 
pleasure, ease, and comfort; squeamishness and timidity; and an aversion to suffering and 
resistances—and put humanity on a path that would lead to positive development and self-
enhancement.  
4.3 Reginster and “The Will to Overcoming Resistance” 
In The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism (2006), Bernard Reginster 
offers a new reading of the will to power. Playing a central role in the basic project he attributes 
to Nietzsche—responding to the problem of nihilism—Reginster understands the will to power 
as “the will to overcoming resistance” (126). He continues by pointing to the fact that Nietzsche 
contrasts the will to power from the will to happiness, which he takes to support the claim that 
“the will to power is not a will to the state in which resistance has been overcome” (126). That is 
to say, the goal is not the satisfaction of some desire that will lead to enduring happiness (a claim 
which will prove important in responding to the modern notion of “happiness” as a kind of static 
goal or end state). Rather, as Reginster proposes, Nietzsche would have us understand the will 
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 See the note attached at the end of essay one of the Genealogy, where Nietzsche writes “something, for example, 
that clearly had value with regard to the greatest possible longevity of a race . . . would by no means have the same 
value if it were an issue of developing a stronger type.”  
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power as a kind of continuous striving. At the same time, the will to power is not merely a will to 
there being resistances to overcome or resistances that perpetually frustrate a person. As 
Reginster points out, rightly, if this were the case, there would never be any development, but 
simply unending frustration. Reginster thus reiterates that “the will to power … is a will to the 
very activity of overcoming resistance” (127).  It is this feature that Reginster finds to be 
common among all that Nietzsche associates with the will to power.
247
 
While explicating his interpretation Reginster offers a number of valuable observations 
and marshals a fair amount of evidence for interpreting the will to power in this way.
248
 For 
example, he observes that if we look at BGE 259, which can sound extremely harsh to our 
modern sensibilities with its description of life as “appropriation” and “exploitation”, what 
Nietzsche is actually saying is that appropriation and exploitation are a consequence of pursuing 
power, not necessarily the basic nature of power. Recognizing this fact can temper Nietzsche’s 
rhetoric, while clarifying the basic descriptive claim he is making. Seeing this point helps 
legitimate Reginster’s interpretation of the will to power and the direction he takes. 
On the other hand, some of what Register says can come across as puzzling, most notably 
what he refers to as “the paradox of the will to power”, whereby “the satisfaction of the will to 
power requires dissatisfaction” (133). However, Reginster, seemingly aware of what Pippin 
would later critique as “a paradox so extreme as to court parody” (289), clarifies his remark by 
pointing out that “Nietzsche is not saying that the pursuit of the will to power is self-defeating or 
self-undermining”. Rather, the supposed paradox Reginster identifies simply points to a salient 
feature of the will to power: “it is a kind of desire that does not allow for permanent (once-and-
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for-all) satisfaction” (138). This captures an important element of Nietzsche’s view, and is an 
element that should not be unexpected, given that he is working against the idea of permanent 
satisfaction. The will to power should be understood as a kind of continuous striving that 
importantly seeks challenges and resistance. This reading strikes me as correct in describing 
power as an activity, specifically “the activity of confronting and overcoming resistance” 
(136).
249
 
To explain this, Reginster develops an idea about how we can understand the will to 
power, by looking at how it relates to other desires. As he has argued, the will to power is a 
desire to overcome resistances. Reginster points out that this particular desire has no content.
250
 
What gives it content is a first-order desire, e.g., solving a difficult philosophical problem, or 
vanquishing the tennis foe who repeatedly beats you. Thus the will to power necessitates a desire 
for something beyond power. Reginster succinctly captures the idea he sees in Nietzsche: “The 
will to power will not be satisfied unless three conditions are met: there is some first-order desire 
for a determinate end, there is resistance to the realization of this determinate end, and there is 
actual success in overcoming this resistance. But then, the conditions of the satisfaction of the 
will to power do indeed imply its dissatisfaction” (136).  
Reginster’s account directs our attention, rightly I think, to an important element of 
Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power, pointing to the role of overcoming resistance. However, 
as Robert Pippin rightly points out, while Reginster gestures at the importance of self-
overcoming in understanding the will to power, he never develops this line of thought. In a 
footnote Reginster offers something of an explanation of the importance of self-overcoming 
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 “Power, for Nietzsche, is not a state or a condition, but an activity, the activity of confronting and overcoming 
resistance” (136). 
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 Reginster writes that the will to power is “a desire for the overcoming of resistances in the pursuit of some 
determinate first-order desire” (132).  
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when he says that “overcoming itself … is what makes life worth living” (299, footnote 14). The 
question that needs to be answered is how overcoming makes life worth living, which will be 
pursued below.  
Accepting Reginster’s new interpretation of the will to power, we have a new way to 
understand a key element of Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the sickness of enervation. If will to power 
is the will to overcome resistance, then we can see how Nietzsche identifies the will to engage 
resistances and challenges as what is missing in modern humanity. This fits with Nietzsche’s 
basic critique as I have presented it. In light of this, we have identified an important feature of 
human life that needs to be addressed.   
Robert Pippin offers several criticisms of Reginster’s account, and in doing so helps to 
clarify how we should understand the will to power.
251
 Pippin finds Reginster’s formulation that 
one must actively desire resistance to a particular goal to be illogical, in that no one reasons that 
they want a particular end, but would prefer that it not be achieved easily.
252
 In support of 
Reginster’s claim, there are many pursuits where, while resistance might not be actively willed, 
resistance is expected as a necessary element in the project with which a person is engaged. 
Additionally, if a pursuit is too easy, a person rarely takes the task seriously. For example, no 
athlete expects to get better against competition that offers little to no resistance; similarly, no 
musician expects to improve continually learning simple pieces of music that pose no technical 
challenge whatsoever. As the above examples show, resistance and challenge are necessary for 
improvement. Whether or not a person actively desires resistance or a challenge misses the point: 
resistance and challenge are part and parcel of genuine development. 
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 See Pippin’s review of Reginster in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 77, No. 1 (July 2008). 
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 Pippin further criticizes as “sparse and far from clear” (288) the evidence Reginster appeals to as support for his 
reading: “Whatever I create and however much I love it, soon I must oppose it and my love” (Z II.12). This passage 
does not say that one must be simultaneously for something and opposed to it; rather, one opposes what one loves 
soon afterwards, a fact which any artist knows all too well. 
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Pippin is clearly aware of this, for as he continues he speaks of a milder reading of how 
we should understand Nietzsche’s talk about resistance. Pippin says that “one simply must 
concede that the pursuit of any truly worthy goal, pursued in the service of some higher order 
desire, will inevitably confront great, difficult obstacles” (288). Reginster at times expresses a 
milder reading of the sort Pippin here articulates, which suggests that the two are not as far apart 
on this issue as Pippin seems to think. Despite Pippin’s criticisms of the paradoxical nature of the 
will to power that Reginster emphasizes, there is much in Reginster’s account that is insightful 
and helpful. We must heed Pippin’s critique and recognize that, while Reginster overstates the 
supposed paradox in the will to power, he is right in illuminating the idea that it is a will to 
overcome resistance.  
Pippin criticizes Reginster’s account for advocating a person seek out “as much 
resistance and suffering as possible”. While Reginster’s language does at times seem to suggest 
this, in his more careful moments this is not the position he lays out. Nonetheless, Pippin is right 
to articulate a more measured view that understands the need for resistance as “welcomed tests 
of one’s resolve and ability” (289). However, I would go further and say that such tests are not 
just welcomed as tests; as Nietzsche’s writings indicate, such “tests” [challenges] are necessary 
for the development of a strong will.  
In his review of Reginster Pippin effectively directs the focus towards what might be 
called internal resistances, which he describes as internal dissatisfaction.
253
 While this is 
undoubtedly important in Nietzsche’s thought—one need only consider his repeated remarks 
about the need to cultivate self-contempt—Pippin overlooks how various forms of external 
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 Pippin writes that “Nietzsche recommends an ‘’internal’’ creation of one’s own distress, which again sounds like 
an exhortation to a constant self-dissatisfaction in the service of a constant ‘’self-overcoming’” (Pippin, 289). He 
goes on to say that self-overcoming can be understood as “the ability to foster in oneself constant dissatisfaction 
with one’s own achievements” (289, note 15). 
[151] 
 
resistance [suffering] play an important role in a person’s life, particularly the person’s 
development, self-enhancement, and the cultivation of a strong will. 
Important sources of resistance and challenge in a person’s life are ubiquitous: a 
recalcitrant world, one’s competitors throughout life (be it one’s siblings, one’s athletic 
opponents, or one’s intellectual adversaries), one’s teachers, and one’s friends, to enumerate 
some of the more obvious examples. In light of this, one might wonder how it is that for one 
person these sources of external resistance register as challenges to be taken on, while for 
another person these same sources of resistance register as insurmountable obstacles fraught with 
needless suffering, to be avoided at all costs.  
This is but one of many difficult questions that will require further investigation. Most 
importantly, we desire an account addressing how to strengthen the weakened, enervated wills of 
modern humanity, such that people can achieve something more than small goals and make their 
lives worth living. To answer this key question, we must build on Reginster’s insight that the will 
to power is “the will to overcoming resistance”. Developing this idea, so that we might gain an 
understanding of both the nature of this sickness and how to address it, is the project of the next 
two sections. 
4.4 A New Understanding of Enervation; A New Prospect of Treatment 
I now turn to constructing the outline of a Nietzschean response to the sickness of 
enervation, using Reginster’s insight that the will to power is “the will to overcoming resistance” 
to address the sickness Nietzsche diagnoses. For our purpose, Reginster’s analysis of the will to 
power helps to illuminate the nature of the sickness of enervation. Specifically, we can now see 
that this sickness manifests itself in people whenever they avoid resistance and challenge. The 
sickness is choosing goals that require only the most minimal forms of challenge. Thus the 
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sickness of modernity, presenting as a weakened, enervated will, can be understood as a kind of 
weakness of will [i.e., an aversion to overcoming resistances]. 
Having used the phrases “weakness of will” and “weakened will”, it is important to note 
that this is not the traditional problem of weakness of the will mentioned by Socrates and 
addressed by Aristotle.
254
 Nietzsche diagnoses in modernity what might alternatively be 
described as an atrophied will, i.e., a will that has lost its strength and vitality through limited 
use. Katsafanas notes that “the claim that we will power is not a claim about what we will; it is a 
claim about how we will” (Katsafanas 2013; 161).255 Accordingly, Nietzsche’s real interest is in 
strong and weak wills.
256
 A strong will then, is one that aims to overcome resistance in the 
course of pursuing some end. In contrast, a weak will is one that aims at ends that specifically 
avoid resistance. Such a will has succumbed to willing goals that are too easily attained.
257
 
To better understand the issue, we can turn to an intriguing remark Nietzsche makes in 
the Genealogy that “man would much rather will nothingness than not will” (GM III.28). What is 
of interest is Nietzsche’s claim that human beings would prefer to will anything, even the 
nothingness he identifies as “the beyond”, God, and “the true life” (A 7, 18, and 43), than not 
will. This passage suggests that the problem does not concern the presence or absence of willing, 
but rather lies in the nature of willing. Willing nothingness seems to be an example of a weak 
will, aiming at small goals like repose or self-preservation. Nietzsche’s point then is that 
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 Interestingly, in the 1888 writings, Nietzsche does discuss when people come to desire and prefer things that are 
not good for them. He alternately calls this decadence and corruption, which is “to choose instinctively what is 
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 Katsafanas points out that Heidegger makes much the same point, that “it [will to power] comprises an 
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is only a matter of strong and weak wills” (BGE 21). Nietzsche elaborates on the problem of weak wills in TI V.2, 
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 This claim can be tempered by the fact that Nietzsche recommends progressively strengthening the will, 
beginning with more attainable goals at first, and working one’s way up to more challenging goals.  
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humanity is not lacking in will, but in the right kind of willing. The right kind of willing, 
according to Nietzsche would be the will to overcoming resistances. It does not posit a particular 
goal, but a particular kind of willing.  
That human beings would accede to “small goals” may seem puzzling unless we 
understand the allure of such goals.
258
 Some of these goals are: pleasure, ease, and comfort.
259
 
Granting that these are common goals, we should not be surprised about their allure, as any 
hedonist from Epicurus to Bentham would point out. Additionally, we could look to the account 
Nietzsche offers in essay one of the Genealogy and the triumph of slave values to explain how 
such “small goals’ can become dominant. Nietzsche’s analysis suggests that an enervated will 
leads a person to will small goals, and that having small goals then enervates a person’s will. It 
stands to reason that, as a person becomes accustomed to these small goals, at some point, she 
will likewise become conditioned to desire only small goals. Each conditions the other. The 
problem of “small goals” typically producing enervation should be evident; they condition 
people to be satisfied with this shallow version of “happiness”, i.e., “wretched contentment”. 
We can better appreciate Nietzsche’s concern about the harm of small goals by 
considering how he understands happiness. Katsafanas highlights an important distinction in the 
way Nietzsche looks at happiness.
260
 Katsafanas points out that Nietzsche criticizes the idea of 
happiness as a state. Rather, happiness is best conceived as a process.
261
 Happiness results when 
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 By “small goals” I mean goals that are too easily attained, that offer little or no challenge.  
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 “What they want to strive for with all their might is the universal, green pasture happiness of the herd, with 
security, safety, contentment, and an easier life for all” (BGE 44). 
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Elsewhere N describes the goal as the time “when there is nothing more to fear” (BGE 201). Reginster writes that 
“happiness is often conceived in terms of fulfillment: the complete satisfaction of all of your desires, the state in 
which nothing is left to be desired” (Reginster, 2007; 33). 
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 See Z P.3, II.2, III.5, BGE 200, TI I.12, A 1-2, WLN 11[75], and WLN 14[174]. Nietzsche “argues that 
happiness is not a state at all, happiness obtains when we are engaged in efficacious pursuit of a goal, not when we 
attain the goal” (Katsafanas, 2013; 173). Katsafanas points out that “recent psychological research strongly 
supports” Nietzsche’s claim (Katsafanas, 2013; 174). Reginster likewise adds that “Nietzsche’s conception of 
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a person is engaged in a continuous process, e.g., the process of playing a piece of music or 
playing a game of chess. As Nietzsche says about happiness, it is “the feeling that power is 
growing, that some resistance has been overcome. Not contentedness, but more power; not 
peace, but war” (A 2). Since the will to power is “a kind of desire that does not allow for 
permanent … satisfaction” (Reginster, 2006; 138), we can understand one of the symptoms of 
the sickness of enervation as the desire for just that: permanent satisfaction.
262
  
Thus, we see that people have mistakenly come to believe that happiness is best 
understood as a state to be achieved, a state of permanent satisfaction, a state with no suffering, 
i.e., a state with neither resistance nor challenge, but rather pleasure, ease, and comfort. This goal 
of permanent satisfaction is, in some sense, the “ultimate” goal, a goal which undermines having 
goals. Against this Zarathustra advocates we think of goals in a different way:   
 
That I must be struggle and becoming and purpose and the contradiction of purposes – 
alas, whoever guesses my will guesses also on what crooked paths it must walk! 
Whatever I may create and however I may love it – soon I must oppose it and my love, 
thus my will wants it. (Z II.12) 
 
Goals are such that what matters is their pursuit; though we have to be careful not to take this to 
mean that achieving the goal is unimportant, for the goal is important. When I play a game of 
tennis, I strongly desire to win (otherwise playing makes very little sense). However, the activity 
                                                                                                                                                                           
happiness in terms of the successful confrontation of difficulty has recently found empirical confirmation in research 
on the psychology of happiness” (Reginster, 2007; 33, footnote 19). See Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The 
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is what is most important; after all, in having the desire to win, I am not going to remain satisfied 
with a victory, I am going to want to test myself once again in competition.
263
  
In light of Reginster’s elucidation of the will to power, we can now confidently say that 
the problem is that people who have weak wills are people who are avoiding resistances. Having 
gained a deeper understanding of the nature of a weakened, enervated will directs us to a 
potential means of addressing it.  
One might object that, if we look around, we do not see lassitude and apathy in people, 
but rather counter-examples of energy and engagement which seem to undermine Nietzsche’s 
criticism. There is no doubt that there are many who have taken on the world and its problems 
with tremendous energy, casting aside the goals of pleasure, comfort, and ease. However, this 
seems to be the minority, further highlighting the lassitude and apathy of the majority who are 
content with their small pleasures. Beyond that, if we take literature and film to accurately 
capture the zeitgeist, we have evidence suggesting the listless, bored, modern human being is 
widespread.  
We can address this objection in another way by reflecting on Nietzsche’s general 
concern: he expresses worry that having small goals will hinder our ability to become something 
greater; that is to say, aiming at pleasure, ease, and comfort will undermine the potential for 
human excellence.
264
 Additionally, Nietzsche is concerned that the presence of the Last Man 
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 Small goals, presumably, could lend themselves to continual testing. However, given their level of ease, they tend 
not to be tested because there is little reason to do so. For example, if my goal is to get up off my couch and go 
brush my teeth, and I do it, I do not feel like that is worth doing again. [But a small goal like beating a video game 
level may actually inspire me to work at it. In some ways, the matter is really about continual testing, and small 
goals tend to preclude this for various reasons. Thus we see that the problem is the nature of certain kinds of goals, 
not merely their smallness.] 
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 “Beware! The time approaches when human beings no longer launch the arrow of their longing beyond the 
human, and the string of their bow will have forgotten how to whir!” (Z, P.5). 
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type will undermine those who have it in themselves to be something greater.
265
 Thus we see 
Nietzsche worries both about the harmful impact that having small goals has on the person, as 
well as the harm on other people.  
“Today, the will is weakened and diluted by the tastes and virtues of the times” (BGE 
212). This claim should not surprise us, given Nietzsche’s strident critique of modern morality. 
Specifying the cause of the problem is one thing, offering some type of treatment to address it is 
another thing. While Nietzsche does not offer an explicit method of treatment in these passages, 
he hints at what needs to be done. For one, if a people’s tastes and virtues are part of the 
problem, then a potential solution would be to cultivate and create new tastes and new virtues. Of 
course, that is easier said than done. And it is not necessarily a task for everyone. However, this 
is the task of Nietzsche’s philosophers of the future. 
Fortunately, Nietzsche has more to say that is relevant to the issue. In a discussion of new 
philosophers, he says, perhaps naïvely, that they are the ones who will not only initiate the 
creation of new values, but also “teach humanity its future as its will, as dependent on a human 
will” (BGE 203). What can go unnoticed however, is that Nietzsche then hints at more concrete 
ways of accomplishing this task. He continues, pointing out that conditions could either be 
created or exploited to help strengthen the will. Nietzsche points to a complacent culture as part 
of the problem, after which he intimates various conditions that could be exploited to help 
strengthen the will, e.g., a legitimate cultural threat—he speculates that Russia may be such a 
threat—war, or internal political strife (BGE 208). These speculations, vague as they may be, 
nonetheless point to the need for challenge and resistance in life, both at the cultural and 
individual level. Articulating how this might work is the subject of the next section. 
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 “Then the earth has become small, and on it hops the last human being, who makes everything small” (Z P.5). 
Nietzsche expresses a similar sentiment in the Genealogy, where he expresses concern that the sick “undermine life 
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4.5 The Therapy of Suffering and Resistance: Attempt at a Solution 
Humanity has small goals, Nietzsche charges. People desire the repose of pleasure, ease, 
and comfort. He diagnoses that the will is weakened by our current tastes and virtues. This leads 
to the condemnation and desired abolition of resistances and challenges [the very things which 
prevent people from attaining the state of repose they desire]. Addressing the problem of 
modernity’s weak wills, Nietzsche says that “strength of will and the hardness and capacity for 
long-term resolutions must belong to the concept of ‘greatness’” (BGE 212). 
In virtue of these issues, the central question is obvious: what can be done to get people 
to see that the goal of mere pleasure, ease, and comfort, is no recipe for genuine happiness; that 
eliminating all resistance and challenge [to the extent this is possible], only weakens the will; 
that small goals and weak wills inevitably diminish human beings? Given the problems he 
diagnoses, we would expect Nietzsche to offer some kind of account about how it is that a person 
could achieve the strength of will necessary for greatness and self-enhancement. We can look at 
a handful of select passages which clearly state not only what is at issue, but, if I am correct, 
point to what Nietzsche believes needs to be done to help a person overcome settling for small 
goals and become something greater. 
To begin we can turn our attention to BGE, where Nietzsche both diagnoses the problem 
and offers a response. Having criticized hedonism, utilitarianism, pessimism, and 
eudamonianism, and then scoffed at their understanding of pity, Nietzsche says “we see how 
humanity is becoming smaller, how you are making it smaller!” (BGE 225) He then expresses 
exasperation about the idea of abolishing suffering before capturing the nature of the problem:  
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Well-being as you understand it—that is no goal; it looks to us like an end! —a condition 
that immediately renders people ridiculous and despicable—that makes their decline into 
something desirable! (ibid) 
 
Having offered a concise statement of the problem he has diagnosed, Nietzsche makes it clear 
that instead of abolishing suffering, he would prefer to not only retain it, but to increase it.
266
 
This claim, Nietzsche recognizes, will sound strange and alarming to most people. He continues, 
explaining why suffering, resistances, and challenges are necessary: 
The discipline of suffering, of great suffering – don’t you know that this discipline has 
been the sole cause of every enhancement in humanity so far? The tension that breeds 
strength into the unhappy soul, its shudder at the sight of great destruction, its 
inventiveness and courage in enduring, surviving, interpreting, and exploiting 
unhappiness, and whatever depth, secrecy, whatever masks, spirit, cunning, greatness it 
has been given: – weren’t these the gifts of suffering, of the disciple of great suffering? 
(Ibid)  
 
Nietzsche’s claim is straightforward and to the point: if the goal is enhancement and becoming 
something greater, then what is necessary is “the discipline of suffering”, i.e., more resistance in 
a person’s life. 
 Lest one think that this passage is an outlier that is not representative of Nietzsche’s 
position, elsewhere he emphasizes the same point. For example, earlier in BGE, having criticized 
the modern ideals of equality, sympathy [Mitgefühl], and the elimination of suffering, Nietzsche 
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 “You want, if possible (and no “if possible” is crazier) to abolish suffering. And us? – it looks as though we 
would prefer it to be heightened and made even worse than it has ever been!” (BGE 225) 
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goes on to say he is opposed to the elimination of suffering. Having seen “where and how the 
plant ‘man’ has grown the strongest” (BGE 44), he holds the reverse position, that suffering has 
helped enhance humanity. Among those things that Nietzsche identifies as important to human 
development are: 
harshness, violence, slavery, danger in the streets and in the heart, concealment, Stoicism, 
the art of experiment, and devilry of every sort; that everything evil, terrible, tyrannical, 
predatory, and snakelike. (Ibid) 
 
What is needed is “prolonged pressure”, constraint, and danger. But even all of this, he goes on 
to say, does not accurately capture what he has to say.
267
 
These passages and many others help clarify why Nietzsche values suffering and ill-
treatment in the world: suffering, resistances, and challenges contribute to a person's 
development, helping her become stronger.
268
 Resistances, obstacles, and challenges all are 
necessary, he claims, for development and self- enhancement. Self-contempt motivates. Part of 
the problem, Nietzsche says, is that the very things that are good for us—suffering, obstacles, 
resistances—are the things we have sought to eliminate and avoid. Thus Nietzsche laments that 
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 In a famous note from fall 1887, Nietzsche powerfully expresses what he means, offering the following: “On the 
kind of men who matter to me I wish suffering, isolation, sickness, ill-treatment, degradation—I wish they may 
become acquainted with deep self-contempt, the torment of self-mistrust, the misery of the overcome: I have no 
compassion for them, because I wish them the only thing that today can prove whether a man has any value or not—
his ability to stand his ground …” (WLN 10[103]). 
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 “Perhaps harshness and cunning provide more favorable conditions for the origin of the strong, independent spirit 
and philosopher” (BGE 39). “A species originates, a type grows sturdy and strong, in the long struggle with 
essentially constant unfavorable conditions” (BGE 262). “The continuous struggle with constant unfavorable 
conditions is, as I have said, what causes a type to become sturdy and hard” (ibid). Nietzsche remarks that “order of 
rank is almost determined by just how deeply people can suffer”. He continues, noting that “profound suffering 
makes you noble; it separates” (BGE 270). “Look for the highest type of free human beings where the highest 
resistance is constantly being overcome” (TI IX.38).  He says that “strong natures need resistance, that is why they 
look for resistance” (EH I.7). In several notes from late 1887 / early 1888, Nietzsche goes on to describe 
“unsatisfaction” as “life’s great stimulus” (WLN 11[76]) and that “the effect of that unpleasure is to stimulate life—
and to strengthen the will to power” (WLN 11[77]). 
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people have “abandoned the regions where it was hard to live” (Z P.5). Having acquiesced to the 
allure of pleasure, ease, and comfort, people have turned away from resistances and challenges.  
What should be clear is that Nietzsche is saying to those who advocate the elimination of 
suffering: you've got it all wrong, eliminating suffering is not the solution, but just another 
manifestation of the problem. The best course of action is to take suffering on, to welcome it as a 
[necessary] means to becoming something greater and self-enhancement. And since people seem 
determined at all costs to avoid suffering and resistances, Nietzsche is going to advocate that 
such resistances not only be kept, but that they be not only emphasized but heightened at both the 
cultural and individual level. 
Nietzsche is advocating nothing less than a revaluation of suffering.
269
 Beyond 
advocating for a revaluation of suffering, Nietzsche is also advocating that resistances, obstacles, 
and challenges become unavoidable in life, thereby making it necessary to engage them [in a 
positive way]. In a world filled with suffering, resistances and challenges, they come to us 
whether we want them or not. Part of Nietzsche’s project is to get people to welcome such 
obstacles and challenges. Few would argue with Nietzsche that life is filled with resistance and 
suffering; the bigger issue has to do with how a person responds to it. The problem is that, as we 
have seen, all too often people respond to suffering and resistance in ways which are harmful to 
them, e.g., by resigning themselves to it, by turning away from it, or by working to eliminate it, 
even if they are unaware of the negative effects of doing so. Nietzsche has to show that suffering 
and resistances are not “evil”, but rather that they are valuable, ought to be welcomed, and 
thereby put to positive use in the service of self-enhancement.  
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 “The revaluation of suffering from the standpoint of the ethics of power … shows that suffering is not merely a 
complement or precondition of the good … but a constituent of it. As Nietzsche sees it, the good lies in the activity 
of overcoming resistance—it is the will to power. From the standpoint of the ethics of power, suffering is not just 
something that … individuals have to go through in order to be happy; it is rather part of what their very happiness 
consists of” (Reginster, 2006; 231). 
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In light of Nietzsche’s unusual campaign for suffering and resistance, we need to 
consider precisely how to understand what he is advocating. After all, to claim that the world 
needs not to abolish suffering, but rather more suffering, seems absurd. Against the idea of 
welcoming suffering, the desire for abolishing suffering seems considerably more reasonable. 
How then ought we to understand Nietzsche’s claim here? Additionally, how is it that Nietzsche 
understands suffering? Reginster helpfully writes that “suffering is the experience of resistance 
to the satisfaction of desires” (Reginster, 2006; 233).270 While this is no doubt an idiosyncratic 
understanding of suffering, evidence strongly suggests this is what Nietzsche has in mind when 
he talks about suffering.
271
 
If we understand resistances and challenges as being more or less equivalent to suffering, 
or at least as the primary cause of suffering—which Nietzsche seems to hold—then we can 
understand Nietzsche as criticizing modernity by saying, “if you want to abolish suffering, then 
you abolish resistances. And if you want to abolish resistances, then you abolish the means 
through which a person develops into something greater”. Against that, Nietzsche wants to retain 
suffering in the world, and the reason why is clear: he wants to retain resistances and challenges 
because they are necessary for self-enhancement.  
As we attain some clarity about how Nietzsche understands suffering and why it is 
valuable, there are several other questions and objections that need to be addressed. To begin, 
there is the objection that, against Nietzsche’s argument that resistances [and suffering] should 
be not only preserved, but enhanced in life, the real problem is the overabundance of resistance 
and suffering in life. If the problem is that humanity is becoming smaller and may soon no longer 
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 “As I have used the term strictly, suffering refers to the displeasure that results from resistance to the satisfaction 
of our desires” (Reginster, 2006; 234). 
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 I address Nietzsche’s idiosyncratic understanding of suffering below, including the potential for 
misunderstanding it creates, as well as how it admits of a potentially damning criticism of Nietzsche’s position. 
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have the ability to become something greater, then it is mistaken to identify what is causing this 
with the absence of resistance and suffering. Rather, the cause of this problem is the 
overwhelming presence of resistances and suffering in the world, which undermines us, mentally 
and physically, invariably pushing people beyond their breaking point. Having been continually 
pushed beyond what they are capable of, people understandably long for shelter from the storm. 
And it is this state of affairs—unrelenting, punishing suffering—that drives people to the “small 
goals” of pleasure, comfort, and ease, not too little suffering. 
Additionally, if Nietzsche thinks that the world has been [even modestly] successful in its 
goal of eliminating suffering, then he is deeply mistaken. More than that, if he thinks that it is the 
absence of suffering that has enervated and diminished human beings, then once again Nietzsche 
has erred in what he identifies as the cause of enervation and diminution. There are few things 
that have greater power to cut people down and level them than profound and needless suffering 
does.
272
 For when a person’s energy is entirely focused on self-preservation, the ability to engage 
in projects of self-enhancement has been cut off.  
Finally, one might charge that Nietzsche does not understand the [potential] impact of 
suffering. We can imagine myriad examples of suffering that neither contribute to any 
accomplishments nor have any value whatsoever; rather, these examples are all deeply 
debilitating and undermine the ability for any kind of development or self-enhancement. For 
example, the child slowly starving to death in Bangladesh; the family displaced and struggling to 
survive in the face of a protracted civil war from which there is no escape; the terminally ill 
patient whose body is being ravaged by cancer as death draws ever closer. The list is seemingly 
endless with examples of great suffering from which there is no escape. What is more, it is not 
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 It is important to note that this kind of leveling is not the same as the diminution that Nietzsche diagnoses as 
being caused by the sickness of enervation.  
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only a mistake to try and conceive these examples as situations where a person could use her 
suffering as an impetus to greatness, but it seems wrong to do so. These examples seem to 
represent clear cases of what might be called irredeemable suffering.  
Despite his continued engagement with the problem of suffering, to say nothing of his 
own debilitating physical suffering, Nietzsche never addressed cases of this sort, what I have 
called irredeemable [or needless] suffering. Given that he never addressed such cases, we have 
grounds for criticizing what seems to be a serious omission. In virtue of his apparent lack of 
interest in cases of irredeemable suffering—as evidenced by his lack of engagement with the 
issue—is there anything in Nietzsche’s thought that indicates how he might have assessed this 
type of suffering?  
As a starting point, we can look to his remarks in Zarathustra “On Free Death”, in which 
he talks about dying at the right time. There is much of interest in “On Free Death”, though much 
of it goes beyond the scope of the current discussion. Among the relevant things Nietzsche has to 
say, he speaks of “[dying] at the right time” (Z I.21). Nietzsche is fairly straightforward, albeit it 
in a way that sounds extremely harsh to our modern sensibilities: many people never truly live, 
and thus the best thing for them is to die. We can reasonably conclude that those who are born 
into a situation where their lives are beset by nothing but extreme poverty, starvation, disease, 
and slow death, are those who Nietzsche genuinely feels would be better off dying quickly.
273
  
This is not the only place where Nietzsche shows recognition of needless and 
irredeemable suffering. Elsewhere Nietzsche talks of the sick and suffering in a way that conveys 
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 Against this we can imagine a terminally ill person suffering debilitating pain in her final weeks who could 
nonetheless produce a profound piece of art, the culmination of her life’s work. Thus we might say that it is up to the 
individual what she does with her life even in the face of needless suffering. In contrast are cases like the child 
starving to death who, because of a situation he has no control of, is structurally unable to accomplish anything as he 
struggles to preserve a life he may have come to see is unlikely to be saved. In light of cases like this, more will 
have to be said to properly delineate what I have been calling irredeemable suffering. I return to this shortly. 
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a different kind of suffering from the suffering he identifies as valuable.
274
 In BGE 62, for 
example, Nietzsche indicates that the religions of suffering preserve what ought not to be 
preserved, taking sides with the failures of life. Nietzsche goes on to suggest that the best thing 
for them would be to die at the right time.
275
 Thus we see that, while Nietzsche finds suffering to 
be valuable, he clearly identifies a particular kind of suffering which is not an impetus to self-
enhancement. In other words, against the positive kinds of suffering Nietzsche values, he does 
recognize a form of suffering that is irredeemable and debilitating, even if this kind of suffering 
is not where his interests lie. 
To speak of “irredeemable suffering” leads to another issue that needs to be addressed, 
specifically how to distinguish the “good” suffering Nietzsche values, from the “bad” suffering 
Nietzsche is aware of, but with which he is not concerned. Katsafanas recognizes that this is an 
issue and tries to distinguish “good” suffering from “bad” suffering. He characterizes good 
suffering as "suffering associated with achievement", while bad suffering is "suffering associated 
with conditions such as disease or hunger".
276
 We can see what Katsafanas is aiming at, but he 
does not fully succeed in delineating good and bad suffering by appealing to disease and hunger 
as examples of bad suffering. After all, hunger and disease, while apparently irredeemable, could 
be the impetus a person needs to achieve something greater. Nietzsche’s life is evidence that a 
person can experience debilitating sickness and still persevere to accomplish great projects, as 
Nietzsche did with his writings. What we want is some kind of definition that will capture and 
delineate all forms of “good” suffering from “bad” suffering. Accordingly, I will provisionally 
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 See BGE 62, GM III.13-15, and the conclusion to EH IV.8. 
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 “With humans as with every other type of animal, there is a surplus of failures and degenerates, of the diseased 
and infirm, of those who necessarily suffer.” The religions of suffering, including Christianity, “have preserved too 
much of what should be destroyed” (BGE 62).  
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 In a footnote, Katsafanas writes that “there is an important difference between the suffering associated with 
achievement, and the suffering associated with conditions such as disease or hunger” (Katsafanas, 2013; 194, 
footnote 28). However, Katsafanas never elaborates on the nature of this difference, but takes it as given. 
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define “good” suffering as suffering that leads to accomplishment, while we can understand 
“bad” suffering as irredeemable, debilitating suffering which [definitively] undermines a 
person’s ability to accomplish things. 
Consider the following pair of examples: in the first case, we can imagine a student who 
is continually challenged by his teacher, given various intellectual challenges, which demand 
careful attention and thoughtful reflection from the student, but at the same time cause 
significant mental anguish on the student, as she works to address these challenges. The 
obstacles and resistances before her push her to her limit, but in the end she masters difficult 
material, sees the faults in the argument(s), and is able to offer an insightful creative solution to 
the philosophical problem. The resistances highlighted in this example strike us as good or 
valuable, insofar as they are necessary for the intellectual accomplishments of the student, 
leading to her self-enhancement.
277
  
In contrast are cases such as a captured prisoner of war being tortured, a child dying of 
leukemia, or a person dying of starvation.
278
 In these types of cases we would be mistaken to say 
the suffering presents itself as a challenge like the previous example. Rather, the challenge is the 
preservation of one’s life, which is being destroyed by suffering that is needless, excessive, 
irredeemable, and debilitating. 
If what distinguishes good, valuable suffering from bad, undermining suffering is 
whether or not the person is able to accomplish what she aimed at, then it would appear a person 
can only know if suffering is valuable after the fact. However, this does not seem right. It would 
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 One can point to all sorts of real-world examples where a person suffered greatly and was able to use that 
suffering as an impetus to do good in the world, like the examples of Martin Luther King Jr., Nelson Mandela, and 
Malala Yousefzai. 
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 There are also trickier cases, like the case of a Tibetan monk self-immolating in protest of Chinese policies, 
which seem to be examples of irredeemable suffering, but which could also be seen positively by Nietzsche, insofar 
as the act can be an impetus to others. In “On Free Death” Nietzsche does extol the value of what he calls “the 
consummating death”. The consummating death is “a goad and a promise to the living. The consummated one dies 
his death, victorious, surrounded by those who hope and promise” (Z, “On Free Death”). 
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appear that bad suffering is not simply suffering that leads to the inability to accomplish 
something. For example, I might get something of value out of a failed attempt to climb a 
mountain or a tennis match that I lose. Thus, if I can take something valuable even from failure, 
then the suffering is not necessarily bad. Bad suffering must somehow be debilitating, as in tasks 
that are so difficult they overwhelm me, or tasks which prevent me from engaging further 
challenges [as the examples in the previous paragraph would presumably do]. 
In the end, drawing the distinction between good and bad suffering is not going to be 
easy, but as I have sought to show, it can be done. However, we can draw some general 
conclusions. First off, Nietzsche does seem committed to recognizing the distinction. Secondly, 
what constitutes good or bad suffering is going to be dependent on the person, as what will be 
appropriate for one, will not necessarily be appropriate for the other. And finally, in virtue of the 
fact Nietzsche’s goal is self-enhancement, it would seem that, while good suffering is to be 
valued, retained, and heightened, bad suffering ought to be removed to the degree that it can. 
Insofar as bad suffering could prevent one from benefitting from good suffering, Nietzsche ought 
to recognize that certain kinds of suffering are best eliminated. 
This brings us to a related concern: how do we discern the right amount of resistance 
[suffering] for a given person? One might look to Nietzsche’s aphorism, “From life’s school of 
war” for an answer, as he famously wrote, “what doesn’t kill me makes me stronger” (TI I.8).279 
Elsewhere Nietzsche writes that “the strength of a spirit would be proportionate to how much of 
the “truth” he could withstand” (BGE 39).280 While these are intriguing claims, they do not 
satisfactorily address the question; rather, they simply restate the issue. How do I know what will 
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 Against Nietzsche’s reasoning in this aphorism, Robert Solomon has replied that “that which doesn’t kill me 
most likely leaves me debilitated” (Solomon, 2003; 32). 
280
 This was an idea Nietzsche routinely returned to in his notebooks. “The measure of a man is how much of the 
truth he can endure without degenerating” (WLN 35[69]). “’How much ‘truth’ can a spirit endure and dare’?—a 
question of its strength” (WLN 10[3]). 
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make me strong as opposed to killing, or debilitating me? How do I know how much I can 
endure? 
The success of a Nietzschean “resistance therapy” hinges on the person not being crushed 
by the weight of the challenges and resistances thrown at her, but rather being able to typically 
meet the challenge(s) and develop into something greater. Just as the lack of resistance is 
inimical to a person’s development, so too is excessive resistance injurious to a person, 
potentially catastrophically so. What is necessary is having some understanding of just what a 
person is capable of and directing her to challenges that are appropriate. 
Here we can imagine a person experimenting and working to figure out what works best 
for her. This idea has some merit, given Nietzsche’s high estimation of the value of 
experimentalism and risk-taking. However, just as a person will go to a physician to have an 
expert diagnose what is wrong with her, we can see the value of having a trained eye directed at 
diagnosing what is best for a person. After all, just as a person is often unable to accurately 
diagnose what is at issue with her, so too will a person struggle to discern precisely what the 
right level of challenge and resistance is necessary for her. As we have seen, the goal is to find a 
genuine challenge, where the resistance is neither negligible nor impossible to overcome. In an 
effort to become a better tennis player I will avoid playing against children—who would be no 
competition at all—just as I will avoid playing Roger Federer—whose serves would probably 
prove impossible to return. The task is to find the right level of resistance such that it proves 
genuinely challenging and allows a person to develop as she struggles against these resistances.  
This is where we can look to two of Nietzsche’s “physicians”, whose expertise can assist 
a person in discerning the right amount of resistance for her to take on in life. The first figure I 
have in mind is the rare type Nietzsche identifies at the end of BGE, the genius of the heart. 
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More common than the genius of the heart is the “Nietzschean” friend. Each of these figures has 
the unique ability to discern what is necessary for a person’s development in a way that the 
person is not. Thus we have two potential answers as to who will be able to help determine the 
right kind and the right amount of resistance necessary in a person’s life, so that they might work 
to engage resistances and develop a strong, powerful will. 
 To begin, let us turn to Nietzsche’s conclusion to BGE, where he talks about the genius 
of the heart. This passage shows both what is required to inspire a person, while simultaneously 
showing just how difficult this is to achieve. Most important for our concerns, the genius of the 
heart “knows how to descend into the underworld of every soul” (BGE 295). The person 
Nietzsche describes is extra-ordinary, and embodies a tremendous understanding of the depths of 
human being. Nietzsche’s description of the genius of the heart is of a person who is able to get 
people to learn to listen, who imparts the taste for new desires, and perhaps most importantly, is 
able to guess the hidden treasure in a person’s soul.  
Divining the gold buried in the mud of a person’s soul, the genius of the heart is precisely 
what would be needed to help wake people up from their self-induced hibernation.
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 Beyond 
adopting the role of an enlightened therapist, there is more the genius of the heart does. 
Nietzsche continues, describing a person “that enriches everyone who has come into contact with 
it … they are made richer in themselves, newer than before … full of hopes that do not have 
names yet, full of new wills and currents” (BGE 295). In essence, Nietzsche describes a person 
who both diagnoses and inspires. The genius of the heart is overflowing with wisdom, which 
pours forth to others, helping them in myriad ways, ways essential to their becoming something 
greater. 
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 Such a person is needed for the simple fact that, as Nietzsche often reminded us, each of us is farthest from 
himself, a fact which can help explain how we are unknown to ourselves (GS 335 and GM P.1). If this is the case, 
then what could be more important than someone knowing us in the way the genius of the heart knows us?  
[169] 
 
Given the portrait Nietzsche paints of the genius of the heart, it is easy to see precisely 
how this figure could help a person understand her present strength of will and direct her toward 
the most appropriate kinds of challenges that she needs to confront so that she might become 
something greater. In effect, the genius of the heart will be able to discern exactly how much a 
person can handle, and keep her from taking too much on. Additionally, the genius of the heart 
exhibits many other abilities that will be beneficial to a person struggling to overcome small 
goals, be it by inspiring a person, strengthening her, or imparting new desires. 
While the genius of the heart is the rarest of persons, there is another type of person that 
Nietzsche extols, a type significantly more people are fortunate to have in their lives: the 
Nietzschean friend. A complete account would require a rather lengthy treatment, but the 
essentials relevant in the context of this section are fairly straightforward. The Nietzschean friend 
aligns with Nietzsche’s high estimation of resistances and challenge, of hardness, joy, and self-
overcoming. Important in the present context, this ideal friend can serve an important role by 
helping to identify resistances and challenges that might be appropriate. 
In a nutshell, the ideal friend is not merely someone we know, have affection for, who 
shares our interests, and is, in effect, another version of oneself. Nietzsche deconstructs this 
notion, and in doing so builds up the notion of a friend who is one’s competitive partner in life, 
who pushes one, and with that, the friend can be a kind of bridge to one’s higher self.282 “In 
one’s friend one should have one’s best enemy. You should be closest to him in heart when you 
strive against him” (Z I.14).283 Through an agonistic engagement with one’s friend, one can work 
to become what one can become what one has it in oneself to be. In essence, the Nietzschean 
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 “Nietzsche’s vision of true friendship is agonistic, fighting against the friend’s self-satisfaction in favor of his 
higher self” (William Schroeder, manuscript, chapter 2, p.17, 2005). 
283
 “If one wants a friend, then one must also want to wage war for him: and in order to wage war, one must be able 
to be an enemy” (Z I.14). 
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friend is an ideal form of resistance in the world. Given that resistance and challenges in life are 
essential to a person’s development, it is easy to see the value of such a friend. 
That the Nietzschean friend can play this role should not at all be surprising. What we 
would hope from Nietzsche is an explanation about how it is the friend can push a person, in the 
right ways, to help her strive towards becoming something greater. Fortunately, Nietzsche gives 
a response to this question. The friend is someone who a person is challenged by, someone a 
person competes with, and as such, the friend pushes a person to improve; the friend can be a 
mirror to one’s self, which allows a person to see her flaws and what must be overcome, as well 
as her strengths, all of which a person may not clearly see in herself. Beyond that, the friend can 
motivate a person as a source of inspiration. Ideally, the friend can help to elevate a person, as 
would be expected with any kind of competition, where one tries to best the other, a challenge 
which necessitates one be at one’s best.  
As we see, the Nietzschean friend answers our earlier question about knowing the right 
level of resistance by actually being the right level of resistance and challenge. At the same time 
then, through competition with one’s friend, one can learn about one’s abilities, both one’s 
strengths and weaknesses, helping to calibrate what is challenging and what is not. In this way, 
as Nietzsche briefly detailed in HH  368, the friend acts as a ladder to one’s higher self.284    
*** 
Finally, having sorted through various problems about how to understand Nietzsche’s 
project, the nature of suffering and resistances, and how to know the right level of suffering to 
take on, there is one last issue. We can imagine many people who recognize that resistances and 
challenges can be beneficial to them, but who nonetheless decides that pleasure, ease, and 
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comfort are more attractive goals. How is Nietzsche to address this issue? There is a lot that 
could be said in attempting to address this issue on Nietzsche’s behalf, for it is a question of 
considerable importance in the context of his project of combatting the sickness of enervation. 
However, I believe we can conclude by looking at the note Nietzsche affixed to the end of essay 
one of the Genealogy for a concise response to this concern. In this note he reflects on the value 
of different values, pointing to the need to ask the question “value for what?” 
Something, for example, which obviously had value with regard to the longest possible 
life-span of a race (or to the improvement of its abilities to adapt to a particular climate, 
or to maintaining the greatest number) would not have anything like the same value if it 
was a question of developing a stronger type. 
 
As we have seen, Nietzsche’s concern has been to overcome the diminution of humanity and 
develop a stronger type, a project I have shown necessitates suffering and resistances. Given 
Nietzsche’s statement here, he concedes that, depending on a person’s goals, different people 
will hold differing values. This may seem a troubling concession on Nietzsche’s part. 
But this is not the end of the story though, for Nietzsche ironically concludes the note by 
saying that he will leave it to the English biologists to infer that “the longest possible life-span” 
is more valuable. Against that, he points to the real task before philosophers: to determine “the 
rank order of values”. From Nietzsche’s perspective, what constitutes the higher value could not 
be clearer: “the discipline of suffering”—a life with resistances, obstacles, and challenges—is 
necessary for enhancing humanity, and against a life of pleasure, ease, and comfort, it is to this 
project that mankind should turn.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE GREAT HEALTH 
5.1 Introduction 
Having surveyed the different forms of sickness that beset humanity in chapter one,
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and reconstructed Nietzsche’s responses in chapters two, three, and four, the final task is to 
investigate Nietzsche’s notion of the great health. As a general goal, Nietzsche seeks to 
overcome the ideals and values that have resulted in sickness and inaugurate both a new ideal 
and new values which will put humanity on the path to health. However, beyond the general goal 
of restoring humanity’s health by working to eliminate the negative elements in a person’s life, 
Nietzsche also appeals to a new ideal that he calls “the great health”, which he describes as “the 
ideal of a human, superhuman well-being” (GS 382).  
Nietzsche’s notion of “the great health” is highly elusive, and the minimal treatment it 
receives can make the work of elucidating it rather difficult. For example, when Nietzsche says 
of the great health that it is “a health that one doesn't only have, but also acquires continually and 
must acquire because one gives it up again and again, and must give it up”, it is easy to furrow 
one’s brow in consternation. However, when read in concert with Nietzsche’s treatment of 
sickness and health, and when we understand that health should be understood as a process as 
opposed to a state, even the more perplexing statements Nietzsche makes can fall into place. 
Given the nature of this new ideal, there are several questions that need to be addressed, 
but the most important questions are how to understand the great health and how one might 
achieve it. Additionally, given what Nietzsche says about the great health, one might question 
why it is worth pursuing. I will argue that answers to these questions can be reconstructed from 
Nietzsche’s statements about the great health, read in conjunction with his related remarks about 
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reduction and equalization of the European human”, a concern he describes as “our greatest danger” (GM I.12).  
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four elements central to the great health: overflowing abundance, laughter and cheerfulness, 
living experimentally, and forgetting. 
To answer these questions I will proceed as follows: section 5.2 begins by examining the 
movement from sickness to health, which ought to be understood as a process, and that so too is 
the movement from health to great health a continuation of this process. I briefly examine the 
puzzling question of how the great health could be stimulated by sickness. I continue in section 
5.3 by examining Nietzsche’s remarks on “the great health” in HH P.4, GS 382, and GM II.24, 
with the goal of illuminating the basic features of the great health. Section 5.4 offers an 
examination of four key elements of the great health listed above, which I argue are central to 
understanding the great health. Understanding each of these elements not only illuminates the 
nature of the great health, but at the same time gives us insight into how the great health goes 
beyond mere health. 
5.2 From Health to “The Great Health” 
Collecting what has been argued in the previous three chapters, one way in which 
Nietzsche’s notion of health could be construed is as a kind of making whole, a self-
connectedness and integration. This can be seen if we consider the different forms of sickness I 
have argued Nietzsche is most concerned with diagnosing and treating. There is the sickness of 
bad conscience [consciousness of guilt], which turns a person against herself in virtue of what 
she is and what she has done. Then there is the sickness of life negation, which is marked by a 
hatred of life, grounded in a rejection of all that is strange, questionable, and terrible in life. 
Finally, there is the sickness of enervation, which finds people under the spell of small goals that 
undermine the will and leave a person mired in mediocrity. I have argued that Nietzsche works 
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to address each of these sicknesses, offering “treatments” that can help eliminate these negative 
factors in a person’s life and make a person whole. 
Instead of turning against oneself through guilt-driven forms of self-negation and self-
punishment, Nietzsche advocates for a kind of self-affirmation, acknowledging one’s acts, and 
working to overcome the fragmentation that comes with rejecting parts of who she is, such that 
she brings herself and her past acts into a coherent whole. Similarly, Nietzsche works to 
overcome an attitude of life-negation by inculcating a love of life, such that a person can both 
affirm life and take it on without being overwhelmed by what is strange, questionable, and 
terrible in it. Finally, Nietzsche works to address the lassitude of modernity by cultivating a 
strong will, born of continued engagement with resistances and challenges. 
Throughout this all, while the goal Nietzsche advocates is a kind of healing [integration] 
of the self, his notion of health ought to be understood as a continuous process. That is to say, 
health as Nietzsche conceives it is not an end state one reaches, but rather achieving health is an 
ongoing process, where a person is continuously working to eliminate the negative factors that 
impede health, be it a person’s self-alienation or her disconnectedness from life. More than that, 
the process can go beyond health, towards what Nietzsche calls the great health. The great health 
can thus be understood as an ongoing development of the positive elements of health.
286
  
Another way of looking at their relationship is to understand health as a precondition for 
the possibility of great health. It would be a mistake, according to Nietzsche, to see the process 
as ending with health; instead, we should see how health and the great health are part of a 
[larger] process. One issue worth exploring then is how the elements of health—good 
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 I owe the idea that health can be understood as eliminating negative elements, while great health is incorporating 
positive elements, to William Schroeder, who thoughtfully and patiently discussed several important ideas about 
great health with me. My work in this chapter is greatly indebted to him, as his ideas not only helped clarify several 
opaque issues, but also influenced me to think through several other ideas in radically different ways, thereby 
strengthening the chapter. 
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conscience, love of life, and the will to overcome resistance—are related to, and inform, the 
elements of the great health. Additionally, we want to see how the great health builds on health 
and takes it higher. However, until the great health has been examined, the specific details of the 
relationship between health and great health will have to wait. I will clarify this in section IV. 
That health and the great health would be related as parts of a basic process should not be 
surprising. Throughout his writings Nietzsche was continually ruminating on the nature of 
sickness, its impact on a person, and how she might work to not only overcome sickness, but also 
achieve and maintain health. Given the fluidity of a person’s health, it stands to reason that just 
as a person could oscillate between sickness and health, so too is there potential for a higher kind 
of health, a state in which a person is “supercharged” with health. This is where Nietzsche’s 
ruminations on the relation between sickness and health can prove illuminating. It is in exploring 
this relation, oddly enough, that we can begin to understand the relation between health and the 
great health. Part and parcel of this higher health includes having experienced and overcome 
sickness, a fact which Nietzsche—no stranger to sickness—emphasizes throughout his 1880s 
writings.
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 See HH P, HH II.356, D 114, GS P.1-4, 120, GM III.9, CW 5, P, EH I.1-2, and III.1 where Nietzsche talks about 
the value of having been sick and the higher health that emerges from experiencing sickness and overcoming it. 
Schacht (1983) and Richardson (1996) emphasize this point. Schacht points to the important fact that Nietzsche's 
new health "is a different sort of 'health' from that which he takes to have preceded the onset of this sickness" 
(274). Thus Schacht later implies that sickness, on one level, instead of warranting outright condemnation, is an 
integral part of this new health. Building on this point, Richardson notes that “the overman wins through … 
suffering a higher health” (70). In the same way “sickness is [later] taken up into a ‘higher health’” (133). 
Richardson later points out the need to accept “sickness as well as health”, such that the overman isn’t purely 
healthy (“though [his] values do favor health”). Nietzsche claims that “sickness itself can be a stimulus of life: it is 
just that you have to be healthy enough for this stimulus!” (CW 5). There is the question whether all forms of 
sickness can be genuine stimuli that lead to a higher health. In chapter 4 I distinguished good and bad forms of 
suffering, where the former were valuable forms of resistance that contributed to the strengthening of a person’s 
will, while the latter forms of suffering, what I called irredeemable suffering, lacked the positive value of good 
suffering (about which it is right to advocate their elimination). In the same way, there are good reasons for thinking 
that there are irredeemable forms of sickness, i.e., those which are so debilitating that they cannot be stimuli to 
health.   
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In brief, Nietzsche claims that “being sick is instructive” (GM III.9), for it allowed him to 
see things from the perspective of the sick. More importantly, when a person succumbs to 
sickness, Nietzsche claims it can act as an impetus to self-overcoming, as it was for him.
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Having experienced and overcome sickness, Nietzsche holds that a higher health has been 
won.
289
 Not only is this a bold statement to make, it invites several questions: (1) why does 
Nietzsche think health won from sickness is higher and better? (2) What makes this “higher 
health” an improvement over a person’s health prior to having succumbed to sickness? 
The idea that a person wins a higher health via sickness may seem counterintuitive, but 
we can find an analogue that captures what Nietzsche seems to be trying to convey. After the 
H1N1 flu virus hit in 2009, a study found that among those who had caught this particularly 
virulent strain of the virus, some had developed a supercharged immune system. The reasoning 
was that due to the unique nature of the H1N1 virus, people’s immune systems created multiple 
kinds of antibodies to deal with the virus.
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 Without having experienced the H1N1 virus, people 
would not have developed a supercharged immune system. In the same way, what Nietzsche 
seems to be suggesting is the idea that without experiencing sickness, a higher health could not 
be achieved. On the surface, that we need to have undergone sickness to achieve higher health 
should strike us as a questionable claim. But if we understand this claim along the lines of the 
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 “[S]omeone who has completely lost his way in a forest but strives with uncommon energy to get out of it again 
sometimes discovers a new path which no one knows” (HH 231), which Nietzsche offers as a possible explanation 
of genius. Similarly, one might surmise, great health arises in response to the pain and torment of sickness. See also 
HH 230 and 233 for similar reflections on the stimulus that sickness can be. 
289
 Nietzsche examined how the weak, sick, and degenerate could, because of this very sickness, try new things, and 
thereby actually initiate development and progress. Thus he can claim that progress is preceded by weakness and 
decline (HH 224). Similarly, the type of self-overcoming and development that Nietzsche would talk about in the 
1880s is preceded by sickness and struggle.  
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 Roberts, Michelle. (11 January 2011). “Swine flu offers 'extraordinary super immunity'”. BBC News. Retrieved 
from http://www.bbc.com/news/health-12152500. See Wrammert, Koutsonanos, et al., “Broadly cross-reactive 
antibodies dominate the human B cell response against 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza virus infection” in The Journal of 
Experimental Medicine, vol. 208:1, January 2011. 
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way a person’s immune system becomes stronger and grounds a higher health in light of having 
undergone sickness, then Nietzsche’s claim is suddenly more intelligible and more plausible. 
Reflecting on the value of sickness, Nietzsche concludes—surprisingly—that there is a 
sense in which we cannot do without it. A remark from 1885-1886 in the Nachlass can help shed 
some light on Nietzsche’s position. Reflecting on health and sickness, Nietzsche remarks that 
one of the yardsticks of health is “how much sickliness it can take upon itself and overcome—can 
make healthy. What would destroy more tender men is one of the stimulants of great health” 
(WLN, 2[97]). I began this section began by claiming that health is a process in which the 
various elements of sickness are eliminated. The overcoming of sickness brings an additional 
benefit: it stimulates higher health. He finds in sickness a specific kind of resistance to be 
overcome, one which acts as a stimulus to higher health in a person’s life. This aligns with his 
high estimation of engaging resistances and explains the otherwise counterintuitive need for 
sickness. Health as Nietzsche wants us to understand it would be radically different without the 
influence of sickness.  
Not only is this a bold claim on Nietzsche’s part, but there is something puzzling about it 
too. If we understand sickness, health, and the great health on a scale, one would expect that 
health might be a precondition to the great health. Intuitively, it is not clear how sickness would 
contribute to the great health. What Nietzsche seems to be suggesting is that sickness is a kind of 
bridge between health and the great health. As I sought to show with the example of the H1N1 
virus leading to supercharged immune systems, Nietzsche’s claim that sickness contributes to 
higher health becomes plausible. Furthermore, with this example, the reasons why higher and 
better health can be won from sickness become clear. 
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Having some sense that a higher health can be derived from sickness is one thing, but that 
the great health has the same relationship to sickness is another. Only in 1886, in the new preface 
to HH and the newly composed fifth book of GS, did Nietzsche begin to articulate a new 
conception of health—what he called “the great health”—and how it was to be understood. What 
might have precipitated the development of his ideas on the great health is unclear, though based 
on Nietzsche’s claims in the 1886 prefaces, one could speculate that he had experienced 
something unique after his unexpected recovery from his illnesses, i.e., the spiritual sickness 
related the influence of Schopenhauer and Wagner, and he sought to articulate the nature of this 
new experience, and where it might go if developed further.  
Whatever the reasons that precipitated Nietzsche’s ruminations on the great health, he did 
begin to conceptualize the notion. We will see that the great health builds upon health and takes 
it higher by developing new key features. Where his understanding of health can be understood 
as eliminating various features of sickness, as we have seen, sickness plays an important role in 
achieving the higher health Nietzsche envisions. We have also seen that Nietzsche does not 
conceive of health simply as a state of well-being.
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 This process-view of becoming healthier 
will be developed further with his analysis of higher health, as Nietzsche envisions a process that 
one is continually working to maintain and develop, lose and reacquire. This higher health 
includes something more than mere health, accentuating the positive factors in a person’s life. It 
is a kind of optimality that comes from a higher level of functioning, unburdened by negative 
factors, and healthy enough to overcome even the most difficult challenges. Collecting these 
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 Compare how health is traditionally conceived: since 1948 the World Health Organization has defined health as 
“a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.” 
Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted by the International Health Conference, 
New York, 19-22 June, 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of 61 States (Official Records of the 
World Health Organization, no. 2, p. 100) and entered into force on 7 April 1948. 
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ideas and much more, Nietzsche presents his most expansive account of what he calls “the great 
health” in GS 382, which is the focus of the next section.   
5.3 “The Great Health” 
While Nietzsche’s treatment of the great health is not extensive, there are a handful of 
references in his published writings: HH P.4, GS 382, GM II.24, and EH Z.2. Beyond these 
explicit statements, there are certain ideas that are integral to understanding the great health, e.g., 
overflowing abundance, which animate Nietzsche’s writings in the 1880s. Just like good 
conscience, love of life, and the will to overcome resistances illuminated our understanding of 
the health, so too are ideas like abundance and laughter, living experimentally, and overcoming 
sickness important to developing our understanding of the great health.  
In early 1886, Nietzsche first broached the idea of great health in the preface to the new 
edition of Human All Too Human. In the context of overcoming a kind of spiritual sickness—
related to his being dominated by Schopenhauer and Wagner—Nietzsche talks about “that 
tremendous overflowing certainty and health” (HH P.4), which we can understand as the goal 
towards which this process aims. And while he acknowledges that there is a long road from 
solitude and experimentation to this overflowing health, he does provide some insight into the 
nature of this goal.  
As Nietzsche continues, he identifies other parts of this goal, including what he calls a 
“mature freedom of spirit”, which is glossed as “self-mastery and discipline of the heart”; there 
is also an “inner spaciousness and indulgence of superabundance”; and finally a “superfluity of 
formative, curative, moulding and restorative forces which is precisely the sign of great health” 
(ibid). While this passage is helpful insofar as it offers some insight into the nature of the goal 
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Nietzsche is trying to articulate, one might hope for more on the nature of this superabundance 
and overflowing health that Nietzsche envisions. 
In describing some of the elements of the great health, Nietzsche gives us a little window 
into understanding this ideal and goal. What he is talking about here encompasses a notion of 
freedom grounded in self-mastery, or what might be understood as a kind of self-empowerment. 
Nietzsche goes on to identify an “inner spaciousness and indulgence of superabundance”, which 
is a fairly opaque statement. Fortunately, as he continues, there is some illumination, for this 
spaciousness and abundance is identified as something that helps to prevent a person from losing 
herself. How abundance might do this is not at all clear, but as Nietzsche later talks about a 
spaciousness of perspective—presumably born of this abundance—which allows a person to 
adopt a distanced standpoint on herself, something which ought to prevent her from losing 
herself. Finally there is a vast reserve of energy and strength, which generates confidence in 
one’s abilities, including the recognition that one can live experimentally, and in doing so will 
not lose oneself, because of the “restorative forces” which are part of great health. 
While Nietzsche offers some insight into the nature of the great health here, what we 
would like from him is a more thorough account of what it is, and how a person might achieve 
this higher health. The preface to HH offers insight into what the great health is, and offers a 
basic roadmap of the transformative path one might take to achieve it, one aspect—the 
importance of sickness—which we have seen.  
Nietzsche documents that during this transformation there are periods of experimentation, 
followed by periods of convalescence; the person undergoing this process develops a new 
perspective on things, seeing everything as if from on high; she goes further in convalescence, 
and during that time she “again draws near to life” (HH P.5). During this time she develops a 
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new view of herself, which opens her eyes such that she sees things in a completely new way 
than hitherto. Finally, Nietzsche recounts how “the free, ever freer spirit begins to unveil the 
riddle of that great liberation” (HH P.6). What she discovers is that the hardness, the renunciation 
of past reverences, was for a new end, where she becomes a master over herself. As the process 
reaches a plateau, Nietzsche describes how the free spirit can hold a manifold of perspectives, 
while also taking control of her “you shall” and thus learning just what she can do. 
While there is much to take from the preface to HH, this is only Nietzsche’s first word on 
the matter, and he later supplements it. In the penultimate section of Book V of The Gay Science, 
Nietzsche expands upon many of the aforementioned ideas about “the great health”. It is with GS 
382 that Nietzsche offers his most developed and sustained discussion of the great health.
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 In 
this passage he explains the essential features of the great health, how it supersedes health, and 
finally, he intimates an answer about why a person should pursue great health.  
Nietzsche begins the section by looking to the human beings of the future, as he often 
did.
293
 He goes on to speak of a new end, which necessitates “a new means, namely, a new 
health, that is stronger, craftier, tougher, bolder, and more cheerful than any previous health" (GS 
382). By invoking the idea of a new health, Nietzsche implicitly condemns what we might call 
“the old health”, which, appealing to GS 120, might be characterized as the idea of a normal 
health that is the same for everyone. Additionally, this new health goes beyond Nietzsche’s 
notion of health represented in having a good conscience, love of life, and a will to overcoming 
resistances. The new health Nietzsche characterizes as “the great health” is a kind of optimality 
that builds on his notion of health and takes it higher.  
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 This is confirmed by a remark he makes in 1888: “I do not know how to explain this idea [the great health] better 
or more personally than I already did in one of the concluding sections of the fifth book of the ‘gaya scienza’” (EH 
Z.2). 
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 For example, Nietzsche refers to a new health in the preface to volume two of HH, describing the new health as 
“a health of tomorrow and the day after,” for “you predestined and victorious men, you overcomers of your age, 
your healthiest and strongest men” (HH II P.6).  
[182] 
 
Nietzsche then explicitly invokes the idea of “the great health”, which he characterizes as 
“a health that one doesn't only have, but also acquires continually and must acquire because one 
gives it up again and again, and must give it up!” While this certainly sounds strange, this 
language should not surprise us, given Nietzsche’s earlier remarks about the kind of higher 
health that a person wins through overcoming sickness.
294
 One must be ready to give up the 
lower form of health, though strictly speaking, it will have been taken up into a higher health. 
Furthermore, insofar as the great health is not something which, once attained, one always 
possesses, Nietzsche is saying that one gives up the great health. But this gives rise to another 
question: why must one give up the great health? What is it about this higher health that 
necessitates losing it to gain it? 
If we look back to HH P.4, Nietzsche characterizes this health as something that one can 
lose as one tests oneself. Great health is both won and lost, and as it is won again, the reward is a 
higher health. Thus what we find in this passage offers credence to the idea that one of the things 
contributing to the great health is having undergone and overcome sickness. In the same way, the 
preface to HH tells us that the great health is born of letting go of previously held ideals, so that 
one might work toward higher, more difficult ideals. 
Nietzsche goes on to speak of “we Argonauts of the ideal” (who are “dangerously 
healthy”) before he laments the sight of modern-day man, who pales in comparison to the ideal 
before him. Nietzsche then describes the new ideal as "a peculiar, seductive, dangerous ideal”. 
This ideal will strike many as peculiar insofar as it stands contrary to our understanding of health 
as an achieved state, whereas Nietzsche envisions the great health as a continuing process. At the 
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 To talk of overcoming sickness already suggests Nietzsche’s discussions of self-overcoming, but to talk about the 
great health as something one gives up and reacquires again and again, makes the connection to self-overcoming 
explicit. “That I must be struggle and becoming and purpose and the contradiction 
of purposes” (Z II.12). 
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same time, for others it will appear a seductive ideal, as is evident in Nietzsche’s description of 
the over-rich world that unveils itself as the reward for those who strive for this ideal. But this is 
what makes it a dangerous ideal, for it is not necessarily for everyone;
295
 however, seduced by 
this ideal, but not strong enough for it, many will be crushed by it. Additionally, if we keep in 
mind the movement described in the preface to HH, we saw that the path to the great health is 
marked by periods of convalescence and new insights. Proceeding too quickly can be dangerous; 
one must take time to integrate a new ideal into what one has become.  
Nearing the conclusion of the passage, Nietzsche develops how he understands the great 
health, describing “the ideal of a spirit that plays naively”296, which he explains is done “not 
deliberately but from overflowing abundance and power”. Thus we find Nietzsche once again 
appealing to the notion of abundance as a defining feature of great health. Compared to what has 
hitherto been esteemed as highest humanity, the person of great health possesses “a human, 
superhuman [übermenschlichen] well-being”. Given that, it “will often enough appear inhuman", 
which goes to show just how exceptional this new health is in comparison to humanity’s present 
ideal. The splendor of this superhuman well-being is so great that the greatest things among 
human beings pale into insignificance. As is often the case, Nietzsche’s rhetoric can go too far as 
he tries to convey the nature of his new ideal. After all, the elements of health examined 
earlier—good conscience, love of life, and the will to power—are themselves extremely 
demanding ideals and significant achievements. 
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 Nietzsche intimates that the great health is not something everyone is capable of achieving, remarking that “we 
don’t readily concede the right to it to anyone” (GS 382). One might question what it means to say that a person 
either has or does not have the right to the great health. Of course there is the possibility that those who purportedly 
have no right to the great health could nonetheless work to achieve it. Whether or not they would be successful is 
another question. These are questions Nietzsche does not directly address, but strictly speaking, just because 
someone lacks the right to the great health, does not mean the ideal is off limits. 
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 Note the connection to the final stage of the three metamorphoses, the child stage, about which Nietzsche writes: 
“The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a wheel rolling out of itself, a first movement, a 
sacred yes-saying” (Z I.1). 
[184] 
 
Nietzsche invokes the great health again at the conclusion of the second essay of the 
Genealogy. In the context of a suggestion about how a person might work to wed bad conscience 
to anti-natural inclinations, Nietzsche briefly talks of the type he believes would be necessary to 
perform this experiment, a type he goes on to identify as having the great health. Nietzsche gives 
a brief description of the great health, which emphasizes many of the same features used to 
describe the great health in GS 382. Fortunately, the characterization he presents also offers 
insight into some additional features of the great health.  
Nietzsche begins by describing “spirits who are strengthened by wars and victories, for 
whom conquest, adventure, danger and even pain have actually become a necessity” (GM II.24). 
This statement should bring to mind what Nietzsche was calling for as a means to address the 
enervated wills of modern humanity. In essence, the person of great health needs what is difficult 
and demanding, i.e., what would be a genuine challenge. Note the subtle change: no longer is 
Nietzsche simply advocating a means of treating a weakened will, but now resistances and 
challenges have become a need. This can be seen as evidence of the relation between health and 
the great health, where the great health takes up an aspect of health and supersedes it.  
Continuing, he notes that, more than needing challenges, “they would also need to be 
acclimatized to thinner air higher up, to winter treks, ice and mountains in every sense” (ibid). 
That is to say, Nietzsche highlights that the type he envisions is accustomed to what is harsh and 
challenging, which lends further evidence to the prior claim that the great health is “tougher … 
than any previous health”, just as it is a “dangerous ideal” (GS 382). The type fit for great health 
must be fully accustomed to what is difficult and demanding. 
The final feature that “belong[s] to great health” is what Nietzsche describes as “a sort of 
sublime nastiness itself, a final, very self-assured willfulness of insight” (ibid). Setting aside the 
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“sublime nastiness [wickedness, malice]”, which suggests something like a kind of divine 
unconcern, what should get our attention is that Nietzsche mentions self-assuredness or 
confidence. This confidence is what we would expect from someone who possesses an 
abundance of energy and restorative power. This type readily engages in actions that others 
would dismiss as audacious and even dangerous. Similarly, given the predilection for “wars” and 
being accustomed to what is difficult and dangerous, a person would need great confidence—
almost verging on a lack of concern—about the risks before her, lest she be overwhelmed by 
these challenges. 
Finally, Nietzsche returns to the great health in Ecce Homo, writing: “In order to 
understand this type [Zarathustra], you first need to be clear about what he presupposes 
physiologically: it is what I call the great health” (EH Z.2). Nietzsche then says that GS 382 
offers the best explanation of the nature of the great health. In light of Nietzsche’s statement 
directing our attention back to GS 382 in order to understand the great health, this is a good time 
to take stock of what Nietzsche has said about the great health. Having surveyed the three main 
passages in which Nietzsche discusses the great health—HH P.4, GS 382, and GM II.24—a 
fairly clear portrait can be put together.  
Nietzsche emphasizes several traits that illuminate how we ought to understand the great 
health. As he begins, the great health is something a person has, gives up and reacquires. This 
will undoubtedly sound strange, since we take health to be something we either have or 
something we lack when we are sick. But for Nietzsche, this process is an example of the kind of 
self-overcoming he identified as “the law of life” (GM III.127). Furthermore, as I argued in 
section II, the great health is such that it is continuously stimulated by sickness. Only by giving 
itself up can a higher health be won. 
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Importantly, there is an overflowing abundance of energy which animates the great 
health. In virtue of this abundance, the great health enables a person to act with supreme 
assuredness, just as it grants a person the ability to fearlessly tempt danger. Inculcating bravery 
and curiosity, the great health allows a person to experiment, so that she can move in the right 
direction for herself. And all the while, this person acts with a certain playful naïveté, at times a 
kind of divine unconcern. One might describe the overall picture Nietzsche presents as the 
picture of a person who lives at a higher level of functioning, rooted in abundance, where all 
things “merely human” do not affect her as they would all other types. Accustomed to what is 
harsh and challenging, this type needs what is difficult and demanding. The great health, 
Nietzsche is suggesting, is predicated on continuous testing, testing that at times may seem to 
veer dangerously close to recklessness.  
Taking Nietzsche’s treatment of the great health, we have a summary account of this 
goal, one which helps us understand how Nietzsche conceives the idea. Additionally, we have a 
portrait of the person of great health, her basic characteristics and needs. The treatment in the 
preface to HH has addressed the great transformation about how the great health might be 
cultivated. Finally, one might question why a person would pursue such an arduous goal. 
Nietzsche does not directly answer this question, but the basic outline of an answer can be seen 
in GS 382.  
Nietzsche writes of “a world so over-rich in what is beautiful, strange, questionable, 
terrible, and divine that our curiosity and our thirst to possess it have veered beyond control”. He 
goes on to ask how, with “such vistas” in sight and “a burning hunger”, how could anyone be 
satisfied with modernity? Nietzsche’s point is clear: those for whom he writes could not be 
satisfied. The reason why a person ought to pursue the great health is clear: this goal can help a 
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person become what she has it in her to become. As Nietzsche concludes the passages, it is here 
“that the real question mark is posed for the first time; that the destiny of the soul changes”. 
Nietzsche’s expectation is clear: who would not be tempted by this goal? 
The portrait Nietzsche offers of the great health in HH P.4, GS 382, and GM II.24 offers 
an intriguing, tantalizing picture of this new ideal. As I have sought to show, there is much that 
can be learned from a handful of passages. One might nevertheless express concern that what 
purports to be a significant element of Nietzsche’s philosophy rests on a scant number of 
passages.
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 Fortunately, while the explicit references to the great health are admittedly few in 
number, there are various ideas that Nietzsche appeals to, like abundance and the overflowing, 
which he routinely invokes beyond his treatment of the great health. That is to say, there are a 
number of important elements that are constitutive of the great health which, though they do not 
explicitly invoke great health, warrant our attention and ought to be examined and explicated. 
These ideas—abundance and the overflowing, living experimentally, laughter and cheerfulness, 
and forgetting—all inform Nietzsche’s understanding of great health. Understanding Nietzsche’s 
reflections on the great health is one thing, but more needs to be said about the essential features 
of the great health, so that how it goes beyond mere health can be further clarified. 
5.4 Elements of “The Great Health” 
Introduction 
 Having surveyed the handful of passages in which Nietzsche explicitly talks about the 
great health, I now turn to examining in greater detail some of the important elements that make 
up the great health. Specifically, I examine the idea of the overflowing, or abundance, which 
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 This concern has not stopped commentators from using a handful of passages in Zarathustra to construct an ideal 
out of the Übermensch, just as the appeal to GM II.2 has been the source for much work on the ideal of the 
sovereign individual. My contention is that, if we go beyond the handful of passages on the great health, there is 
much that Nietzsche says that supplements HH P.4, GS 382, and GM II.24.  
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Nietzsche regularly invokes in his writings from Zarathustra onwards; then I look at laughter and 
cheerfulness, a notion which Nietzsche long championed as reflective of an ideal orientation 
towards the world and self; I continue by turning to another idea that can be found throughout 
the writings of the 1880s, living experimentally; and I conclude with an examination of 
forgetting, which may seem out of place when juxtaposed against the other three elements, but 
which plays an important role in the great health insofar as it helps to uphold a person’s psychic 
order.  
 Once these different elements have been examined, I turn to clarifying the relationship 
between each of the other elements. Following an examination of how laughter, living 
experimentally, and forgetting fit into the coherent whole under the notion of the great health, I 
conclude by highlighting the parallels to good conscience, love of life, and the will to power, and 
more importantly, how the great health is a leap forward beyond the elements of health. What I 
aim to show is that the parallels between the structure of health and the great health should not be 
unexpected, but rather point to what I claimed at the outset, that is, that health and the great 
health are different stages of a process, where the great health is a higher optimality, clearing the 
way to the unexplored, open seas Nietzsche so frequently appealed to as a metaphor for what 
could lie ahead. 
Overflowing Abundance 
Nietzsche routinely invoked the language and imagery of abundance and the overflowing 
in his mature writings, including his discussions of the great health. As a first pass at 
understanding this idea, we should keep in mind Nietzsche’s contention that it indicates the 
possession of overflowing power.
298
 As we will see, while the language of power [or strength] 
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 For example, in the context of the great health, Nietzsche talks of “the ideal of a spirit that plays naively … from 
overflowing abundance and power” (GS 382). 
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gets at part of the notion of abundance, we might better understand it as an immense reserve of 
energy. The task at hand is to clarify how the important but elusive idea of abundance ought to 
be understood, with an eye towards deepening our understanding of the great health. 
In the 1880s appeals to overflowing abundance were manifold, going beyond the context 
of the great health. Examining Nietzsche’s use of this language in other contexts ought to help 
clarify the role of abundance with respect to the great health. Some of Nietzsche’s evocative 
imagery at the beginning of Zarathustra invokes this notion e.g., the overflowing radiance of the 
sun and “the bee that has gathered too much honey” (Z P.1). Elaborating on these images can 
provide some insight into how we should understand this notion of overflowing abundance, as 
well as how it comes to be. 
Nietzsche begins by describing the overflowing radiance of the sun—of which 
Zarathustra joyfully partakes. Nietzsche then describes the overflowing wisdom that Zarathustra 
feels compelled to share, “like the bee that has gathered too much honey”.299 This is some of 
Nietzsche’s more evocative prose, though it is even more elusive. What common feature does the 
sun, honey bees, and Zarathustra share that might help us better understand the nature of the 
overflowing? Neither the sun, nor honey bees, nor Zarathustra should be understood as 
inherently “overflowing”, as they all have, in various ways, accumulated the very things they 
give away.
300
 If this is correct, then there are grounds for thinking that a person can cultivate the 
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 Zarathustra continues speaking, asking to be blessed; he then adds, “bless the cup that wants to flow over, such 
that the water flows golden from it”. Interestingly, Nietzsche notes that the sun needs those for whom it shines, and 
Zarathustra and his animals readily took the “overflow” of sunlight. So too does Zarathustra need to bestow. Thus 
we see the importance of having recipients for what overflows. Later in Part One Nietzsche mentions the 
overflowing heart of the friend, after which he adds the same caveat about the recipients of an overflowing heart. “I 
teach you the friend and his overflowing heart. But one must understand how to be a sponge, if one wants to be 
loved by overflowing hearts” (Z I: “On Love of the Neighbor”). 
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 At times Nietzsche intimates that those who have this overflowing abundance have it innately. See GM I.10-11 
and EH I.2. 
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overflowing. However, before turning to the question of how it is that one might cultivate 
abundance, let us more deeply analyze Nietzsche’s passages. 
Zarathustra, we are told, is “weary of his wisdom” and needs to share it with humanity. 
Undoubtedly, he was not born with this wisdom, evidence suggests it has been accumulating 
during his ten years in solitude in the mountains. That this overflowing wisdom has developed 
over time is uncontroversial, and it suggests what was said above: what is overflowing can be 
cultivated. More intriguing is the case of honey bees. Honey bees make honey, but to do so they 
must first collect nectar from flowers, which they then convert into honey. If we take the 
example of “the bee that has gathered too much honey”, what we learn is that abundance is the 
outcome of something one does with the resources one has acquired. Bees create an abundance 
of honey, the sun creates an abundance of light, Zarathustra creates an abundance of wisdom. 
There are several questions at this point: (1) What kind of abundance does Nietzsche envision? 
(2) What does this tell us about how a person might cultivate abundance? And (3) why do the 
examples Nietzsche presents focus on the fact one must give away one’s abundance?  
Abundance is signified by the fact a person must give something away, which indicates 
that the sun, the honey bees, and Zarathustra are all examples of great abundance, but that much 
was already clear. Furthermore, they are all examples in which abundance was created or 
cultivated, though it is not clear how this was achieved. But these examples indicate it is 
possible. With these examples in mind, what can be said about how this abundance is cultivated? 
Before answering this question, it will be prudent to consider more precisely how to understand 
the kind of reserve of energy or force Nietzsche conceives when he talks about abundance, which 
may shed some light on what a person could do to cultivate an overflowing abundance. 
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Several examples come up where Nietzsche intimates that it is abundance which helps 
insulate a person from something harmful. Guilt and ressentiment are both mentioned as 
emotions to which a person is normally susceptible to, but their poisonous effects can be blocked 
by overflowing abundance.
301
 This suggests the kind of abundance Nietzsche envisions can be 
understood as a kind of psychological strength and spacious reservoir of psychic energy.  
We can gain a better understanding of what Nietzsche wants to cultivate if we develop 
the idea with an analogy. Consider the noxious fumes that come from staining woodwork. In the 
space of a small, enclosed room, the fumes will undoubtedly be potent and noxious, affecting the 
person doing the staining. In contrast, if this work was done in a spacious, well-ventilated room, 
the potency of the fumes diminishes to where they are no longer a danger, which is signified by 
the fact one no longer notices the smell. The person who possesses this abundance is like a 
spacious, well-ventilated room; or, to repurpose a line from Whitman, we can understand the 
abundant person as large and containing multitudes. In virtue of this abundance and inner 
spaciousness, the person is not susceptible to those things that would poison and harm others.  
With the example of ressentiment in mind, we can understand the role that overflowing 
abundance plays in a person’s psychic economy: it is a kind of supercharged psychological well-
being. In virtue of this psychological well-being, this type is able to maintain distance and 
control over what would infect and poison others. Elsewhere Nietzsche claims that the 
overflowing abundant person is able to say yes to all that is questionable about existence.
302
 This 
suggests that what Nietzsche is thinking is something like a kind of psychological fortitude. It is 
like a kind of psychological or spiritual [Geistig] insulation for a person. Where others would be 
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 “Wherever a rich nature is presupposed, an overflowing feeling, a feeling of maintaining control over 
ressentiment, is almost the proof of richness” (EH I.6). See also GM I.10-11.  
302
 “A formula of the highest affirmation born out of fullness, out of overfullness, an unreserved yea-saying even to 
suffering, even to guilt, even to everything questionable and strange about existence” (EH BT.2). 
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harmed, the type Nietzsche envisions has so great a reserve of psychological strength that she is 
able to take on what life throws at her and emerge largely unscathed. The higher health 
Nietzsche envisions, grounded in the idea of overflowing abundance, might be understood as a 
kind of resilience; the person of great health has both a bountiful reserve of energy and the 
ability to regain her equilibrium and health after being tested. 
While I have sought to keep talk of other related elements of the great health out of a 
discussion of Nietzsche’s understanding of abundance, there is much to suggest that abundance 
is foundational for the other aspects of the great health—laughter, experimentalism, and 
forgetting. Similarly, other virtues Nietzsche values are often described in ways that suggest they 
are animated by abundance. This same richness of excess energy [and strength] that insulates a 
person from psychological sickness also enables a person to take considerable risks. Abundance 
grants a person the freedom to act with a minimum of worry. One need not worry about 
squandering one’s energy, for one can lose much and still remain healthy.303 Courage, frequently 
extolled by Nietzsche, is said to have “a surplus of force” as its condition. Even compassion—
about which Nietzsche offered many highly critical arguments—might be worth something in the 
overflowing person, because it will not multiply suffering in this case.  
As a concluding remark, there is one issue that has not yet been addressed. We have seen 
textual evidence that indicates abundance can be cultivated, but Nietzsche does not offer an 
explanation about how a person might cultivate abundance. I return to this issue below in the 
conclusion, for only after examining laughter, living experimentally, and forgetting—when a 
more complete picture of the great health is at hand—will we be able to see what can be said on 
Nietzsche’s behalf regarding how to cultivate overflowing abundance.  
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 “With people who still knew a different sort of life—one that was fuller, more extravagant, more overflowing 
[…] a lot can be risked, a lot can be challenged, a lot can also be squandered” (TI IX.37).  
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Cheerfulness and Laughter 
While the notion of abundance is central to understanding the great health, it is not the 
sole feature of the great health. Nietzsche characterizes the great health as “stronger, craftier, 
tougher, bolder, and more cheerful than any previous health” (GS 382, emphasis mine). 
Describing health as cheerful or “more cheerful” is certain to confuse. How can health be 
cheerful? We can get a better grasp of what Nietzsche is after if we consider cheerfulness along 
with another notion he frequently invoked: laughter. In the case of cheerfulness and laughter, 
what Nietzsche seems to have in mind is being able to take a particular perspective on both what 
one has achieved and what one is going to do.
304
 One is able to take a step back, gaining a kind 
of distance from oneself and the world, and importantly, in virtue of this distancing, is able to 
laugh at it all.
305
 
The ideas of cheerfulness, gaiety, and laughter became increasingly important in the 
writings of the 1880s, a fact most evident in The Gay Science and Zarathustra. Both of these 
works convey a particular kind of spirit that was partially captured in Nietzsche’s notion of the 
free spirit. Cheerfulness captures Nietzsche’s ideal way of being attuned to the world. One way 
of looking at this attunement is that it shows how one can be within the world, while 
simultaneously viewing it from the vantage point of looking upon the world from a great height. 
Similarly, laughter signifies taking an Olympian perspective on the world and self. Thus we 
should not be surprised that Nietzsche writes that “laughing at something is the first sign of a 
higher psychic life”.306 
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 Kaufmann says, correctly I believe, that “for Nietzsche laughter represents an attitude toward the world, toward 
life, and toward oneself” (BWN, 422 footnote). What Kaufmann does not do is explain the nature of this attitude. 
305
 Zarathustra admonishes the higher men, telling them to “learn to laugh at yourselves as one must laugh!” (Z 
IV.13.15). That the higher men need to learn to laugh suggests their inability to achieve the distancing perspective 
Nietzsche advocates. 
306
 This is a passage from Nietzsche’s notebooks which Kaufmann includes in his translation of BGE (BWN, 422 
footnote).  
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To get a full understanding of the significance and nuances of both cheerfulness and 
laughter—which is central to Nietzsche’s positive ethical view—would necessitate more space 
than is available.
307
 However, a couple of examples from The Gay Science and Zarathustra 
capture the basic idea that Nietzsche holds cheerfulness and laughter to signify. Just as a brief 
survey of The Gay Science reveals an emphasis on cheerfulness, so too does a brief survey of 
Zarathustra reveal the importance of laughter. Cheerfulness arises when a person sees the new 
vistas and new possibilities opening before her. It is a particular disposition towards both self and 
world, marked by a kind of lighthearted care.
308
 Revealingly, Nietzsche would say in the preface 
to the Genealogy, cheerfulness is a reward (P.7).
309
 The significance of laughter on the other 
hand signifies the transformation that allows a person to look at the world in a new way.
310
  
Nietzsche describes cheerfulness and laughter in such a way that they signify an 
orientation that a person comes to possess that is marked by a confident ability to take on all 
things that life throws at her in stride. While they need not always go hand in hand, cheerfulness 
and laughter might be understood as external manifestations of the basic feeling of abundance a 
person possesses. Interestingly, this orientation is not one a person can deliberately adopt, but 
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 For a full treatment of this topic one should consult Kathleen Higgins’ Comic Relief: Nietzsche’s Gay Science, 
Oxford University Press, 2000. See also Lawrence Hatab, “Laughter in Nietzsche’s Thought: A Philosophical 
Tragicomedy” (1988), John Lippitt, “Nietzsche, Zarathustra, and the Status of Laughter” (1992), and Nicholas D. 
More, Nietzsche’s Last Laugh (2014). 
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 In talking about the meaning of “our cheerfulness”, Nietzsche writes “our heart overflows with gratitude, 
amazement, forebodings, expectation”. He continues, noting “a new and barely describable type of light, happiness, 
relief, amusement, encouragement, dawn” in response to the news that “god is dead”. Importantly, Nietzsche 
captures the nature of this cheerfulness with a common image from his writings: “the sea, our sea, lies open again” 
(GS 343). Nietzsche speaks of a combination of gratitude and expectation, which is nonetheless tempered by a kind 
of uncertainty.  
309
 In the preface to GS, Nietzsche discusses the unexpected recovery he experienced, noting the cheerfulness and 
foolishness he is feeling. Yet underneath this cheerfulness lies the impact of his sickness, which informs the new 
cheerfulness he now feels. As I argued in section II, sickness plays a role in health and the great health, such that 
“one returns newborn” (GS P.4). 
310
 See GS 327 where Nietzsche contrasts the gaiety he values against the gloominess and seriousness usually valued 
in treating the types of problems he treats. See Z III.2, “On the Vision and the Riddle”, where the shepherd 
overcomes his nausea, is transformed, and laughs a laugh Zarathustra has never heard before, “a laughter that was no 
human laughter”, which Zarathustra desires to laugh one day. That this laughter is “no human laughter” and the 
shepherd is “no longer human”, which should call to mind Nietzsche’s claim that the great health would “often 
enough appear inhuman” (GS 382). 
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rather one that is part and parcel of who that person is. Accordingly, it is not something that one 
can be taught—though an advisor can point one in the right direction—just as it is not something 
one can be convinced of by argument. Learning to laugh is not something that happens all at 
once, rather it is something a person develops over the course of her experiences. How a person 
develops this orientation depends on being able to distance herself from her experiences, seeing 
them from a new standpoint, seeing the limits, and seeing what is beyond those limits. Being 
able to laugh in the way Nietzsche describes is something learned. 
Returning to cheerfulness and laughter and the kind of attitude it exemplifies, Nietzsche 
locates it between dismissive frivolity which overlooks the importance of things, and a grave 
seriousness. Laughter, as well as the ability to laugh, signifies an assuredness in the person, who 
is thus ready to take on a particular challenge; knowing that she has overflowing abundance, she 
is confident she can accomplish the task at hand. Where an ordinary person would be 
overwhelmed by something tremendous, the person of great health, grounded in overflowing 
abundance and manifest in the almost divine unconcern of laughter, marked by an Olympian 
perspective on things, is able to rise to the occasion of the challenges she undertakes or has 
thrown at her. Importantly, should a person fail in the challenge she has taken up, necessitating 
she appeal to the vast reserve of energy that is the abundance that comes with great health, she is 
able to distance herself from the situation and look upon it with laughter instead of despair.  
Living Experimentally 
Having examined the overflowing abundance that underlies great health, as well as the 
cheerfulness and laughter that marks the orientation of the person of great health, we come to 
living experimentally. Nietzsche frequently emphasized the importance of living 
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experimentally.
311
 We have already seen that having an abundance of restorative energy “grants 
to the free spirit the dangerous privilege of living experimentally" (HH P.4). Interestingly, 
Nietzsche adds that “with this principle in one’s heart one can not only live bravely but also live 
gaily and laugh gaily” (GS 324), showing the connection between living experimentally and 
being able to laugh. As with each of the elements of the great health, they are complementary. 
For Nietzsche experimentation was an enticement to life, but that is not all, for it is also a 
particular way of engaging life. Living experimentally can be understood as a kind of underlying 
principle guiding a person’s actions. Importantly, this must not be understood as arbitrary 
experimentation; rather, living experimentally has a kind of internal order to it, insofar as it 
involves proceeding in the best direction in light of what one has already tried and what one has 
accomplished. 
To talk about proceeding in the best direction might seem to be putting the cart before the 
horse, as living experimentally suggests that a person does not yet know what she ought to do, 
that what is required is attempting and experimenting.
312
 After all, that is part of the rationale for 
undertaking an experiment. However, if we consider that scientific experiments are informed by 
the results of previous research, then this claim is no longer so puzzling. Nietzsche also offers a 
further constraint on the kind of experimenting he values when he talks about living dangerously 
and risk-taking; there is an element of risk in the task undertaken.
313
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 “I find [life] truer, more desirable and mysterious every year—ever since the day the great liberator overcame 
me: the thought that life could be an experiment for the knowledge-seeker” (GS 324). “’Let’s try it!’ But I want to 
hear nothing more about all the things and questions that don’t admit of experiment” (GS 51). Nietzsche would later 
say, “I have already laid particular emphasis on the notions of tempting, attempting, and the joy of experimenting” 
(BGE 210). See also GS 319, and BGE 42. 
312
 Nietzsche also noted several times that, when sick, he instinctively knew what was best for him. While we are 
right to be skeptical of this claim, the idea suggests that there is a sense in which a person has some knowledge of 
the right direction to take. More importantly, the experience of sickness forced Nietzsche into unexplored directions, 
not only giving him further insight into what was good for him, but paving the way for his experimentalism. 
313
 See GS 283 for Nietzsche’s pronouncement to “live dangerously”, which he describes as “the secret for 
harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment”. 
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Not only is the ability to live experimentally a sign of great health, but it can also be 
productive of health. On the one hand, to be able to live experimentally signifies that one is 
abundantly healthy, for one is able to withstand those things that could otherwise undermine and 
exhaust one’s vitality.314 Having restorative powers grounded in abundance is one part of the 
great health. Importantly, if an experiment should go bad, as may happen, these restorative 
powers are able to help put a person back on the right path. On the other hand, living 
experimentally allows a person insight into just what her limits are, thereby helping her develop 
the knowledge required for genuine future experiments.  
What we discover is that genuine experimentation requires that one have a reason for 
undertaking an experiment. Nietzsche advocated various kinds of moral experiments, for 
example, experimenting with the idea that what had hitherto been considered good might in fact 
be bad, and vice versa. There is a clear purpose behind the experiment here, for it may turn out 
that what was considered bad would actually help with the development of human flourishing. In 
contrast, if we imagine someone who just does something for the hell of it, or who just wants to 
try something new, would not be living experimentally according to Nietzsche’s understanding 
of the idea. There is no purpose behind the so-called “experiment”; it is arbitrary and capricious 
if there’s no reason for the experiment.  
The value of living experimentally and its importance with respect to the great health 
should be clear. Each experiment, when guided by this goal, helps a person proceed on the next 
best path, be it moving further towards the goal by undergoing sickness, or being directed onto a 
path that helps a person cultivate a particular virtue they will subsequently need. Thus we can see 
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 Nietzsche writes of "an intellectual preference for the hard, gruesome, malevolent and problematic aspects of 
existence which comes from a feeling of well-being, from overflowing health, from an abundance of existence" 
(ASC 1). 
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why Nietzsche places great value on experimentation, for it is living in a self-directed, purposive 
way.  
Forgetting 
In what may seem a relatively unimportant remark on the nature of health, Nietzsche says 
that "forgetting represents a force, a form of strong health" (GM II.1). But if we keep in mind 
what he says shortly before this remark, that “there could be no happiness, no cheerfulness, no 
hope, no pride, no present without forgetfulness”, this tells us that there is something of great 
importance with respect to the ability to forget. Importantly, Nietzsche says that forgetting 
should be understood as “an upholder of psychic order” (ibid). The claim I want to make is that 
forgetting, in ways that will become clearer in this section, is an important part of great health for 
the “psychic order” it brings a person. That is, forgetting is vital insofar as it is a kind of letting 
go of one’s past, including both what is bad and what is good, even as the past is taken up and 
incorporated as part of who one is. In effect forgetting might be understood as a continuous 
process of psychic archiving.  
Nietzsche’s early essay on history extolled the value of forgetfulness, or living 
unhistorically (UM II.2). In the early essay on history, Nietzsche offers a series of strong remarks 
about the importance of forgetting. He expresses concern that what we do not forget often 
“returns as a ghost” and disturbs the present, bringing conflict and suffering to a person. 
Nietzsche goes so far as to say that “it is altogether impossible to live at all without forgetting”. 
For such reasons Nietzsche connects happiness to “the ability to forget” (UM II.2). 
Nietzsche’s appreciation of the value of forgetting continues in the writings from the 
1880s. Nietzsche contends that forgetting is necessary for a person’s psychological health. In 
Zarathustra we find him stating that “forgetting and passing by are the best wisdom” (Z III.9), a 
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position Nietzsche reiterates in his own voice in Ecce Homo when he describes the “well-turned-
out person” as the type who “lets many things fall by the wayside” (EH I.2).315 This 
characterization might best capture the element that Nietzsche finds to be part and parcel of the 
great health. Nietzsche says that one of the problems of sickness is that a person “do[es] not 
know how to get over anything”, which makes memory “a festering wound” (EH I.6). A means 
of addressing this wound can be found in the cure of forgetting (BGE 269). Thus an important 
part of a person’s overall psychic health is having a mechanism that prevents things from 
burrowing into her psyche and poisoning her psychic health.  
Now, accepting Nietzsche’s claim that forgetting is an important element of a person’s 
psychic order, the next issue that must be considered is how a person cultivates this kind of 
curative forgetting. It is obvious that a person cannot simply will to forget. Rather, as Nietzsche 
describes it, forgetting has become almost second nature. To get a sense of the ideal Nietzsche 
envisions, we can turn to a remark he makes about the noble type in the first essay of the 
Genealogy. What Nietzsche finds valuable is being “able to shake off with a single shrug a 
collection of worms that in others would dig itself in” (GM I.10). The ability to do this can be 
attributed to “an excess of formative, reconstructive, healing power that also makes one forget” 
(GM I.10). Talk about formative and restorative powers should call to mind one of the elements 
of the great health—abundance—that he mentioned in the preface to HH. Nietzsche seems to 
identify this same power with the ability to forget. Of course, that does not indicate how it is that 
a person is able to shrug things off. 
The important question to be asked in response to this claim concerns how a person 
manages to possess such a force [power]. Why, one might ask, are so many poisoned by the sting 
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strength is found in the “excess of formative, reconstructive, healing power that also makes one forget (GM I.10). 
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of resentment, while some are not poisoned by the same sting? The short answer is that the latter 
possess other elements of the great health, including abundance and the elevation that comes 
with laughter, which insulates them from things that are far beneath them, which the former 
simply lack. Overall, the ability to forget seems to be grounded in the overflowing abundance 
this type possesses. Such a person would, in virtue of this abundance, stand beyond the reach of 
something like ressentiment and its poisonous effects. For ressentiment to take root in a person, 
she must be susceptible to feelings of powerlessness and hatred. However, if a person is in 
possession of this abundance, then she will have distanced and insulated herself from such 
feelings. Nietzsche’s reasoning suggests that the poisonous infection of ressentiment will be 
unable to take root, in virtue of the absence of the emotions that are necessary for it taking root in 
a person. 
5.5 Conclusion 
 In the course of investigating abundance, laughter and cheerfulness, living 
experimentally, and forgetting, I have sought to elucidate how these disparate elements function 
as well as the roles they play in constituting great health. Throughout, Nietzsche seems to 
identify the foundation of the great health with what he alternately calls abundance and the 
overflowing. This abundance can also be understood as what unifies and energizes the notions of 
laughter and cheerfulness, living experimentally, and forgetting.  Granting this, it suggests some 
interesting ideas; for example, there is the possibility that a healthy person, albeit without great 
health, might possess some—or all—of the elements of great health, albeit in a way that is not 
unified as it is with the person of great health. This should not surprise us, as the process-view of 
health Nietzsche holds is such that the elements of health and great health are connected and 
influence one another as a person acquires and gives up great health. 
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 At the conclusion of the section on abundance I noted that the question of how a person 
might cultivate this overflowing fullness would be delayed until the other elements of great 
health had been examined. I return to that question now. While abundance grounds laughter, 
living experimentally, and forgetting, at the same time, as a person cultivates these elements of 
her psychic economy, they help to cultivate or “charge” the psychic energy that is Nietzsche’s 
notion of abundance. Abundance affects laughter, living experimentally, and forgetting, and in 
return, so too is abundance affected by these elements in a person. If there is any way in which 
abundance can be built up—and Nietzsche’s writings strongly suggest it can be cultivated—this 
kind of interplay is one way in which it can be done.   
To get a clearer understanding of how this works, consider a person learning to play 
tennis. Initially tentative, she does not regularly go to her backhand, because it is a weak part of 
her game. However, as she is challenged and forced by necessity to develop her backhand, she 
develops this part of her game. But that is not all, for she simultaneously develops confidence in 
her overall game as she successfully uses her backhand. With greater confidence, she is more 
likely to use her backhand, further strengthening this element of her game. Her growing 
confidence allows her to push herself, to accept the challenges before her, and take risks (instead 
of playing it safe), to rise to the challenge, and continuously develop her game. While Nietzsche 
never explicitly explains abundance and the elements of great health affecting one another in this 
manner, this is a reasonable way to imagine how the development would unfold. As a person 
learns to laugh, to live experimentally, and to forget, so too does she cultivate the expansive 
reserve of energy Nietzsche calls abundance.  
*** 
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 At the beginning of this chapter I claimed that the great health goes beyond mere health. 
Part of the way this works is that, where health can be understood as a project which aims at 
eliminating the negative factors in a person’s life, great health works in a different way, by 
building up the positive factors in a person’s life, such that one is able to achieve a higher health. 
Having examined Nietzsche’s understanding of the great health, as well as four key elements of 
the great health, we are in a position to see how it is that the great health goes beyond mere 
health.  
To situate ourselves, we should recall the three main elements of health from the previous 
chapters: good conscience, love of life, and the will to power. Each of these three elements can 
be understood as eliminating a particular kind of negative factor in a person’s life. Laughter and 
cheerfulness, living experimentally, and forgetting can be understood as essential elements in 
achieving a higher health than the health developed through loving life, seeking out resistances 
and challenges, and cultivating a good conscience. That is not to say that these elements of health 
are completely supplanted by the elements of great health. Rather, the idea Nietzsche suggests 
has an undercurrent of Hegelian supersession, i.e., the idea of this higher health includes taking 
up what is overcome and retaining it, but in a transcended form.  In other words, the higher 
health Nietzsche envisions not only builds up the positive elements of laughter, experimentalism, 
and forgetting, but in doing so takes up augmented forms of good conscience, love of life, and 
the will to power. How this works can be seen in the specific elements of great health and how 
they take key features of health, supplement them, and create something higher.  
 Love of life, or life affirmation, is Nietzsche’s response to the problem of life negation 
and the devaluation of life. Love of life is an orientation toward the world and life that a person 
is able to cultivate, which inculcates a new perspective on what is strange, questionable, and 
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terrible in life. No longer overwhelmed by these aspects of life, the person is instead open to life 
and ready to rise to the challenges life throws at her. Laughter also signifies a particular 
orientation towards life that Nietzsche values. There are noticeable differences between the two 
orientations, of course; love of life captures a kind of enchantment with life, just as it expresses 
how a person is energized by life. The orientation signified by laughter is something else 
altogether, capturing an Olympian perspective, in which a person is able to distance herself from 
life. In virtue of that distancing, she is able to laugh at both herself and life.  
These two orientations seem worlds apart, with the former marked by enchantment and 
intimacy, whereas the latter is marked by a kind of distance. Furthermore, it is difficult to see 
how laughter could be higher than love. It would be easy to object that if Nietzsche thinks 
laughter is a higher orientation, then he has erred in his judgment of what constitutes a higher 
health. Against this, one could argue on Nietzsche’s behalf that, while love is undoubtedly a 
higher orientation, it is also more susceptible to distortion. The enchantment that makes love so 
energizing and alluring an orientation can also cause a person to see things in a distorted way in 
virtue of her investedness. Even taking this potential concern into consideration, it would be 
foolish to think that distance is higher than connection. 
Nietzsche wants to retain the intimacy and investment of love. Laughter can be 
understood as superseding love of life when we see what it brings. Laughter adds additional 
context to the investment. If we imagine someone who thinks his beloved is the entire world, on 
the one hand we find this laudable, but there is also a sense in which making such an extreme 
claim is confused and worrisome. However, supplementing the intimacy and investment of love 
with an additional perspective can build on this love. Specifically, having the ability to take a 
distanced look at things, to laugh at one’s errors, one is able to see more clearly. Thus intimacy 
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and investment is not negated, rather, the investment is enhanced by the ability to step back. A 
higher kind of health can be found in the very distancing that is a hallmark of the orientation 
Nietzsche seeks to convey when he talks about laughter. I spoke of how the orientation Nietzsche 
identifies with laughter is marked by a kind of Olympian perspective, and it is this perspective 
which may be said to take love of life and make it into something higher. 
The will to power can be understood as Nietzsche’s response to the problem of 
enervation and the weakening of the will. Recognizing how certain forms of suffering, i.e., 
certain kinds of resistances and challenges, have been essential to the project of self-
enhancement, Nietzsche advocates that people engage resistances. By cultivating the will to take 
on and overcome resistances, a person can strengthen her will. Given the value Nietzsche sees in 
engaging resistances, we would expect that people would need to continue to engage such 
challenges, lest they succumb to the sickness of enervation again. This need might lead one to 
question how great health would supersede this need for resistance. Living experimentally shows 
how a person might engage the world in a different way that nonetheless continues to 
acknowledge the need for resistances, but goes beyond this general need to take on more 
personal challenges. 
Living experimentally, or choosing the best course of action in light of what one has tried 
and done, directs a person to resistances and challenges in a different way. In both cases, whether 
guided by the will to power or living experimentally, a person will be directed towards 
resistances. The difference is the kind of resistance. Where the will to power indicates a general 
need for obstacles and challenges, insofar as this is what is needed for self-enhancement, 
Nietzsche’s conception of living experimentally directs a person to a more specific kind of 
challenge. Illuminated by what a person has done and, more importantly, what she needs to do, 
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living experimentally might be understood as involving more individualized or discriminating 
projects. Experimentalism is more attuned to a person’s values than simply engaging general 
resistances. Guided by what one ought to do next, these more personal challenges are necessary 
for cultivating and maintaining great health. 
However, the more personal nature of living experimentally is not all that sets it beyond 
engaging basic challenges that mark health. Evidence suggests that the kind of experimentalism 
constitutive of great health involves taking on more challenging obstacles. In GS 382 Nietzsche 
alludes to the Argonauts, which can help clarify the way in which living experimentally takes up 
the idea of needing resistances, but goes beyond it. A sea voyage in the ancient world builds the 
level of challenge, as it is a genuinely dangerous undertaking, going over the horizon, sailing into 
the unknown. Not all challenges carry this degree of difficulty; there is something different about 
this quest. Given this new challenge, before undertaking a voyage like the Argonauts, there are 
various preliminary tasks that must be accomplished. People must be healthy enough for such a 
dangerous voyage. The general need for resistances helps to strengthen the will, which gets a 
person to a point where she can undertake the project of living experimentally.  
Nietzsche says that being able to live experimentally is liberating (GS 324), for it opens a 
new perspective on the challenges before her. The kind of perspective unveiled by living 
experimentally can be seductive, tempting her to engage in the kinds of dangerous projects that 
are a part of this higher health. There is a reason Nietzsche describes the ideal of great health as a 
“seductive, dangerous ideal” (GS 382). Now a person sees the open seas that lie before her, 
tempting her to set sail. In effect, she engages more personal resistances and challenges that are 
necessary for great health, which she could not have taken on previously. Thus we see that 
resistances and challenges remain essential, but they now take on a new, more personal 
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dimension as she undertakes a new way of living guided by the idea that life can be an 
experiment. 
Good conscience is Nietzsche’s response to the problem of bad conscience and 
consciousness of guilt. It is marked by a conscious attempt, through philosophical therapy, to rid 
a person of pervasive feelings of guilt and the need for self-punishment. Part of the project of 
philosophical therapy is to get people to avoid interpreting local failures as global failures 
indicative of existential guilt. The ability to forget, a kind of letting go of parts of one’s past, 
works to maintain psychic order, building on good conscience and superseding it. Before seeing 
how this works, a few points of clarification need to be made. First, the ability to forget is not to 
be understood as passive forgetfulness, where a person forgets important things, including 
potential lessons from her past; rather, the kind of forgetting Nietzsche values is an important 
element of the great health which actively helps to maintain a person’s psychic health. Secondly, 
forgetting deals with matters of significance, not with what is trivial or unimportant. There may 
seem to be only minor differences with the kind of psychic order cultivated by good conscience 
and forgetting. While the differences may appear small, there are important ways in which 
forgetting goes beyond having cultivated a good conscience. The ability to forget is indicative of 
a higher health to the degree that letting go of one’s past has become second nature. 
Importantly, the kind of forgetting Nietzsche envisions is such that the past is taken up 
and incorporated as part of who one is. The nature of incorporation can be understood by an 
analogy with learning how to play a musical instrument. When a person first starts learning how 
to play the bass, there are all sorts of things she has to be consciously aware of, but as she gets 
better, much of what she has learned becomes second nature and need not be consciously 
attended to any longer. This knowledge is, of course, not forgotten, but rather it is taken up and 
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incorporated into her ability. As I have described it, the knowledge is archived. Where formerly 
she had to be attentive to the position of her fingers, in time this becomes natural; her fingers 
know exactly where to go without any conscious effort. So too with the kind of psychic order 
Nietzsche envisions with his notion of forgetting: certain things are archived. The things a person 
needs to let go of are forgotten. However, insofar as a person’s past is archived, strictly speaking 
it is not completely forgotten. Over time this process of forgetting becomes second nature, which 
helps insulate a person from certain things she has done. Forgetting is a self-activating process, 
whereas maintaining a good conscience is a more deliberate practice. 
One way to understand forgetting is to highlight an interesting relation with 
experimentalism. Where experimentalism is predicated on knowing the next best path to take in 
light of what one has done, forgetting might be understood in a parallel way. Above I explained 
forgetting as a kind of letting go of one’s past. With this in mind we might understand the kind of 
forgetting Nietzsche is advocating as knowing what to let go of in light of where one is going 
and what one intends to do. Juxtaposing experimentalism and forgetting like this, a tension 
seems to arise between the kind of self-knowledge experimentalism assumes and the kind of 
forgetting necessary for psychic order. However, as I have sought to show, the kind of forgetting 
Nietzsche values is what might awkwardly be called a “knowing forgetting” or psychic 
archiving. Lessons are learned and integrated, but a person is able to let go of things, thereby 
removing the psychic clutter that builds up around a person and inhibits her, which can help to 
inform her of the best thing to do next. 
Taking all of this into account, I have sought to show how the portrait Nietzsche offers of 
the great health can be seen as a significant development beyond health, working to build up the 
positive elements in a person’s life. What makes this a higher health is the fact it incorporates 
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important elements of health—the psychic order of good conscience; the open, affirmative stance 
of loving life; and the need for challenges and resistances—and builds upon them. Laughter and 
cheerfulness, experimentalism, and forgetting, unified and energized by abundance, all take up 
essential features of the elements of health and add to them, producing the great health. 
Animated by abundance, great health is a kind of optimality, where a person is operating at a 
higher level of functioning. 
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